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Abstract 
 
There is a growing concern that adverse events occur frequently in operating theatres. 
Adverse events such as wrong site surgery and surgical site infections have a severe 
detrimental impact on not only the patient but also the healthcare staff and the services. 
Institute of Medicine’s report, ‘To err is human’ highlighted that teamwork failures are a 
leading cause of death and suffering. Yet, in surgery, measuring teamwork and 
designing interventions to improve teamwork and patient safety in operating theatres 
remains an area of research that is largely unexplored. This thesis aims to measure and 
improve teamwork in operating theatres to ensure safer surgery. In this project, the 
WHO surgical safety checklist was evaluated for its impact on patient safety. The WHO 
checklist improved patient safety processes in operating theatres but its impact on 
teamwork, intra-operative problems and theatre efficiency was not clearly understood. 
Therefore, a framework was developed to measure teamwork failures, equipment 
problems and technical failures as surrogate markers of teamwork, patient safety and 
efficiency in operating theatres. Equipment failures emerged as a sensitive measure of 
teamwork in operating theatres. Teamwork failures were also associated with technical 
failures, delay in case progress and patient harm. It emerged that the WHO checklist 
can improve teamwork and theatre efficiency and reduce equipment problems in 
operating theatres when it is used in its true spirit rather than a tick-box exercise.  
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Thesis outline 	  
In the introduction, I discuss the complexity of surgical systems, challenges and threats 
to patient safety. Then I move on to discuss the significance of assessing complex 
systems like surgery not merely on the basis of morbidity and mortality parameters but 
other measures of quality of care. I discuss how adverse events are systems failures 
arising due to lack of teamwork and communication in a complex and high-risk 
environment. Discussing the importance of teamwork in surgery, in chapter 3, I describe 
interventions such as checklists and team briefings to improve teamwork in operating 
theatres. Having discussed the role of teamwork in operating theatres, in chapter 4, I 
present a review of literature on measurement of teamwork in surgery.  
Checklists and briefings have emerged as the key interventions to improve teamwork in 
operating theatres. Recently, the World Health Organisation introduced a surgical 
checklist for operating theatres. This checklist is a combination of checks and briefing 
elements to ensure that certain processes essential to patient’s safety in operating 
theatres are carried out. Imperial Healthcare NHS Trust was chosen as a pilot study site 
of the checklist, which gave us an opportunity to evaluate the impact of WHO checklist 
on teamwork and patient safety. Chapter 6 describes and presents the findings of the 
pilot study designed to evaluate the WHO surgical checklist.  
Compliance to the WHO surgical checklist was found to be variable. In chapter 7, I 
describe a qualitative interview study conducted to understand the benefits, drawbacks 
and user opinions of the WHO surgical checklist. This study was useful in understanding 
how to ensure long-term resilience and compliance of the WHO surgical checklist. 
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Based on the interview study, I modified the surgical checklist to make it more suitable 
to the needs of NHS. 
While the UK evaluation found that patient safety processes improved, the relationship 
between the WHO checklist and clinical outcomes could not be clearly established. 
Therefore surrogate markers of intra-operative outcomes and theatre efficiency had to 
be defined, and a framework for measuring teamwork and other failures in operating 
theatres was developed. This lead to chapter 8, which is a descriptive observation study 
of problems and failures occurring in the operating theatres in order to identify markers 
of teamwork, theatre efficiency and patient safety. This framework was subsequently (in 
chapter 11) used to assess and evaluate the surgical checklist and its importance in 
preventing errors in surgery. 
With the theatre observation study, equipment failures emerged as major problem in the 
operating theatres, which were closely associated with teamwork failures. Therefore, it 
was necessary to further explore equipment failures in operating theatres to understand 
teamwork and other ‘systems factors’ associated with them. Chapter 9 and 10 describe 
two multicentre studies examining the nature of observed and self-reported equipment 
failures and exploring underlying teamwork and ‘systems’ factors. 
The WHO surgical checklist has been made mandatory for NHS by the National Patient 
Safety Agency. However, for the checklist to be beneficial and resilient, it needs to be 
used correctly. Chapter 11 describes a study to assess the usability and variation in the 
quality of checklist use. Using the teamwork framework developed, the impact of the 
checklist on theatre teamwork, equipment failures, and patient safety was assessed. In 
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chapter 12, I summarise the research findings, discuss the limitations and challenges 
faced and conclude by defining the scope for future research. 
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Project Hypotheses 
 
 
Teamwork failures during surgery can lead to equipment problems, surgical delays 
and patient harm.  
A well-designed and implemented checklist intervention can improve teamwork; 
reduce equipment problems and patient harm during surgery.  
 
Specific research questions 
Can teamwork interventions such as checklist improve patient safety and clinical 
outcomes? 
What is the impact of teamwork failures in operating theatres? 
Can teamwork failures be measured using observational methods? 
Can equipment problems be measured using observational methods? 
Are Equipment problems secondary to poor communication and teamwork? 
Do Teamwork failures lead to equipment failures, technical failures and compromise 
patient safety? 
Can teamwork in the operating theatre be improved with the use of the checklist? 
Does the effectiveness with which the checklist is used have an impact on safety and 
teamwork in operating theatres? 
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Project aims 
 
The aims of this research project are:  
• To discuss the role of teamwork in surgery and its impact on patient safety. 
• To discuss various interventions to improve teamwork in surgery drawing onto the 
role of checklists and briefing interventions in improving teamwork. 
• To evaluate the impact of WHO surgical checklist on clinical processes, clinical 
outcomes and theatre efficiency. 
• To study associations between teamwork failures, technical failures and 
equipment failures and their impact on patient safety. 
• To develop a feasible and reliable framework for measuring teamwork and 
markers of intra-operative care and efficiency. 
• To evaluate the usability of WHO checklist and variation in the quality of checklist 
use and its impact on failures and teamwork in operating theatres. 
 
 
 
 
 
 20	  
 
Chapter 1 
Surgery- a complex system 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
Surgery is an integral and indispensable part of healthcare. In UK, one in eight of us will 
undergo surgery at some stage in life (Weiser, Regenbogen et al. 2008). Surgery today 
is a viable and preferred choice of treatment for cancer, trauma and other diseases. 
Surgery is a desirable and well-established profession for young budding doctors and 
nurses who choose it as a life long career. The fascination of surgery may be due to the 
‘hands on’ approach to deal with disease, or injury, or the sophisticated technology 
involved but the ultimate objective of every surgeon, nurse or anaesthetist is to treat his 
or her patient satisfactorily and safely. This chapter provides an overview of the history 
of surgery from the dark ages to the current era and discuss the challenges faced then 
and now. It also talks about the complexities of the surgical systems and how teamwork 
plays a role in effective functioning of this unique system.  
 
1.2 The evolution of Surgery. 
Today, millions of surgical procedures are performed each year globally, but there was a 
time when surgery was performed only as a last resort in moribund patients and was 
associated with high morbidity and mortality. In this section, I give a brief history of 
surgery describing how surgery evolved through time and cultures.  
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The first evidence of a surgical procedure goes back to the Neanderthal ages. Skull 
remains from Neanderthal era have been discovered which depict “trepanation”, the 
oldest known surgical procedure (Restak 2000) where, a window is made into the skull 
to treat intracranial diseases. It was used to treat extra-dural hematomas resulting from 
trauma. 
An Indian scholar and physician called Sushrutha in 600 BC wrote the oldest known text 
of surgery. His knowledge of surgery is contained in his text known as ‘Sushrutha 
Samhita’. It very elaborately describes diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of various 
ailments as well as various surgical procedures including cosmetic surgery like 
rhinoplasty; as in ancient India, avulsion of nose was a common mode of punishment 
(Rana 2002). 
In the medieval world, until the Renaissance, the practice of surgery was mainly 
restricted to the Middle East. By the 13th century, the need to have a structured training 
for physicians became more evident in Europe. Montpellier, Padua and Bologna 
Universities emphasised the academic side of Surgery, and by the fifteenth century, 
Surgery was a separate university subject. Rogerius Salernitanus composed Chirurgia, 
which laid the foundation for modern surgery. By this time, the role of barbers as 
surgeons was a well-established tradition in Britain. With Physicians coming out of the 
universities eager to practice surgery, an area of conflict emerged between the company 
of barbers and fellowship of surgeons.  In 1540, Henry VIII in order to resolve the conflict 
merged the two to form the Company of Barber-surgeons. But they always maintained 
an uneasy relationship. The 18th century, however, saw the rise of private anatomy 
schools and the development of an academic basis for surgical practice through the 
teaching and publications of the leading European surgeons. Thus, in 1745, the 
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surgeons broke away to form a separate Company. In 1800, the Company of Surgeons 
was granted a Royal Charter to become The Royal College of Surgeons of London, later 
of England (Royal_college_of_surgeons). Hence, we see that surgery slowly evolved 
from a seldom-practiced unregulated cult to a specialized branch of medicine under the 
control of a royal college. Now, surgical training is a well structured, eight year 
programme after medical school which is guided by a curriculum, evaluated through 
periodic appraisals and royal college examinations, and regulated by various agencies 
such as the General Medical Council, National Patient Safety Agency and the Royal 
College of Surgeons to ensure minimum standards of care.  
 
1.3 Early challenges to surgery. 
Patient harm due to surgery has always been the most important concern to a surgeon. 
Until the 19th century, pain was possibly the biggest deterrent to surgery and therefore 
its use was restricted to life threatening conditions. In late 19th century, ether was first 
used as an anaesthetic, which marked the beginning of painless surgery (Aldrete, 
Marron et al. 1984). Infection still remained the biggest killer after surgery. Joseph Lister 
a surgeon from Glasgow described the use of carbolic acid to disinfect instruments, 
surgical incisions and dressings (Lister 1867). With discovery and mass production of 
penicillin during 2nd world war, infection related mortality in surgery started declining. In 
1969 Polk, established the role of prophylactic antibiotics in preventing surgical site 
infection (Polk and Lopez-Mayor 1969). Today there are well-established guidelines for 
antibiotic prophylaxis. 
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In the 20th century the advancement in surgical technology has been tremendous. 
Lesser blood loss, smaller incision and quicker recovery have been the prime driving 
forces in turn making surgery possible for extremes of ages and co -morbidities. Open 
surgery is rapidly being replaced by endoscopic surgery. Robotic surgery entered the 
arena in the last decade, which is promising to take surgery to the next level of 
technological sophistication (Ahmed, Khan et al. 2009). 
 
1.4 Changing challenges in surgery. 
With the two greatest challenges to surgery overcome and development of minimally 
invasive techniques, the acceptance of surgery among masses has increased 
manifolds. More than 200 million surgeries are performed globally each year (Weiser, 
Regenbogen et al. 2008) with more than 8 million surgeries performed in UK alone 
(Vats, Vincent et al.).  
The increasing appeal of surgical procedures has put considerable pressure on surgical 
services, which are constantly trying to reduce the waiting period before a patient has 
surgery. At the same time, we are also providing treatment for patients with increasingly 
complex co-morbidities in the extremes of ages involving sophisticated technology. This 
technology is complex and vulnerable to failures that can be potentially harmful in 
unfamiliar hands.  Surgery today has become a complex system of care, which depends 
on individuals with special skills to work together in cohesion to drive it. Such a system 
demands a greater degree of inter-professional teamwork and communication and can 
easily lead to error and patient harm. While the techniques and technology have been 
advancing tremendously through research, the importance of ensuring safety and 
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teamwork in such a system has been largely overlooked. Thus, arises the present 
challenge of preventing inadvertent harm to patients as a result of changing needs of a 
complex system.  
 
1.5 Complex nature of surgery. 
Surgery has moved from the barbershops of the past to the high- tech operating 
theatres of today. Up to two-thirds of the adverse events in hospitalized patients are 
related to surgery (Leape, Brennan et al. 1991). Evidence suggests that patient harm in 
surgery is largely due to the factors that interplay within a complex system (Vincent 
2004). This section describes the complexities that such a system involves. It is 
important to describe these complexities as in the present healthcare they pose a great 
challenge to patient safety. These challenges arise due to demanding teamwork and co-
ordination that is required to work effectively. 
 
1.5.1 Surgical care pathway. 
One would like to think that the surgical care pathway is a simple process where the 
patient comes to see the surgeon, they decide upon the surgery and surgery takes 
place. Figure 1 shows that the pathway is quite complex and it involves interaction, and 
decision making at various levels. Moreover, parallel to the main pathway, there are 
further more interactions and pathways that operate to facilitate surgery, these include 
administrative tasks to organise theatre lists and ensuring that all resources needed 
before surgery are available and patient work up is complete (Figure 2). For example, in 
order to undertake surgery, the patient needs to be fit to undergo surgery, for which he/ 
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she is arranged to come to separate pre-operative assessment clinic. On assessment, if 
required, investigations are sent off and specialty referrals made to manage associated 
medical problems such as cardiac failure or renal impairment. The case files for the 
patients are requested through a separate complex channel of communications to make 
them available in time for clinic appointments and ward admission. The surgical 
appointments are organised through a separate management tree critical to continuity of 
care and follow up of the patient. Equipment required for the surgical procedure is 
organised by the theatre staff and managers. The equipment may be requested from 
sterilisation services or arranged from other hospitals or companies. The care of the 
patient before and after the surgery is handed over from one ward nursing team to the 
other through the recovery team. Therefore, it is clear that the process requires good 
coordination and clear communication between the surgeons, anaesthetists, nurses and 
managerial and administrative staff to provide safe, efficient and timely patient care. 
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Figure 1.1 Surgical care pathway. 
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Figure 1.2 Complexity of surgical pathway. 
 
 
1.5.2 The patient.  
The patient is the prime focus of this complex system. Every patient is unique with his 
own individual needs. A simple procedure such as an inguinal hernia repair may pose a 
small threat to a healthy young patient as compared to an elderly patient with a valvular 
heart disease who is on anticoagulants for a metal heart valve. Both patients require 
different level of planning and organisation for the same procedure. With the increasing 
life expectancy, patients with severe medical conditions are undergoing surgery. It 
requires a high level of inter-specialty communication and co-ordination to manage 
these medical conditions in preparation for surgery.  
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When patients are admitted to hospital for elective procedures, there is sufficient time to 
plan and prepare for surgery but emergency surgical admissions pose a bigger 
challenge to surgical planning as well as decision-making. These patients are often very 
sick and need greater collaboration and communication between the surgeons, 
anaesthetists and theatre staff for safe, appropriate and timely management.   
Therefore, patient variables can make even simple surgical procedures complex and 
require greater teamwork and communication to ensure patient care and safety. 
 
1.5.3 Operating theatres. 
Operating theatres are highly specialised units that are labour as well as technology 
intensive. An operating theatre suite consists of a set of atriums, which are built to 
specifications to ensure good lighting, good clean airflow and ergonomic movements. An 
ideal operating theatre should have the following characteristics (Harsoor 2007):  
1. Location- it should be located in a low-rise building with adequate natural light and 
away from the regular traffic of patients and flow of air from the wards. 
2. It should be designed ergonomically to minimize criss-cross movement of machines 
and staff members. 
3. It should have dedicated electric lifts. 
4. It should have a regular supply of gases and water. 
5. It should have adequate illumination.  
6. it should be fire safe with fire exits. 
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An NHS operating theatre comprises of: 
a) A room where the operation takes place. This room contains the operating table, 
operating lights, oxygen, air and vacuum supplies, machines such as the suction 
apparatus, screens and stacks for laparoscopic procedures, anaesthesia 
machine and medical waste disposal systems. All these systems require 
maintenance, which is provided by different departments from within or outside 
the hospital. To make sure that for every procedure, these resources are 
available and functioning requires prior planning and coordination. 
b) A preparation room where the nurses organise the equipments needed for the 
procedures. This is an area where the nurses would store the surgical 
instruments for surgery. Different procedures require different equipments. To 
ensure that the required equipments are sterilized and available involves 
communication between the surgeons and nurses who can then arrange 
equipments from various companies and hospital sterilization units. An induction 
room where the anaesthetist administers anaesthetic agents under monitoring. It 
contains the anaesthesia machine, monitoring apparatus, intubation trolley and 
the drugs cabinet.  
c)  ensure sterility.  
In the operating theatres, various problems can arise that could have an impact on 
patient care. Operating theatres are resource intensive environments where a variety of 
surgical instruments, electronic equipments and other resources are required to perform 
surgical procedures. Often, one or more of these resources may be missing or 
unavailable leading to chaos and tensions (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Operating 
theatres depend heavily on the use of complex, technology intensive equipment. It is 
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imperative that such equipment requires high maintenance and technical knowledge to 
perform effective and safe surgery. Also different manufacturers and suppliers may 
provide various resources. Instruments might be sent out to outside agencies for 
sterilization. These functional arrangements require complex communication and 
coordination between the surgeons, theatre nurses and the external agencies to ensure 
that the right equipments and resources are available in time for the surgical 
procedures. All these variables pose significant challenges to theatre teams; therefore 
good teamwork is essential to working in the operating theatres.  
 
1.5.4 Surgical teams. 
The surgical team is a group of individuals who work together to perform a surgical 
procedure and share a common goal, which is to ensure correct surgery on the right 
patient safely. The surgical team comprises of:  
a) Surgeon- who is responsible for performing the procedure. He should have seen the 
patient on a number of occasions prior to performing the procedure, taken an informed 
consent and marked the surgical site after reviewing the patient and answering patient’s 
queries on the day of the surgery. He should be competent in performing the procedure 
and is also responsible for overall care of the patient before and after the procedure. 
b) Surgical assistant- is usually a surgical trainee who is responsible for peri-operative 
care of the patient and making sure that all the investigation results needed prior to 
surgery are available.  
c) Anaesthetist- who is responsible for providing anaesthetic support for the procedure, 
monitoring patient’s medical well-being during the procedure, giving prophylactic 
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antibiotics etc. He also has a role within and outside the operating theatre, which is 
crucial to the safety of the patient.  
d) Operating Department Practitioner- provides assistance to the anaesthetist. He/ she 
is the first person receiving the patient in the operating theatre and along with the 
anaesthetist, also responsible for checking the anaesthetic machines and drugs.  
f) Scrub nurse- is responsible for assisting the surgeons during the procedures by 
providing the instruments needed to perform the operation. For a surgeon to be able to 
perform surgery safely and accurately, it is important that the scrub nurse understands 
the procedure; the equipment needs and has the situational awareness to anticipate the 
next step of the procedure and be ready with the equipment needed for the next surgical 
step. 
g) Circulating nurse- along with the scrub nurse, organises the equipment for the 
surgery. Prior to the procedure the nurses confirm the patient identity and procedure. 
During the procedure, circulating nurse is the eyes and hands of the scrub nurse to the 
outside world. The circulating nurse should have the spatial orientation of the theatre 
and know the location and functioning of the equipment needed. She needs to 
communicate efficiently with the scrub nurse to facilitate the surgery.  Circulating nurse 
and scrub nurse also conduct the swabs, instruments and needle counts during and 
after the procedure to prevent retained foreign bodies. Different individuals are 
responsible for various tasks crucial to a surgical procedure and it requires good 
communication and teamwork to co-ordinate these tasks effectively. For example, lack 
of communication between surgeon and scrub nurse can lead to situations where right 
equipment may not be available for the surgery. Lack of co-ordination between surgeon 
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and surgical assistant can make the surgery more difficult and even lead to iatrogenic 
injuries.  
In UK, recent changes to the healthcare structure have introduced new challenges to the 
way surgical teams work. European working time directive is one such challenge. From 
August 2009, all NHS hospitals have to ensure that doctors are working on an average, 
48 hours a week as compared to previous 56 hours a week. This directive has been 
introduced to ensure that doctors providing care to the patients are not tired and 
overworked. However, it poses a new challenge of ensuring continuity of care in service 
provision. It means that the patients will be looked after by a number of different doctors 
working on a shift system. In such a system, in order to ensure continuity of care, the 
role of good communication and an effective handover cannot be over emphasized. 
These challenges further highlight the need for good teamwork between the surgical 
teams to ensure patient safety. 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion. 
Surgery has been transformed into a complex system that relies heavily not only on the 
competency of the surgeons and anaesthetists but also the nurses who provide 
assistance and support in the ward, clinics and theatres; the technology needed to 
perform the surgery, the staff who ensure that the technology is available and 
functioning and the administrative staff who communicate between different specialties 
and the patients to ensure that dates are booked, investigations are arranged and letters 
are sent. Good teamwork is essential for such a system to function effectively. Often, the 
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roles and tasks of different team members are not clearly defined and this ambiguity 
may lead to certain safety checks or tasks being missed due to blurred responsibility 
(Kwaan, Studdert et al. 2006; Tan, Naik et al. 2006). In event of errors occurring, patient 
safety may be compromised which could lead to prolonged hospital stay, increased 
morbidity or even death. In the next chapter I consider the nature of risks to patients 
undergoing surgery. 
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Chapter 2 
Quality and Safety in Surgical care 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
Surgical technology has made it possible to treat complex pathologies with minimal 
blood loss and shorter length of hospital stay associated with surgery. An increasing 
number of people are undergoing surgery. A growing percentage of these patients are in 
the extremes of ages or have significant co-morbidities. For instance, between 1987 and 
1990 there has been a 67% increase in the use of coronary artery bypass surgery on 
patients aged over 80 years (Peterson, Cowper et al. 1995). Similarly an increasing 
number of cancer patients are undergoing curative and palliative surgery due to 
improved prognosis following cancer surgeries, better patient selection and staging and 
improved peri-operative care. Table1 below illustrates the trends of improvement in one 
and five-year survival rates for patients diagnosed with cancer in 2000-2001 as 
compared to year 1971-1975.  It shows that the one-year and five-year survival rates for 
gastrointestinal cancers (Oesophageal, stomach, colon and rectal cancer) have almost 
doubled in 25 years. This is due to early screening and diagnosis, multidisciplinary 
approach to cancer treatment, effective chemo and radiotherapy, and also the 
advancement in surgical techniques and introduction of laparoscopic surgery to stage 
and treat these cancers thereby reducing the surgery associated morbidity and mortality.  
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Table 2.1 Relative age standardised cancer survival rates for England and Wales 
(CRUK). 
One-year survival rate (%) Five-year survival rate (%) 
Cancer Type Sex 
1971- 1975 2000- 2001 1971- 1975 2000- 2001 
M 12 30 3 8 
Oesophagus 
F 16 27 5 8 
M 13 37 4 15 
Stomach 
F 15 40 5 18 
M 39 74 22 52 
Colon 
F 40 73 23 53 
M 50 76 25 50 
Rectum 
F 51 75 27 52 
Breast F 82 96 52 81 
Prostate M 65 91 31 71 
 
The incidence of infection following surgery has also been gradually declining. Table 2 
below shows the incidence of surgical site infection after orthopaedic procedures in UK. 
Which shows that with the use of prophylactic antibiotics and better surgical planning, 
the risk of infection following surgery has been reduced significantly.  
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Table 2.2 Rate of surgical site infection in UK (1996- 2007) (Jen, Holmes et al. 
2008). 
Surgical site infection (all ages in orthopaedic surgery) Year 
Cases Rate (per 1000 bed days) 
1996/7 2219 14.7 
1997/8 2242 15.4 
1998/9 2601 15.8 
1999/0 2687 15.9 
2000/1 2698 15.8 
2001/2 2752 15.9 
2002/3 2993 15.9 
2003/4 2873 14.1 
2004/5 2796 13.1 
2005/6 2554 11.3 
2006/7 2398 10.2 
 
Wider varieties of surgeries are being carried out by minimally invasive techniques using 
laparoscopic and robotic technology. This has resulted in a reduction in blood loss and 
shortened hospitals stays (Nagpal, Ahmed et al.). Increasing use of advanced 
analgesics that can be controlled by the patients themselves also contribute to a 
reduction in post-operative morbidity such as pneumonia and thrombo-embolism. 
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Further, many procedures that were previously performed by open technique involving a 
large skin incision, are now increasingly being performed using laparoscopic technique 
which reduces the post operative pain and enhance recovery. 
 
2.2 Measuring performance and effectiveness in surgery. 
With the growing number of surgeries being performed by healthcare providers, it is 
important to ensure patient safety and effectiveness in surgical service provision.  
2.2.1 Outcome measures. 
Morbidity and mortality are the outcome measures that have been traditionally used to 
measure the effectiveness of surgical care and patient safety. They are useful when 
outcomes themselves are of interest and reflect all facets of surgical care collectively, 
including differences in technology and patient variables (Faiz, Haji et al.). They can also 
be used to identify areas of need and resource utilisation at a national or regional level.  
They are also less useful for assessing quality of care at a more specific level such as a 
particular department or a surgeon as they may not detect the various factors applicable 
locally such as the severity of existing morbidity among patients treated in that 
department etc. Risk adjustments have been used to take into account such factors 
however a systematic review conducted by Pitches et. al (Pitches, Mohammed et al. 
2007) found that the view that hospitals with high risk adjusted mortality provide poorer 
care is inconsistent. Therefore, risk adjustment although helpful in reducing the bias due 
to patient factors, can be misleading. Statistical risk adjustment of outcomes cannot 
resolve its poor correlation to performance (Pitches, Mohammed et al. 2007). Risk 
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adjustment may not allow for case mix variables, as they may be unknown and in some 
cases, it may even introduce a bias.  
Clinical outcomes may be influenced by factors other than quality of care therefore, 
although they could serve as alert systems to trigger an investigation into the system 
(Jarman, Aylin et al.), they should not be used as a yardstick to reward or punish a 
hospital or clinician. Moreover this system only compares the performance and does not 
highlight the areas of improvement (Lilford, Brown et al. 2007). 
Outcome measures are of little use when the system is analysed to obtain information 
on system changes to improve quality of care (Lilford and Pronovost). These measures 
can identify the area of need but do not give any information about the underlying 
causes. In addition, the sample size required to show the effectiveness of an 
intervention against an adverse outcome that has a very low incidence may be large and 
not feasible at a single centre. Therefore in certain instances, process measures may be 
more useful in understanding surgical performance and efficiency. 
2.2.2 Process measures. 
Experts believe that processes may be better measure of quality of patient care 
provision at root level (Lilford, Brown et al. 2007) as compared to outcome measures 
such as risk-adjusted mortality. Patient safety processes are established and evidence 
based practices that should be ensured before any surgical procedure. For example, 
timely administration of antibiotic prophylaxis has been shown to reduce surgical site 
infections therefore, adherence to antibiotic prophylaxis guidelines before a surgical 
procedure can be used as a process measure. The benefit of using process measures is 
that it reduces the case mix bias as it uses the chances of an error occurring as the 
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denominator rather than the number of patients treated. It reduces the confounding bias 
that arises when a surgeon or hospital is caring for more unwell patients (Lilford, Brown 
et al. 2007).  
In surgery, patient safety processes are performed by various individuals as explained in 
the previous chapter, and in order to ensure that processes are adhered to, inter-
professional teamwork is important. Studies show that these processes are poorly 
performed in the absence of good teamwork among the care providers (Gawande, 
Zinner et al. 2003; Kwaan, Studdert et al. 2006). For example, use of prophylactic 
antibiotics is an important process to prevent surgical site infection. However, antibiotic 
prophylaxis may be missed due to poor communication between surgeons and 
anaesthetists (Tan, Naik et al. 2006; Haynes, Weiser et al. 2009). Similarly, ensuring 
arrangement of blood before a major surgery is a process critical to patient safety, yet in 
the absence of good teamwork among surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists, it may be 
overlooked. This can put patients’ life at risk and lead to crisis during the surgery. 
Setting up of the suction machine, electric diathermy machine and body warmer at the 
start of surgery are processes that may be omitted or partly performed if the co-
ordination between team members is poor. Therefore, it is obvious that if we want to 
improve the provision of processes we have to improve teamwork in surgery. Whereas it 
is easier to measure patient safety processes, the underlying teamwork problems are 
not apparent to the untrained investigator. The insight into underlying teamwork errors is 
necessary to understand the cause of poor processes and thereby improve them.  
In the absence of good teamwork, processes and tasks crucial to high quality surgical 
care are forgotten or under performed (Undre, Sevdalis et al. 2006) which may lead to 
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adverse events (Sutcliffe, Lewton et al. 2004). The next section discusses the causation 
of adverse events and underlying factors.  
While the outcome measures such as morbidity and mortality may be attributable to the 
unpreventable patient factors, process measures can help in understanding poorer 
outcomes as a result of factors that can be prevented. These ‘adverse events’ where the 
patients come to harm that could be prevented by effective and safe health care 
systems will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
2.3 Adverse events in Healthcare. 
Adverse events can be defined as errors in healthcare that lead to unintended injury to 
the patient which may result in temporary or permanent disability and is not caused by 
disease process (Vincent 2001). Adverse events in healthcare have been a growing 
concern for the health authorities, clinicians as well as the general public. Adverse 
events can not only result in patient harm but also reduce staff morale. They also lead to 
litigation and law suites, which has greater financial and social implications on 
healthcare (Leape, Brennan et al. 1991). In this section, I will describe the extent and 
implications of adverse events, their causes and how the system plays a vital role in 
causing as well as preventing these errors.  
Studies show that nearly 10% of patients admitted to acute care hospitals suffer adverse 
events (Table 3) (Vincent, Neale et al. 2001). In 2000, United States Institute of 
Medicine reported that there are up to 98000 deaths each year due to medical errors 
(Kohn, Corrigan et al. 1999). A retrospective record review of 1014 medical records by 
Vincent et al. in a UK Hospital showed an adverse event rate of 10.2% of which at least 
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half were preventable and almost a third led to moderate or greater disability or even 
death (Vincent, Neale et al. 2001). They also showed that these events prolonged 
hospital stay by 8.5 days, which not only means extra costs and staff time but potential 
loss of valuable space and time that could have been used to care for other patients. 
Table 2.3 Adverse events in acute hospitals in five countries (Leape, Brennan et 
al. 1991; Ludbrook, Webb et al. 1993; Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995; Thomas, 
Studdert et al. 2000; Vincent, Neale et al. 2001; Davis, Lay-Yee et al. 2003)(Adapted 
from Vincent et al) 
Study Number of acute 
care hospitals 
Date of 
admissions 
Number of hospital 
admissions 
Adverse event rate 
(% admissions) 
Harvard Medical Practice 
Study (HMPS) 
51 1984 30195 3.7 
Utah-Colorado Study 
(UTCOS) 
28 1992 14052 2.9 
Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study (QAHCS) 
28 1992 14179 16.6 
United Kingdom 2 1999 1014 10.8 
Denmark 17 1998 1097 9.0 
New Zealand 13 1998 6579 11.2 
France ** 7 2002 778 14.5 
Canada 20 2000 3745 7.5 
*The California study assessed `potentially compensable events’; ** Figures from 
France are from the pilot study not the full study 
2.4 Adverse events in surgery. 
40-60% of all adverse events in healthcare are related to surgery (Brennan, Leape et al. 
1991). In fact, they are more likely to occur in surgical care than in non-surgical 
specialties. Analysis of these adverse events reveal that nearly half of these are 
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preventable (Gawande, Thomas et al. 1999). The risk of preventable adverse events 
increases with the age of the patient, so they are more likely in elderly patients 
(Gawande, Thomas et al. 1999). To understand the patient safety risks involved in high 
turnover surgery, many studies have been conducted in past years. Considering that 
over 8 million surgeries are performed each year in the UK alone, it would suggest that a 
large number of patients come to preventable harm from surgery. According to a recent 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) alert (National_Patient_Safety_Agency(UK) 
2009), major complications are reported to occur in 3–16% of inpatient surgical 
procedures, with permanent disability or death rates of approximately 0.4–0.8%. In 
England and Wales, 129,419 incidents relating to surgical specialties were reported to 
the NPSA’s Reporting and Learning System in 2007 of which 1,105 lead to severe harm 
to the patient and 271 lead to death.  
 
2.5 Operating theatres and adverse events. 
Operating theatres are complex environments. This environment is prone to errors, 
which can lead to adverse events. Two-third of all surgical adverse events occur in the 
operating theatres (Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003). The factors responsible for errors 
could be task complexity, communication lapses, blurred inter-professional 
responsibilities or poor teamwork. Studies have shown that errors in teamwork can lead 
to adverse events in the operating theatre (Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003).The care of the 
patient is transferred from ward staff to theatre nurse who may not have seen the patient 
before. Similarly, after surgery the care is transferred from the theatre staff to the 
recovery who in turn hand over the patient care to the ward staff. These transitions in 
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care can be complex and require clear and precise communication. However, during 
handovers, critical information may often be missed and tasks omitted (Nagpal 2010). 
Therefore, it is clear that operating theatres are high-risk environments for the patient 
not only due to the technology involved and due to dependency on cohesive teamwork, 
but also due to the transfer of care and responsibility from one team to the other. Below I 
discuss some of the important types of errors associated with patient harm in the 
operating theatres. 
2.5.1 Wrong site procedures. 
Wrong site, wrong procedure, and wrong person events can be catastrophic to patients, 
healthcare professionals, and institutions (Makary, Sexton et al. 2006). Wrong site 
surgery is considered to be a ‘never’ event (Michaels, Makary et al. 2007) which should 
never happen. Wrong-site procedures often occur because of the simple omission of 
pre-operative safety-checks (Kwaan, Studdert et al. 2006). As it is a rare occurrence, its 
incidence is difficult to estimate but it is believed that in the US there maybe around 
2500 cases per year, of the 75 million surgical procedures performed (Kwaan, Studdert 
et al. 2006). In 2007, NPSA reported 16 cases of wrong site surgery, which led to one 
case of severe disability and one death. However, these figures are obviously an under-
estimate as they reflect a reporting bias. Near misses are far more common and may 
not be reported. Kwaan et. al showed that communication errors are the single most 
common cause of wrong site surgery followed by deviation from protocols and 
procedures (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Root causes of wrong site surgery (Kwaan et.al 2006). 
	  	  
2.5.2 Retained foreign body. 
Ensuring that swabs, instrument and needle counts are correct at the end of a 
procedure is crucial to safe surgery. It can be a cause of increased patient morbidity or 
death and also damage the confidence and morale of the healthcare staff. The 
incidence of retained foreign body in surgery is 1 in 5000 cases (Gawande, Studdert et 
al. 2003). The risk factors for retained foreign body are emergency surgery, unexpected 
change in plan of surgery and high body-mass index of the patient (Gawande, Studdert 
et al. 2003), which clearly indicate that the occurrence of these adverse events are more 
likely in non-routine circumstances. Swabs are the most commonly retained foreign 
bodies. Considered to be another ‘never’ event, that attracts considerable media 
attention and censure of the surgical community, it is associated with 2% risk of mortality 
and a re-operation rate of 69% (Gawande, Studdert et al. 2003).  
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2.5.3 Surgical site infections. 
Another preventable adverse event is surgical site infection. Incidence of surgical site 
infection (SSI) is 3.4% with a case fatality of 5.8% (Astagneau, Rioux et al. 2001).  While 
hospital guidelines make recommendations on the class and dose of prophylactic 
antibiotics that should be administered, it is often neglected. To be most effective, they 
have to be administered with in 60 minutes prior to skin incision. There are studies, 
which show that the compliance with this aspect is as low as 50% (Bratzler, Houck et al. 
2005).  
2.5.4 Venous thromboembolism. 
Deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism constitute 9% of adverse events but 
19% of negligent events where the cause of error was non- adherence to protocols due 
to negligence (Gawande, Thomas et al. 1999). Although guidelines for DVT prophylaxis 
are established, the adherence to these guidelines can be as low as 30% (Thomas, 
Studdert et al. 2000). One of the causes for the non-compliance can be explained by the 
blurred inter-professional communication and blurred roles and responsibilities in the 
operating theatres (Tan, Naik et al. 2006). 
 
2.5.5 Equipment problems. 
Equipment problems are common in operating theatres, which not only cause theatre 
disruption but also inter-professional confrontation and even patient harm. Missing and 
malfunctioning equipment required for a surgical procedure are common occurrences in 
most operating theatres. Christian et al, in their observation of 10 surgical procedures 
found that there were close to 15 resources added per procedure after the 
 46	  
commencement of an operation (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Equipment problems 
are more like cause a disruption of workflow, delay case progression and lead to 
deterioration in the dynamics between team members rather than compromise patient 
safety. However, in a survey of theatre team members, respondents believed that nearly 
10% of errors in the operating theatre were related to equipment problems (Flin, Yule et 
al. 2006). The American College of Surgeons’ Closed Claims study revealed that in 5% 
of claims, the errors were equipment related (Griffen, Stephens et al. 2007). In addition 
to case progression, equipment related issues should cause some concern as surgeons 
often adjust their technique to adapt the procedure in order to ‘workaround’ equipment 
problems (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Though this has not been studied in great 
detail, there is a potential that such an adaptation can result in technical errors. A 
majority of these equipment problems may be preventable if the surgeons and theatre 
staff communicate effectively prior to surgery as this will not only help organise 
equipment well in time but also help in developing a common shared mental model 
among the team members. 
In this section I have discussed various types of adverse events. However, in order to 
understand these events we need a systematic approach, analyse them and assess 
their causative factors. The next section will discuss the approach to understand these 
adverse events.  
 
2.6 Systems approach to the understanding adverse events. 
The understanding of patient harm and adverse events has been discussed and 
researched time and again. With the passage of time, our understanding of adverse 
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outcomes has evolved. There was a time, when they were thought to be mainly due to 
patient factors. Patient risk factors such as obesity, smoking, advanced age and 
coexisting morbidities are associated with poorer outcomes. At the same time technical 
skills of the surgeons, especially in technically demanding complex surgeries have also 
been related to postoperative outcomes. While patient factors and surgical skills are 
critical determinants of adverse surgical outcomes, a wide range of other factors also 
determine safety and performance. These factors include work environment such as the 
technology and user interface, working hours, protocols or the lack of them, team 
structure, leadership and hierarchy or individual factors such as stress and decision-
making. Other high-risk industries such as oil industry; defence and aviation have been 
focusing on these systems related factors of safety and performance for a number of 
years in order to make their organisations safer. Of late, these factors are increasingly 
being explored and researched in healthcare (Sexton, Thomas et al. 2000; Lingard, 
Espin et al. 2004; Sutcliffe, Lewton et al. 2004; Catchpole, Giddings et al. 2006; Makary, 
Sexton et al. 2006). In other high-risk organisations, working conditions that provoke 
staff to workaround and improvise have been found to be unsafe and have led to some 
major incidents (Aviation Safety Network). In order to reduce workarounds, High-risk 
organisations have implemented Safety Management Systems whereby emphasis is 
placed on learning from critical incidents and on the implementation of actions to reduce 
the recurrence of those incidents. In cases where incidents and near misses occur 
frequently, the processes implemented through a Safety management System can be 
relied upon to produce continuous improvement and achieve reduction in associated 
risks (Reason 1997).  
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In the systems approach to healthcare, the organisation is moving away from a name 
and blame culture to a more positive and constructive culture of designing a system that 
teases out errors and ensures processes that are important for safety and quality in 
healthcare (Studdert and Brennan 2001; Vincent 2004). It involves systematically 
identifying and reporting adverse events and incidents, analysing these events, 
introducing changes, and putting in place safety systems or interventions that would 
prevent these events from occurring again.  
 
2.7 Clinical incident- learning lessons. 
A clinical incident can be any unintended or unexpected incident, which could have or 
did lead to harm or adverse event to one or more patients receiving NHS 
care. Therefore, it is obvious that Incident reporting lies at the centre of the systems 
approach to understanding adverse events. In order to identify adverse events, there 
should be a robust and reliable reporting system that can highlight safety issues. In UK, 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has launched a National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS). Similar systems also exist in USA and Australia. Over the 
past 5 years, over three million clinical incidents have been reported on the NRLS. 
These incidents are used to identify areas of patient safety risks. Such a system is 
important as these incidents may not be identifiable as major concerns at a local level, 
but NRLS can identify patterns and frequencies of these events at a national level and 
issues alerts. But such a system is largely dependant on the reporting of clinical 
incidents by health care staff.  
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2.8 Analysing clinical incidents 
Clinical incidents should be seen as a window into the system (Vincent 2004). In the US, 
the Joint commission has adapted a root cause analysis approach to investigate these 
incidents. Vincent et. al (Vincent, Neale et al. 2001) at CSRU have developed a systems 
analysis approach to analyse these events. Based on Reason’s model of accident 
causation and literature on medical errors (Cooper, Newbower et al. 1984; Cook, Woods 
et al. 1989; Eagle, Davies et al. 1992; Bark, Vincent et al. 1994) Vincent et al (Adams 
and Bohan 2000; Vincent, Taylor-Adams et al. 2000) identified seven main categories of 
factors that could affect the safety of the healthcare system (Box 2.1). This framework 
has been used in the subsequent studies to analyse failures in operating theatres. 
NPSA has designed a root cause analysis-teaching programme, which utilises all these 
approaches to investigate clinical incidents. Incident analysis helps in shaping the 
system for a safer future and once clearly understood, a tool to predict future potential 
threats to patient safety. Systems approach to analysis of clinical incidents provides a 
very effective way of understanding surgical adverse events. It uses a combination of 
case record reviews, interviews and a checklist of human factors applying Reason’s 
model of organisational accidents to clinical incidents (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2 Vincent’s framework of clinical incidents (Adapted from Reason’s 
Model of Organisational causes of Accidents)(Vincent, Taylor-Adams et al. 2000). 
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Box 2.1 Framework of factors associated with adverse events. 
 
1. Institutional context     
Economic and regulatory context  
2. Organisational and management factors 
Financial resources and constraints  
Organisational structure  
Policy standards and goals  
Safety culture and priorities  
3. Work environment  
Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns  
Design, availability, and maintenance of equipment  
Administrative and managerial support  
4. Team factors 
Verbal communication  
Written communication  
Supervision and seeking help  
Team structure  
5. Individual (staff) factors  
Knowledge and skills  
Motivation Physical and mental health  
6. Task factors  
Task design and clarity of structure  
Availability and use of protocols  
Availability and accuracy of test results  
7. Patient characteristics  
Condition (complexity and seriousness)  
Language and communication  
Personality and social factors  
The systems analysis approach is beneficial to healthcare staff as the methods used are 
designed to promote a culture of openness and prevents finger pointing. It is useful in 
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preventing them from happening again. But, this system is a retrospective approach to 
clinical incidents and is used once patient harm has actually occurred. Therefore, 
increasingly, feasibility of prospective analysis of systems is being researched in 
healthcare to be able to prevent clinical incidents even before they happen by identifying 
potential errors in the system (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006; Catchpole, Giddings et 
al. 2007). For instance, during an operation, poor communication between nurse and 
surgeon may lead to certain equipment not being made available which could lead to 
technical difficulties during the surgery and potential patient harm. However these 
factors may be difficult to understand with retrospective analysis but will be identifiable 
on prospective analysis. These methods will be discussed in further detail in the 
subsequent chapters. Increasingly in surgery, the scope of direct observations and video 
recordings is being explored to map out surgical errors and problems that could lead to 
adverse events. But these techniques require a very open culture in the healthcare, 
where staff is not resistant to being observed for the fear of disciplinary action or 
litigation. Nevertheless, observation and recording offer us the opportunity to understand 
the finer nuances of care processes such as team interactions and communication 
barriers that could lead to adverse events which may not be understood through 
retrospective case record reviews.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Patient outcomes after surgery have traditionally been used to assess performance and 
effectiveness in surgery. However, patient safety processes may be more sensitive 
measures of assessing quality of healthcare service. In event of poor adherence to 
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patient safety practices, adverse events can occur. But it is essential to analyse these 
adverse events systematically to understand the underlying causes. A systems 
approach to addressing adverse events is necessary to develop a culture where they 
can be discussed openly and practices and system modifications to prevent them are 
accepted readily. Many adverse events in surgery are closely related to teamwork in the 
operating theatres; therefore understanding the role of teamwork in adverse events is 
necessary. 
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Chapter 3 
Teamwork in surgery 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how teamwork plays an important role in the safety 
of healthcare systems. In this chapter, I discuss the principles of teamwork and its role in 
ensuring patient safety in surgery. I also present a brief review of literature on 
interventions used to improve teamwork in surgery. 
 
3.2 Teamwork 
Teamwork is important in all organisations ranging from leisure to high-risk industries. In 
football, teamwork is important in mounting an offensive attack as well as laying out an 
impenetrable defense. There are situations where the teamwork is far more demanding 
and challenging with low margins of error as in Formula one racing teams where a few 
milliseconds saved at the pit stop can be critical. Similarly, in surgery teamwork is 
important to ensure safety and prevent adverse events.  
The term “teamwork” is formed of two widely used terms: Team and Work. In old 
English, team referred to a,” set of draft animals yoked together” and it was not until the 
16th century that it was applied to a group of humans. In old English “teamwork” meant 
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work done with a team of beasts”. It was only after, nineteenth century, when it took up 
its present meaning, “people working in concert” (Xyrichis and Ream 2008).  
Teamwork in healthcare is defined as  “A dynamic process involving two or more health 
professionals with complementary backgrounds and skills, sharing common health goals 
and exercising concerted physical and mental effort in assessing, planning, or 
evaluating patient care. This is accomplished through interdependent collaboration, 
open communication and shared decision-making. This in turn generates value-added 
patient, organizational and staff outcomes.” (Xyrichis and Ream 2008) 
This definition indicates some of the key elements of effective teamwork that have been 
further delineated by other researchers. Effective teamwork comprises of certain 
behaviors that are reflected in the way effective teams interact. These attributes can be 
used to assess teamwork skills of an individual or a team. Dickenson and McIntyre 
described the various components of teamwork (Dickinson 1997). Salas et al conducted 
a review of literature to define the key components of Teamwork and described 
leadership, mutual performance monitoring, backup behavior, adaptability, and team 
orientation as the ‘Big five’ core components of teamwork and for effective teamwork 
these core components require supporting coordinating mechanisms such as: shared 
mental modes, closed-loop communication, and mutual trust (Salas 2005). Table 3.1 
describes the various components of teamwork.  
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Table 3.1 Dickenson and McIntyre’s Components of teamwork. 
Teamwork Component Definition 
Communication Active exchange of information between two or more members of the 
team, as well as an individual team member providing information to 
others in the appropriate manner. 
Example: Prior to starting a surgery, surgeon, nurse and anaesthetist 
discuss the details of procedure, need for antibiotics and any known 
drug allergies.  
Coordination It reflects the execution of team activities such that members respond 
as a function of the behaviour of others. Successful co-ordination 
implies the effective operation of other components of teamwork. In 
this way, the actions of individual members are merged to produce 
synchronised team performance. 
Example: As the anaesthetized patient is wheeled into the operating 
room, to transfer the patient on the operating table, the anaesthtist 
secure the airway while stabilizing the head, the ODP and circulating 
nurse position the ‘patslide’ under the patient while the surgeon secure 
the foot end. Then at the command of the anaesthtist the patient is slid 
onto the operating table with a collective effort of the team.  
Situational awareness It refers to ‘awareness’ of the ‘situation.’ "Situation awareness" is the 
correct term for the field of study that concerns the knowledge and 
understanding of the environment that is critical to those who need to 
work in cohesion. 
Example: During the arthroscopy procedure, the circulating nurse 
changes the bag of arthroscopy fluid as it empties without being 
prompted by the surgeon or the scrub nurse, as she knows that the 
arthroscopy fluid is essential to smooth running of the procedure. 
Shared mental model Organized way for team members to think about how the team will 
work; helps team members understand and predict the behavior of 
their teammates. 
Example: While preparing for the surgery of a patient with latex allergy, 
the team is briefed about the allergy and team members adapt their 
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roles to ensure safety, such as: surgeon and nurses wears latex free 
gloves, and ensure that the patient does not come in contact with 
equipment and dressings containing latex. 
Leadership This includes the direction and structure provided by formal leaders as 
well as by other members. 
Example: In a busy operating list, the surgeon ensures that the 
required equipment are available prior to the surgery and adequate 
staff is available and takes a decision to modify the list or postpone a 
surgery to ensure safety. 
Monitoring team performance It refers to the observation and awareness of activities and 
performance of other team members by the team. 
Example: The theatre sister ensures that surgeon and anaesthetist are 
available on time to start the operations and briefs the team of any 
delays and their reasons to ensure that the delays can be avoided. 
Back-up behaviour it involves actually helping other team members to perform their tasks. 
It also implies a degree of interchangeability among members and 
willingness to provide and seek assistance. 
Example: As the surgeon closes the skin wound after surgery, the 
circulating nurse is busy helping the scrub nurse in tidying up the 
instruments, the ODP is fetching the transfer trolley, the Anaesthtist 
adopts the role of ODP and brings the wound dressing for the surgeon 
so that he does not have to wait for the dressing to be provided. 
Team-orientation This includes the nature of the attitudes that team members have 
toward one another, the team task, and their team leadership. It also 
includes self- awareness as team member and group cohesiveness. 
Example: the surgical team nurses gets together before the start of the 
surgery, new members are introduced to the team, discuss the order of 
the list and their roles for the day. 
3.3 Teamwork in high-risk organisations. 
Teamwork has been studied in some detail in high-risk industries such as aviation, oil 
industry, military and nuclear industry. In aviation, failures and mistakes can lead to 
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airline crashes, which could lead to loss of life. In aviation 60-80% of all accidents are 
due to human error and teamwork failures (Foushee 1984). Similarly, in military, 
teamwork errors can lead to harm to army personnel as well as civilians. Industries like 
healthcare have multiple specialised professionals working towards a common goal with 
a high risk of errors, which can have severe consequences. These organisations 
function as hazardous, fast paced and highly complex systems, where failures can have 
disastrous consequences and therefore make risk prevention a priority (Roberts 1990). 
Aviation and military have been at the forefront in acknowledging the importance of good 
teamwork in achieving safety and high reliability (Salas 1995).  
 
3.4 Teamwork in healthcare systems. 
Health care is also a high-risk environment. In this section I will discuss how healthcare 
is also a complex high-risk organization and also discuss the role of teamwork in 
achieving patient safety. 
Healthcare is a hierarchical system where physicians lead teams of junior doctors and 
within a team; the roles are well defined with the consultant (or attending) being 
ultimately responsible for the care of his patient. Similarly, nurses have a hierarchy too. 
However, there is also a hierarchy across the two professional groups, which creates 
ambiguity regarding responsibilities. Furthermore this hierarchy can also inhibit 
communication. The hierarchies reinforce assertiveness but at the same time create an 
environment of mutual trust, thereby mitigating the negative impacts of hierarchy, 
whereby, the team members can monitor each other's performance and provide support 
when required (Shamir 1990). 
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In healthcare, team members frequently make decisions crucial to patient care such as, 
administering antibiotics, requesting investigations, decision to admit, decision to 
operate. Various team members with varying levels of expertise make these decisions. 
Therefore, it is essential that these decisions be communicated to the other care 
providers so that patient care is continuous and evidence based. In the current climate 
where staffs are working on shift patterns, it is crucial that teams coordinate task 
management and handover relevant information to the next team.  
Apparently minor errors, in healthcare, can lead to patient harm or even death. 
Therefore, errors are thoroughly investigated and often lead to reprimand and 
restrictions on the healthcare providers. Although the consultant is responsible for the 
overall care of his patients, junior doctors and nurses providing care can often make 
mistakes for which they are accountable. 
 Healthcare providers may have to perform tasks at short notice within a limited span of 
time with limited margins of error and delay. Trauma cases coming to emergency 
department may give the trauma teams only a few minutes to anticipate and prepare for 
the patient. Once in the emergency room, patient has to be stabilised and examined for 
definitive management, which will require input from various surgical specialities as well 
as anaesthetists, and intensivists. Such a stressful environment, demands clear and 
timely communication between different specialties and good coordination to organise 
investigations, resuscitate the patient and organise theatres if needed. 
In the emergency room various professionals perform separate and simultaneous tasks, 
which may or may not be mutually interdependent. For instance, during trauma 
management in the emergency room, the anaesthetist may be securing the airway while 
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the emergency room nurses, stabilise the neck and the trauma registrar may be 
inserting a drain to relieve tension pneumothorax. The outcomes of all these tasks are 
constantly monitored and fed back across the team members. In all, such situations 
clearly demand good and effective teamwork in terms of communication, coordination, 
situational awareness and development and maintenance of a shared mental model. 
Patient care in surgery involves multiple stages from out patients to preoperative 
assessment followed by admission to ward and operating theatres. Multiple skilled 
professionals are involved at each stage. Therefore, communication and coordination 
between surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists is crucial to ensure that information is 
passed on reliably.  
Although professionals work in their own domains, they heavily depend on other 
specialist professionals to facilitate their tasks. For instance, although surgeons can 
independently perform the surgical steps during the procedure; anaesthetists are vital to 
ensuring that patient is anaesthetised and hemodynamically stable while the procedure 
is being performed. Also, they depend on the nurses and the administrative staff to book 
the patient and bed space for the planned day and arrangement of correct equipment for 
the procedure. It required good communication and coordination between the various 
members to ensure that correct patient is operated at the right time in the right manner. 
 
3.5 Teamwork failures in operating theatres. 
Gawande et al looked into cases of medical malpractice in surgery, and found that, 
around 70% of adverse events were a result of poor team-communication (Gawande, 
Thomas et al. 1999). In operating theatres, team structure is ambiguous, where 
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surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists may not see themselves as part of one team but 
three different teams. This may affect co-ordination and more importantly prevent them 
from communicating effectively. This may lead to conflicting assumptions about how 
work is distributed and coordinated across the team. One example of this ambiguous 
team structure is conflicting perceptions of surgeons’ and anaesthesiologists’ about who 
is responsible for ensuring timely administration of antibiotic prophylaxis (Tan, Naik et al. 
2006) and the effect is reflected in the studies which show that timely antibiotic 
prophylaxis is administered in only 55% of cases (Bratzler, Houck et al. 2005; Haynes, 
Weiser et al. 2009). 
Another deterrent to inter-professional communication is the steep hierarchy, with team 
members reluctant to communicate across the hierarchies (Thomas, Sexton et al. 2003). 
Other industries such as aviation have a better understanding of the effectiveness of 
team communication in preventing errors and adverse events. Aviation’s standardisation 
of cockpit pre-flight communication reflects this understanding. A survey study 
conducted in surgical operation theatres suggests that two-third of nurses and 
physicians consider better communication within the teams as the most important 
element in improving safety and efficiency (Sexton, Thomas et al. 2000).  
As is expected, these adverse events are a major concern and cause of mal-practise 
litigation. Contrary to the premises of malpractice law, studies show that majority of 
errors do not appear to be solely the result of individual failures (Studdert and Brennan 
2001; Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003). Planning and interaction among team members 
appear to play a critical and under appreciated role (Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003). 
Teamwork and communication between team members has been largely ignored as a 
fundamental aspect of surgical safety. Observational studies of communication in the 
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operating theatre show absence of protocols and variation in effectiveness (Healey, 
Undre et al. 2004); (Lingard, Espin et al. 2004); (Sutcliffe, Lewton et al. 2004). Failure in 
pre-operative communication between surgeons and anaesthetists lead to 
misidentification of patients (Ludbrook, Webb et al. 1993) and wrong site surgery. The 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare organisations (JCAHO) found that 70% 
of wrong site events could have been prevented by better communication 
(The_Joint_Commission). While other high reliability organisations such as aviation and 
the military appreciate the importance of pre-procedural team briefing, in surgery, any 
form of preoperative communication is only practiced in less than 10% of cases (Sexton, 
Thomas et al. 2000). 
Failures in team communication are only one aspect of systems failure in surgery. As 
many as a quarter of routine surgical and anaesthetic checks are not carried out, 
equipment problems are frequent, and adherence to basic procedures varies markedly 
between different teams (Healey, Sevdalis et al. 2006). In the absence of pre-operative 
checks, crucial equipment and prosthesis are often missing in most operating theatres 
(Roth and Gandhi 2004).  
Attempts to follow guidelines such as those for antibiotic and DVT prophylaxis are 
impeded by blurred inter-professional responsibilities, workflow and communication 
problems (Tan, Naik et al. 2006). Therefore, guidelines or other similar interventions that 
fail to account for the wider system are unlikely to improve safety significantly. 
Understanding the correlation between teamwork and processes is easier but 
correlating teamwork to outcomes is far more difficult. Mazzocco et. al conducted an 
observational study and case record review of 300 surgical procedures to understand 
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the correlation between teamwork and clinical outcomes such as 30 day morbidity and 
mortality. They found that those patients whose surgical teams showed poor teamwork 
behaviours had a higher risk of postoperative death and complications (Mazzocco, 
Petitti et al. 2009).  
Therefore it is evident that there is a need to develop and institute measures to improve 
teamwork in operating theatres. The net section discusses the various interventions 
designed to improve teamwork in surgery. 
 
3.6 Interventions to improve Teamwork in surgery. 
There is growing evidence that teamwork failures are responsible for majority of adverse 
events related to surgery (Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003). In light of this evidence, a 
number of interventions have been designed and implemented in operating theatres in 
an effort to improve teamwork. These interventions have largely been adopted from 
aviation and defence organisations.  
3.6.1 Team training. 
Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report “ To Err is Human” advocated the need to adapt 
concepts of aviation based team training and Crew Resource Management (CRM) into 
healthcare in an effort to improve teamwork and patient safety practices (Kohn, Corrigan 
et al. 1999). In aviation CRM training has been used for more than three decades and 
has been shown to improve safety attitudes, communication and coordination and also 
improve error-management (Helmreich 1998). In healthcare, Gaba et al. were first to 
adopt aviation based CRM training to develop Anesthesia Crisis Resource Management 
(ACRM) to help anesthesiologists manage crises effectively (Gaba, Howard et al. 1998). 
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Grogan et al designed a CRM based 8 hour training programme for operating teams. 
Through role plays in simulated settings, this programme provided training in managing 
fatigue, managing a team, recognising adverse situations, cross checking and 
communication, developing a shared mental model and feedback. Team training 
requires a simulated set up with facilities to reconstructive near- real scenarios and 
presence of trained assessors to reliably assess performance and provide training. 
Academic institutions in UK such as Imperial College have simulated operating theatres, 
specially designed to provide technical and non- technical skills training to surgery and 
anaesthesia trainees. However, such a set up is expensive and therefore limited in its 
reach to the healthcare staff working in non-specialist units and district hospitals. Efforts 
are being made to make simulation technology cheaper and available to wider 
healthcare staff. Kneebone et al have designed a low cost distributed simulation set 
which uses inflatable walls and posters to simulate theatre environment (Kneebone, 
Arora et al.). It enables the setting up of simulation-based training into non-technical 
skills as well as technical skills, which is portable and available at a fraction of price. But 
team training has mainly been an academic exercise in surgery and it is only recent that 
it is making its way into the clinical practice. 
In a retrospective health services study conducted with a test and contemporaneous 
control group involving 182,409 sampled procedures from 108 Veterans Health 
Administration facilities, Neilly el al showed a 18% reduction in annual mortality one year 
after implementing a team training programme (Neily, Mills et al.).  Catchpole et al 
studied teamwork in 112 operations before and after instituting aviation style team 
training for 3 surgical teams (Catchpole, Dale et al.). The team training comprised of a 
two-day training in the classroom followed by 6 days of coaching in operating theatres. 
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They found that team- training can improve team performance but the compliance to 
team-training interventions were strongly influenced by attitudes of key influential 
individuals, thus highlighting the need for change in organizational culture and attitudes 
towards such interventions. 
3.6.2 Team briefings. 
In order to facilitate team communication, develop shared mental models between team 
members, and improve safety, pre-procedural briefings are considered to be critical in 
other high reliability organisations. Team briefings have historically been used in the 
army to exchange relevant information and develop a shared mental model prior to a 
mission. Similarly, a surgical briefing is typically done before starting a surgical 
procedure. The theatre team gets together and discusses the patient, the surgical 
procedure being performed, any critical or unexpected steps, any special instruments 
required, any anaesthetic concerns, or any nursing issues. Briefings facilitate the 
transfer of critical information between people and create an atmosphere of openness 
where team members feel empowered to contribute to the process. Pre-procedural 
briefings are also considered critical in other high-risk organisations as ways to improve 
safety by helping team members develop shared mental models of work and act as 
reminders. The joint commission recommended the use of a ‘Time-out’ or ‘pause for the 
cause’ to confirm the patient, the procedure and the site to be operated prior to the 
incision (The_Joint_Commission). This is now a mandatory requirement for all operating 
theatres in the US. This recommendation laid down the foundations for the 
establishment of pre-operative team briefings where other checks and communication 
interventions can be dovetailed onto the ‘Time-out’. This has resulted in the ‘Time-out’ 
serving as a tool for fostering communication between team members. Just as pre-
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procedural briefings facilitate teamwork, post-procedural debriefings are considered 
critical in fostering a culture of open communication within teams. Debriefings are 
communication interventions that are meant to improve safety through discussion and 
by reflecting on the causes of errors and critical incidents. Safety checks can be 
incorporated into the debriefing process which could be the basis for the development of 
safety centred interventions (Makary, Holzmueller et al. 2006).  
3.6.3 The Surgical checklist. 
Checklists address human failures associated with omission. Checklists are a list of 
items that need to be checked to ensure that essential safety tasks are performed. 
Checklists act as reminders, help in standardisation of processes, add redundancy to 
the system (Hales and Pronovost 2006), provide quality assurance, improve information 
flow and provide feedback that can be used for audit purposes (Lingard, Espin et al. 
2005). They are particularly beneficial in stressful situations as in a busy theatre list 
where there is informational overload, multiple steps in a process, departures from 
routine processes and interruptions or distractions (Reason 2002).  
Checklists are routinely used in high reliability organizations such as aviation and the 
nuclear power industry (Hales and Pronovost 2006). Checklists were first used in 
aviation in 1940s following the crash of the Boeing B17 bomber on its maiden flight in 
Oct. 1935. The ensuing investigation revealed that the pilot forgot to release the elevator 
lock. The pilots called it " too much of a plane to be flown by a man" as the plane 
required the pilot to perform multiple tasks that were easily forgotten. Therefore, Boeing 
introduced a flight checklist that reminded the pilots about the tasks that needed to be 
performed and their sequence. Subsequently, Boeing flew 1.8 million miles without any 
accidents. Ever since checklists have been used in aviation for all flight sequences. In 
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aviation, their use is mandatory for every stage of the flight. 
The checklists currently in use in health organisations across the world (DeFontes J 
2004), (Makary, Mukherjee et al. 2007), (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2008) generally consist 
of pre-operative checks such as confirmation of site, side and surgery, availability of 
equipment and the need for special investigations among others. In addition, the teams 
exchange patient and procedure related critical information and discuss any potential 
intra-operative events. Chapter 5 further describes the design and development of a 
surgical checklist in detail. 
3.6.4 Effectiveness of checklists and briefings. 
A common dilemma among health care staff is whether checklists ‘actually work’ or only 
add to the amount of paperwork. The role of checklists in error mitigation is well proven 
and established in high risk industries such as aviation (Hales and Pronovost 2006) and 
there is growing evidence of its effectiveness in healthcare. Daily checklists and 
reminders in care pathways for acute MI and Stroke patients improved adherence to 
aspirin guidelines and administration of beta- blockers within 24 hr of admission (Wolff, 
Taylor et al. 2004). In trauma services, patient transfer to regional trauma centres has 
improved by using a pre-transfer checklist. (Harrahill and Bartkus 1990). In intensive 
care, checklists have been found useful in predicting successful weaning from the 
ventilators (Walsh, Dodds et al. 2004). Pronovost et al demonstrated that a checklist of 
safety related steps resulted in a large and sustained reduction in catheter related 
bloodstream infections (Pronovost, Needham et al. 2006). In surgery, preliminary results 
from studies on the benefits of checklists and briefings have demonstrated an 
improvement in team and safety attitudes (Awad, Fagan et al. 2005) (Lingard, Espin et 
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al. 2005). There is evidence that they aid in reducing the incidence of events such as 
wrong site surgery (DeFontes J 2004) and lead to an increase in the use of prophylactic 
medication in the peri-operative period (Awad, Fagan et al. 2005), (Altpeter, Luckhardt 
et al. 2007). There is also some evidence that pre-operative briefings contribute to an 
improvement in the safety culture and team environment within the operating theatre 
(DeFontes J 2004), (Makary, Mukherjee et al. 2007). Awad et al found that team training 
in the use of briefings lead to an improvement in the communication between team 
members (Awad, Fagan et al. 2005). In addition, it has been found that pre-operative 
briefings result in reduction of equipment problems and an increase in staff morale 
(DeFontes J 2004).  
 
3.7 Conclusion. 
In order to improve teamwork in surgery, various interventions have been proposed and 
evaluated. Interventions that combine elements of checklist with briefings have been 
shown to improve teamwork and communication. At the same time it is important that 
these interventions are tested using standardised measures so that the effectiveness of 
these interventions can be evaluated.  
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Chapter 4 
Measuring teamwork in surgery- a review of literature 	  	  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter establishes the importance of effective teamwork in surgery. Given 
its significance in surgical systems, it becomes imperative that teamwork is accurately 
assessed and interventions are designed to improve healthcare delivery and reduce 
adverse events resulting from poor teamwork. However, assessment of teamwork is a 
challenge in surgery and unlike other high-risk industries, continues to be a largely 
unexplored area of research. Assessing teamwork is necessary to benchmark the 
performance of teams, which are generally evaluated in terms of clinical outcomes. 
While poor outcomes may alert us to patient safety concerns, they do not highlight 
problems that lead to patient harm. Therefore, in order to reduce adverse events and 
enhance patient safety, we need to identify underperforming teams and develop 
interventions to improve teamwork. Teamwork assessment has been a benchmark 
measure in high risk organisations such as aviation and military, to ensure that the 
teams are working in cohesion and identify personnel who require further training in 
team working skills. In this chapter, I discuss the need and means to reliably assess 
teamwork in surgery.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, much of the conceptual understanding of 
teamwork in healthcare has been adapted from research based in industries such as 
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aviation. However, one may argue that there are some differences between these 
industries and surgery, which poses different challenges in terms of emergent 
complexities in the surgical procedures, that no two patients are identical in their 
problems or surgical interventions. Further, operating theatres are dynamic 
environments with different specialties requiring different inputs and following separate 
guidelines and protocols, teams change during and in between procedures, plans 
change intra-operatively and there is no clear team leader. This necessitates the need 
for research into development of new tools or modification of the existing measures to 
reliably evaluate teamwork in operating theatres. There is a growing realisation in the 
healthcare sector that interventions are needed to improve teamwork in operating 
theatres. In its 1999, report, Institute of Medicine (IOM) has emphasised the need to 
introduce aviation style team interventions (Kohn 2000). Defonte et al in a study 
described the benefits of surgical team briefings on teamwork (DeFontes J 2004). 
Lingard et al piloted a surgical checklist and team briefing to improve communication in 
the operating theatres (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2008). But the long-term impact, 
effectiveness, and sustainability of these interventions can only be analysed if we can 
accurately assess their impact on teamwork and patient safety. Box 4.1 summarises the 
advantages of assessing teamwork in operating theatres.  
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Box 4.1 Key advantages of measuring teamwork. 
 
 
To understand the various measures used to assess teamwork in surgery, I conducted a 
review of literature. 
The aims of this literature review is  
• to identify teamwork measurement tools used for assessment in surgical care  
• to discuss use, validity, and reliability of the same 
 
4.2 Methods 
An extensive and structured review of the published literature was conducted using 
online resources and hand search of references. 
 The electronic databases MEDLINE (OVID), EMBASE (OVID), PsycINFO (OVID) were 
searched. Google Scholar and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews were also 
searched. Keywords from key papers and broad literature searches on the electronic 
databases identified above compiled. Search terms were refined through an iterative 
1.	  To	  design	  a	  yardstick	  to	  classify	  good	  teamwork	  characteristics	  2.	  To	  compare	  performance	  of	  different	  teams	  and	  identify	  areas	  of	  improvement	  3.	  To	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  teamwork	  interventions	  4.	  To	  assess	  correlation	  between	  teamwork	  and	  clinical	  outcomes	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process of reviewing outcomes of preliminary keyword searched in the databases. Key 
articles’ Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) terms were also identified to make the 
search comprehensive. Using the Boolean term “and”, key words and MeSH* terms 
(Box 4.2) were combined to search for relevant articles. A further hand search was 
carried out by scanning article references.  
 
Box 4.2 Key words and MeSH* terms. 
(1) Operating Rooms*, Surg$*, Anesthesia*, Operating theatre*, theatre*;  
(2) Interdisciplinary Communication*, Communication*, Communication Barriers*, 
Communication failure, Teamwork 
(3) Measure, intervention, tool, questionnaire, checklist, briefing, survey, team training  
 
4.2.1 Selection of study. 
Electronic citations and abstracts were scanned to select articles for full text review. 
After going through the text, studies were selected for review if:  
They assessed teamwork or any of its components in the field of surgery or 
anaesthesia. 
Or, they demonstrated an improvement in teamwork or any of its components in surgical 
or anaesthetic fields. 
Or, they described the development of a tool to assess or improve teamwork or any of 
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its components in surgical or anaesthetic care. 
Or, they described teamwork failures in surgery or anaesthesia. 
Studies that were primarily focusing on adverse events in surgery or anaesthesia but did 
not study teamwork in detail and merely identified the role of teamwork in their causation 
were not included in the review. 
 
4.3 Findings of the review- Tools to measure teamwork in surgery. 
Various tools have been used to measure teamwork in healthcare organisations. These 
can be broadly classified into: (1) Observations and (2) Opinion based-Surveys/ 
questionnaires. Observation based tools can be further classified into (a) field notes 
based teamwork analysis and (b) behavioral rating scales. 
4.3.1 Observational measures of teamwork. 
4.3.1.1 Field note based Observation. 
Field notes based observation has its origins from ethnographic methodologies used in 
social sciences. This method involves expert observers being present in the study 
environment taking notes on the tasks, behaviours and problems. The field notes are 
later coded and classified into various themes to draw conclusions from the observed 
data. Field note based observational techniques have been used to explore problems 
and failures in operating theatres. Lingard et al observed surgical operations and 
described communication failures in the operating theatre (Lingard, Espin et al. 2004). 
They classified communication failure events in the operating theatre into occasion, 
content, audience, and purpose failure and also described the impact of these 
communication failure events on the outcomes of surgery such as delays, resource 
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wastage, and adverse events. Christian et al in a study, observed 10 complex general 
surgery procedures and took minute by minute notes which they later coded and 
qualitatively analysed into systems factors such as team factors, individual factors, 
organisational factors, equipment factors, and interpersonal factors and their impact on 
patient safety (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Catchpole et al observed 24 paediatric 
surgeries and 18 orthopaedic surgeries combining field notes with NOTECHS and found 
communication and coordination to be the most common cause of problems in the 
operating theatres (Catchpole, Giddings et al. 2006). Wiegmann et al in an observation 
study recorded surgical errors and flow disruptions during 31 cardiac surgery operations. 
They further classified these errors into teamwork, equipment, interruptions and training 
related issues and associated them with disruptions in operating theatres(Wiegmann, 
ElBardissi et al. 2007) and found that disruptions in surgical flow was associated with 
problems in teamwork in 52% of errors.  
	  
4.3.1.2 Teamwork Behavioural rating systems.  
Behavioural markers are ‘observable, non technical behaviours that contribute to 
superior or substandard performance within a work environment’ (Klampfer 2001). This 
method uses trained observers who are present in the operating theatre to observe and 
analyse the team’s behaviours and task performance. Behavioural rating tools were 
primarily designed in the aviation industry to assess team-working skills of pilots and 
other crewmembers and evaluate effectiveness of CRM training. In aviation, CRM has 
been used for many decades. By mid- 90s, CRM training was a well established practice 
in aviation industry. However, standardised assessment of effectiveness of CRM training 
in imparting non-technical skills remained to be established. This required a systematic 
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and reliable method of measuring behaviours and team interactions. Therefore, a need 
was felt to develop a behavioural rating system to assess pilots. As a result, Aviation 
NOTECHS (Non Technical Skills) rating system was developed to evaluate pilots' non-
technical skills such as leadership, coordination, communication, and decision-making 
(Flin 2003). In the last ten years concepts of CRM training and assessment of non-
technical skills have been introduced in healthcare, which has led to the development of 
a number of teamwork behaviour assessment tools. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery OTAS. 
OTAS has been designed by Undre et al at Imperial College to measure two facets of 
theatre teamwork- team tasks and team behaviours (Undre, Healey et al. 2006). It is a 
tool, which requires two observers to observe and assess teamwork in the operating 
theatre. One observer uses a checklist to mark the theatre teams on tasks carried out in 
the operating theatres. The OTAS checklist consisted of tasks that are considered vital 
to a surgical procedure. The tasks were divided into (1) pre- operative assessment such 
as preparation of patient notes, anaesthetic equipment checks, communication 
regarding consent, co morbidities, allergies, and availability of correct instruments; (2) 
intra-operative assessment such as draping of patient, correct placement and set up of 
equipment, confirmation of surgical site and side; and (3) post- operative assessment 
such as reversal of anaesthesia and airway maintenance, appropriate checks for 
pressure and diathermy site and safe transfer to the trolley. The second observer was 
also present during the different phases and used a behavioural rating system to mark 
different team members (surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists) for their teamwork skills 
such as communication, leadership, coordination, cooperation, and situational 
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awareness. The behavioural marking system was based on Dickinson and McIntyre’s 
model of Teamwork and used exemplar behaviours to score the team members on a 
scale from 0-6. The behavioural marking the OTAS has been tested in general surgery, 
urology and gynaecology surgery and it shows some association with clinical outcomes. 
Its validity and reliability has been further testing (Undre, Healey et al. 2006; Undre, 
Sevdalis et al. 2007; Sevdalis, Lyons et al. 2009). Recently, OTAS has been further 
modified to irefine the behavioural rating system and the task checklist has been taken 
out. The modified OTAS has been shown to have good construct validity (Hull, Arora et 
al.). 
 
4.3.1.2.2 Oxford NOTECHS (Non TECHnical Skills) scoring system. 
Oxford NOTECHS has been adapted from aviation based NOTECHS scoring system to 
make it relevant to operating theatre environment (Mishra, Catchpole et al. 2009). In this 
system, teamwork behaviours have been classified into leadership and management, 
teamwork and cooperation, problem solving and decision-making, and situational 
awareness. A trained observer is needed in the operating theatre to mark the theatre 
teams on these behaviours. Catchpole et al observed 26 laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies and 22 carotid endarterectomies using Oxford NOTECHS to score 
the theatre teams. They also observed procedures for any technical errors using a 
technical error analysis methodology, operating time and other problems as outcome 
measures, and found that operating times were indirectly related to leadership and 
management and low incidence of technical errors was associated with higher 
situational awareness (Catchpole, Mishra et al. 2008) (Mishra, Catchpole et al. 2009). 
Sevdalis et al modified the NOTECHS by adding communication and interaction 
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dimensions to make it more relevant to surgery and they found it to be a reliable 
measure of teamwork (Sevdalis, Davis et al. 2008).  
 
4.3.1.2.3 Anaesthetists Non Technical Skills (ANTS) behavioural marking system.  
ANTS behavioural marking system scores the non-technical skills of anaesthetists in 
operating theatres (Fletcher, Flin et al. 2003). It comprises of four skill groups: task 
management, team working, situational awareness, and decision-making. It was found 
to be a valid, reliable, and usable tool to assess non-technical skills of anaesthetists in 
simulated environment (Fletcher, McGeorge et al. 2002). It has been used in assessing 
anaesthetists’ non-technical skills however its feasibility and reliability in clinical settings 
such as operating theatres remains to be studied (Flin and Patey ; Reader, Flin et al. 
2006). 
 
4.3.1.2.4 Non Technical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) rating system. 
NOTSS behavioural rating system has been developed by Yule et al at University of 
Aberdeen for assessing surgical trainees and consultant surgeons on their observable 
non- technical skills. It divides non- technical skills into situational awareness, decision 
making, task management, leadership, communication and teamwork (Yule, Flin et al. 
2006). The marking system has been tested with 44 consultant surgeons in simulated 
operating theatre setting, however its feasibility and reliability remained to be tested in 
the real operating theatres (Yule, Flin et al. 2008). Recently, Crossley et al evaluated the 
NOTSS in real operating theatre environment. They found that NOTSS  assessment 
was feasible, valid and reliable, however important implementation challenges were 
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highlighted. Most respondents had reservations about assessing cognition (Crossley, 
Marriott et al.) 
4.3.2 Questionnaire based surveys 
Questionnaire based surveys are used to assess the opinions and attitudes of the 
healthcare staff. They are designed to understand the variation in staff attitudes towards 
patient safety and teamwork components such as communication, shared mental model, 
situational awareness, and leadership. Below I discuss some of the surveys used to 
assess teamwork. 
 
4.3.2.1 University of Texas’s Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ). 
Adapting flight management attitudes questionnaire (FMAQ) (Helmreich 1984) used 
widely in aviation, Sexton et al. (year) developed the SAQ to assess safety attitudes in 
healthcare (Sexton, Helmreich et al. 2006). The FMAQ was developed after researchers 
found out that most of the accidents in aviation were due to poor teamwork, leadership, 
and decision making. As 25% of FMAQ items showed utility in healthcare settings, they 
were included in the SAQ. The SAQ has 30 items and six domains, namely, teamwork 
climate, safety climate, job satisfaction, perceptions of management, stress recognition, 
and working conditions. However, only six out of the 30 survey items measures 
teamwork. The teamwork climate reflected the perceived quality of collaboration 
between team members. Teamwork behaviours included assertion (speaking up), 
conflict resolution when there was a difference of opinion, asking questions related to 
patient care and coordination. 
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SAQ has been tested for validity and reliability in the operating theatres. In one study, 
Makary et al administered the SAQ to 2769 staff including surgeons, nurses and 
anaesthetists with a response rate of 71% and demonstrated a high face validity and 
internal consistency (alpha = 0.76) (Makary, Sexton et al. 2006). Content validity of the 
teamwork domain has also been established by comparison with observational 
teamwork behaviour ratings. SAQ was further assessed in 203 clinical domains with 
more than 10000 respondents, to evaluate psychometric properties (Sexton, Helmreich 
et al. 2006). SAQs have also been demonstrated to be sensitive to quality improvement 
interventions at Kaiser permanente where it was used to assess the benefits of a 
briefing intervention in operating theatres (DeFontes J 2004). SAQ has been used 
widely and there is benchmarking data available that enables organisations to evaluate 
their climate data (Sexton, Helmreich et al. 2006).  
 
 
4.3.2.2 Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ). 
ORMAQ survey has been developed by Schaeffer and Helmreich at University of Texas 
(Schaeffer 1993) and adopted for UK operating theatres by Flin et al (Flin, Fletcher et al. 
2003) to measure attitudes to teamwork, leadership, stress, fatigue, and error. ORMAQ 
is based on aviation’s safety attitudes surveys such as FMAQ, CMAQ (Cockpit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire) and was developed by the same team that 
developed the SAQ and both share design characteristics as both were developed from 
ICUMAQ (Intensive Care Unit Management Attitudes Questionnaire). However, ORMAQ 
has been designed specifically for the operating theatres. Flin et al's modified ORMAQ 
contains four sections: (1) Sixty likert scale questions on leadership, confidence, 
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information sharing, stress and fatigue, teamwork, work values, error and organisational 
climate; (2) A section to rate teamwork and cooperation; (3) Error management 
questions; (4) A section inviting suggestions for increasing effectiveness in the operating 
theatres.  
ORMAQ has been used in various studies assessing attitudes among surgeons, nurses 
and anaesthetists in US and European hospitals and has been shown to be valid and 
reliable (Sexton, Thomas et al. 2000).  
 
4.3.2.3 Medical Team Training questionnaire (MTT). 
MTT was developed from the Team Training Questionnaire developed at Veterans 
Affairs (VA) Medical centres in US. This questionnaire was used to evaluate the impact 
of team training based learning exercise for the theatre teams and tested on 384 
healthcare staff members. The MTT consists of four factors: 1) Organisational culture, 2) 
Communication, 3) Teamwork, and 4) Human factors awareness. The MTT study has 
shown construct validity but other psychometric properties and reliability need to be 
assessed further. 
 
4.4 Discussion. 
Teamwork questionnaire surveys offer a quick and easy way to assess theatre staffs’ 
perceptions. A study conducted at Johns Hopkins Hospital in US demonstrated that 
improvements in SAQ safety climate is associated with fewer medication errors and 
reduced length of hospital stay (Thomas, Sexton et al. 2005). Questionnaire surveys are 
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also less resource intensive, requiring little training in their use. Therefore, organisations 
can frequently use them as part of their quality improvement programmes. They can 
help identify specific areas of concern and disparities in the safety attitudes of team 
members and highlight problems within the work culture.  
As a teamwork assessment tool, these questionnaires have some limitations. These 
surveys are based on self-reports and staff’s perceptions, which may not necessarily 
reflect the actual behaviours in the operating theatres. These surveys may highlight 
concerns relating to teamwork but do not divulge further information into team 
interactions and more specific problems within the operating theatres. Surveys are an 
additional workload for theatre staff and may not be completed sincerely or accurately 
thereby reducing their reliability. Theatre environment is a dynamic environment with 
numerous site and specific variability. The surveys are designed to answer specific 
questions that may not be applicable to all the specialties. Furthermore, a study 
conducted at 52 sites in US (44 VA medical centres and 8 academic medical centres) 
showed that the risk adjusted morbidity and mortality in these hospitals did not correlate 
with the different organisational climate safety factors in the SAQ.  However, the 
reported levels of positive communication correlated with lower risk adjusted morbidity 
(Davenport, Henderson et al. 2007). 
All the behaviour rating systems have been developed based on teamwork concepts 
from aviation or teamwork models previously used in these industries. These rating 
systems can be useful in identifying poor behaviours and designing improvement 
training and feedback to the teams. However, they are limited by the set criteria 
specified in the tool and are therefore unable to capture behaviours and events outside 
the scope of the system or different from the exemplar behaviours. Nevertheless, they 
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capture actual teamwork behaviours rather than perceptions of teamwork and can be 
used to assess teamwork performance in training setups and provide useful feedback to 
the participants. 
OTAS and NOTECHS have been used in real theatre settings but other systems remain 
to be studied in such setting. Moreover, NOTSS and ANTS assess teamwork skills of 
specific team members rather than the entire team.  
All the behavioural rating systems are expensive to set up and rely on the observer’s 
understanding of the situation. Therefore they require intense training and reliability 
testing to reduce observer error and bias. These observers have to be present in the 
operating theatres, which in itself might create an observation bias and alter the 
behaviours of the team members.. 
Behavioural rating systems have been adopted from aviation's NOTECHS but it is 
essential that changes be made to make them suitable for surgery. For example, OTAS, 
in addition to behaviour rating, also uses a task checklist that evaluated the level of 
teamwork in performing tasks within the operating theatres such as setting up 
equipments for surgery, connecting the diathermy machine to the patient, surgeon 
checking the availability of blood group and cross match etc. This, up to a certain extent 
diminishes the dependence on an observer's subjective ratings. One of the limitations of 
the OTAS has been that it is very lengthy and ideally requires two observers, one to 
complete the checklist and the other to complete the behavioural ratings. Other 
limitations of the research in behavioural rating scales conducted so far have been the 
sample size. Observational studies are exhaustive and observer needs to be vigilant 
throughout the surgical procedure. Most of the studies that assess behavioural rating 
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systems have been conducted on shorter and less complex surgical procedures such as 
cholecystectomies. Major complex procedures are not only lengthy but may pose 
different set of problems that are yet to be assessed using the behavioural rating 
systems. Also, there is a paucity of benchmarking data to be able to evaluate quality 
service provision. 
Field note based observation tools are more detailed in their ability to explore systems 
factors and teamwork failures. They also provide an opportunity to understand the 
systems factors underlying technical and equipment related failures. Similar to a root 
cause analysis pathway, experts can use these field notes to reconstruct failure events 
and explore the underlying factors and teamwork failures. Further, unlike behavioural 
rating systems where observers score individual members’ teamwork skills, field note 
observations, pay more emphasis on the entire team and also describe the impact of the 
events on outcomes such as technical errors, theatre efficiency and patient safety. This 
information can be directly useful in developing interventions to address problems with 
specific teams. However, one limitation of the observation studies conducted till date 
has been a lack of a common taxonomy. Different systems of coding field notes have 
been used which prevents any comparison between different studies. The coding 
systems are also driven by the objectives and aims of the studies for example, 
Catchpole et al primarily divided events into minor, moderate and major events, whereas 
Wiegmann et al classified events into disruptions and subsequently identifying 
associated teamwork failures that were associated with these disruptions. Most of the 
studies are one time comparative studies therefore reliability and reproducibility remains 
to be assessed.  
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4.5 Conclusion. 
Assessment of teamwork in surgery is varied with no established benchmark 
assessment tool. While surveys are easy to design and administer, they may not 
represent the true teamwork behaviours of the surgical team. Behavioural ratings and 
field note based observations provide a more detailed assessment of teamwork but 
require experts, and are time and resource intensive. Behaviour ratings and 
questionnaires have been used to evaluate effectiveness of teamwork interventions 
where as field notes studies have primarily been used to describe problems and failures 
in operating theatres.  
There is a need to design and test measurement tools that could combine the benefits of 
all the methodologies and provide a more comprehensive and structured view of 
teamwork in operating theatres.  
The findings of this review will be used in the subsequent chapters to design an 
observational method of teamwork assessment that combines the benefits of field note 
observations with the systematic coding framework of the behavioural rating systems. 
This measure will be used to describe teamwork in operating theatres more extensively, 
evaluate teamwork interventions, and further assess the impact of teamwork on patient 
safety and theatre functioning. 
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Chapter 5 
An overview of research programme and methodology 	  	  
5.1 Introduction. 
The introductory chapters give a detailed background to research on teamwork in 
healthcare and surgery. Before I proceed onto the study chapters, I present an overview 
of the research programme to discuss the background to the studies, the methodology, 
the relationship of the studies to each other and the evolution of the research 
programme. 
 
5.2 Mixed methods research. 
Teamwork research has been largely conducted by psychologists using qualitative 
methodology (Helmreich RL 1998; Helmreich 1998; Lingard, Reznick et al. 2002; West 
2004; Lingard, Whyte et al. 2006). However some psychologists have used both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to describe teamwork in surgery (Lingard, Espin et 
al. 2004). While qualitative methodology has laid the foundations and principles of 
teamwork research, I wanted to design my research project amalgamating the benefits 
of quantitative clinical research with the insight of qualitative research. Therefore I chose 
mixed methodology for my research. According to Creswell et al., “mixed methods 
research is an approach to inquiry that combines or associates both qualitative and 
quantitative forms. It involves the use of both the studies in tandem so that the overall 
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strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research” (Creswell 
2009). While qualitative research is helpful in an in-depth analysis of a problem, it 
cannot be used to quantify the differences or strength of association between variables. 
Quantitative research may have the benefit of demonstrating statistically significant 
differences but it does not highlight the underlying factors and their impact on a system. 
Therefore, a mixed methods research was deemed most appropriate for a study of this 
nature and scale, and enabled me to quantify the impact of teamwork on patient safety 
in surgery and explore the factors underlying patient harm as well as the interventions to 
mitigate this harm. Below I present an overview of the methods adopted in my research 
studies.  
 
5.3 Methodology. 
As I commenced my PhD research in 2007, a global WHO project was underway to pilot 
a surgical safety checklist to improve patient safety in operating theatres. WHO checklist 
was designed by a panel of expert surgeons, nurses, anaesthetists and patient safety 
experts under the WHO safe Surgery Saves Lives project. The checklist design has 
been described in chapter 6. The first study I carried out was a part of the pilot to test 
the WHO checklist in a London based tertiary care NHS hospital. This study was a pre-
post study designed to assess the impact of checklist on clinical outcomes after surgery 
in a NHS hospital. To assess the impact of WHO checklist intervention it was introduced 
in two operating theatres. The surgeries performed in these two operating theatres 
included general surgery, orthopaedic surgery and gynaecology including both elective 
and emergency procedures. Data was collected on 360 surgical cases in two operating 
theatres prior to introducing the WHO checklist. Subsequently, data was collected on a 
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further 360 cases. The data was collected through an intra-operative data form, which 
contained questions on process measures, such as administration of antibiotics, 
confirmation of patient identity etc. The data on morbidity and mortality was collected 
post- operatively. Further a subset of cases was observed to assess teamwork through 
a modified OTAS teamwork checklist.  
 
This study provided me an opportunity to assess and understand the impact of checklist 
on teamwork as well as theatre efficiency. Further details of methods and results of this 
study have been described in Chapter 6.  
The results of this study showed that checklist improves teamwork and patient safety 
related processes however the impact on clinical outcomes could not be directly 
associated to the checklist. There was a further need to understand the perceived 
impact of the checklist among its users and human factors associated with checklist 
intervention and design framework to further assess the impact of WHO checklist. 
Therefore, next I conducted an interview study to understand surgeons, anaesthetists 
and nurses perception of WHO checkist. I designed a semi-structured interview study to 
understand theatre teams’ (surgeons, nurses, ODPs and anaesthetists) perception of 
the WHO checklist and it’s perceived impact on teamwork, patient safety and theatre 
efficiency. I enrolled 15 participants using snowball technique. The recruitment was 
continued until theme saturation was attained. The interviews were conducted using a 
topic guide (Appendix 2) and recorded and transcribed for analysis. The analysis was 
conducted using NVIVO software to identify emerging themes.  
I decided to conduct this interview study to understand the perceptions of theatre teams 
towards teamwork and patient safety and the role of checklist. From the interview study 
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it emerged that the impact of checklist on clinical outcomes was not evident to NHS 
staff, therefore there was a need to define surrogate markers of teamwork, patient safety 
and theatre efficiency that could be used to further evaluate the impact of checklist as a 
teamwork intervention. Further, it would help me in understanding the barriers to the 
implementation of checklist and modify it to make it more NHS specific. This interview 
study and its results have been detailed in chapter 7. 
 
My next study aims to study various teamwork failures, explore their association with 
technical failures and equipment failures and describes the impact on patient safety and 
theatre efficiency. In this study, I describe an ethnographic framework designed to 
quantify and assess teamwork failures, equipment failures and technical failures and 
their impact on patient safety and efficiency in operating theatres. This study was key to 
define surrogate markers of teamwork and patient safety that could be studied to 
understand the impact of WHO checklist in greater detail. Further, from the theatre 
teams’ interviews it emerged that clinical outcomes may not clearly represent the quality 
of surgical care provided and the benefits of checklist perceived by the surgeons, nurses 
and anaesthetists. Improvement in clinical processes in operating theatres will contribute 
to improvement in patient outcomes but the impact would be indirect and therefore not 
easily measurable. For any teamwork intervention such as a checklist, to be sustainable, 
staff should be able to perceive a positive impact on intra-operative patient safety and 
theatre productivity. These surrogate markers can be broadly identified as teamwork 
failures in the operating theatres, technical failures in the performance of surgical 
procedures, equipment problems and theatre efficiency. 
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The study of technical failures in surgery has traditionally been retrospective through 
case record reviews and has been predominantly clinical outcome related. It has been 
found that technical failures are often associated with poor teamwork in the operating 
theatres (Mishra, Catchpole et al. 2009) and may lead to patient harm, increased length 
of hospital stay and even death. Equipment failures are common in operating theatres, 
yet being part of the daily routine, largely ignored. Very few studies describe these 
failures and explore their causation despite their prevalence and impact on surgery and 
team dynamics (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006).  
This study uses a prospective field note approach to observe and understand surgical 
systems and study teamwork failures in operating theatres and their association to 
technical failures and equipment failures in operating theatres.  
The methods used in this study were adopted from the ethnographic methodology 
widely used in social sciences. Catchpole et al and Christian et al have previously used 
‘field’ notes to describe events and problems in operating theatres (Catchpole, Giddings 
et al. 2006; Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Similarly, Lingard et al have used field 
notes to observe and classify communication failures in operating theatres (Lingard, 
Regehr et al. 2006). Wiegmann et al (Wiegmann, ElBardissi et al. 2007) observed 
cardiothoracic surgeries with the main emphasis on surgical errors and flow, however, 
they did not classify teamwork errors and concentrated on detection times for surgical 
errors rather than impact on patient safety. Undre et al developed an observational tool 
called the Observational teamwork Assessment in Surgery (OTAS) where observers use 
a task list to assess completion of teamwork tasks and simultaneously use behavioral 
rating to assess teamwork skills of the surgical team members. Many of these studies 
were focused on a limited aspect of teamwork in the operating theatre such as 
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communication errors in operating theatres and their interactions. My study aims to 
schematically capture various teamwork failures, explore their association with technical 
failures and equipment failures and describes the impact on patient safety and theatre 
efficiency.  Further details and results of this study have been described in chapter 8.	  
From the interview study and teamwork ethnographic framework study it emerged that 
equipment problems are common in operating theatres. Equipment problems emerged 
as an important indicator of teamwork in operating theatres therefore, it was necessary 
to investigate these problems further to understand teamwork in operating theatres. It is 
a common perception that equipment problems are frequent in operating theatre 
environments, yet there is a paucity of studies that investigate these errors in detail.  
 I designed this study to understand the scale of equipment problems in UK operating 
theatres, their impact on patient safety and theatre efficiency. For this study I collected 
data from general surgical, orthopaedic, vascular and gynaecology procedures in 
operating theatres at three NHS hospitals. The data was collected using structured self-
report forms (Appendix 4) that were completed by the surgeon and scrub-nurse 
collectively at the end of each procedure. The data form was designed to capture the 
equipment problems faced by the theatre teams, how they were dealt with and their 
perceived impact on theatre efficiency and patient safety.  Further, I observed a subset 
of operations to (1) collect similar data on equipment problems to assess the 
underreporting of equipment problems and their perceived impact. (2) I also analysed 
the teamwork failures underlying those equipment problems and their impact using the 
ethnographic framework. Further details of the methods and results of this study have 
been described in Chapter 9. 
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While the equipment problem data self-report study was being carried out, I also 
conducted semi-structured interviews with surgeons and theatre nurses to understand 
the factors underlying these equipment problems, how they emerged as a result of poor 
teamwork in the complex system. Further, the interview study also aimed to understand 
the role of checklist as an intervention to reduce equipment problems. Surgeons and 
theatre nurses were recruited for the interviews till new themes stopped emerging. The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed and coded with NVIVO software into different 
themes using the Vincent et al. framework of analysis described in chapter 2. This study 
and its findings are described in Chapter 10. 
From these studies I established a robust understanding of teamwork in operating 
theatres and its association with theatre problems, delays, and patient safety. Teamwork 
failures, equipment failures and technical failures emerged as measures of teamwork 
and patient safety in operating theatres.  
 
The final study described in this thesis is a prospective observation study that adopts the 
ethnographic surgical team framework to assess the impact of WHO checklist. The 
WHO surgical checklist has been mandated for use in all operations in England and 
Wales. The checklist was implemented in all NHS theatres. Therefore a pre-post 
longitudinal study was not feasible. However, with the implementation of checklist, it was 
evident that the conduct of checklist by different theatre teams was variable. To assess 
the impact of WHO checklist, it was essential to assess the quality of checklist use by 
theatre teams. My hypothesis was the checklist would have a positive impact on patient 
safety and teamwork during operations where the checklist was performed well.  For this 
study I designed a data form to assess quality of checklist use. For each case under 
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study, teamwork failures, equipment failures, technical failures and their impact on 
patient safety and theatre delays were measured. Self-reported surveys were conducted 
for each case to assess surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists perceived quality of 
checklist use, benefits of WHO checklist and level of teamwork. Correlation analysis was 
conducted to understand the association between quality of checklist use, teamwork 
failures and theatre teams self reported perceptions. Further details of methods and 
results of this study have been described in chapter 11. 
 
5.4 Conclusion. 
I have used mixed methods for this research project. This helped me understanding 
teamwork and patient safety in surgery both at a macro level that can be quantified and 
measured, as well as a micro level that provides an understanding of the complex 
factors underpinning a complex surgical system.   
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Chapter 6 
Impact of WHO surgical checklist on teamwork and patient 
safety  
6.1 Introduction. 
Preventable harm caused to patients undergoing surgery has been a growing concern 
globally. In January 2007, World Health Organisation’s (WHO) World Alliance for patient 
Safety began its work on Second global Patient Safety Challenge. They launched the 
“Safe Surgery Saves Lives” project, aimed at improving patient safety in surgery on a 
global scale. This international effort has resulted in the development of a WHO surgical 
checklist (World_Health_Organisation) that includes items to ensure basic minimum 
surgical safety checks and has been developed with the intention that it can be applied 
across the world. In addition to ensuring all necessary checks, the checklist also sets a 
platform for improving teamwork in the operating theatres. It encourages the theatre 
team to discuss the procedure and equipment needs, confirm patient identity and 
exchange information that may be relevant to post-operative patient care. The WHO 
checklist underwent evaluation at eight international pilot sites across the 8 WHO 
territories. My hospital was one of the pilot sites for the study. The introduction of WHO 
surgical checklist in the OT provided an opportunity to study the improvement in patient 
safety processes, clinical outcomes, and theatre teamwork with an intervention aimed at 
improving patient safety. 
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This study describes the results of the UK site for Safe Surgery Saves Lives project to 
pilot a surgical checklist (Haynes, Weiser et al. 2009).  
6.1.1 Intervention- The WHO surgical safety checklist (Figure 6.1). 
 
6.1.1.1 Checklist development. 
The Safe surgery saves lives checklist project was initiated under the 2nd Global patient 
safety challenge in January 2007. The first international consultation was held in 
Geneva. The consultation was chaired by Prof. Atul Gawande, the lead for Safe surgery 
saves lives project, and comprised of 50 surgeons, nurses, anaesthetists and patient 
safety experts from all over the world. The objectives of the first consultation were to 
address two questions: 1. What are the potential minimum standards of surgical care 
that can be universally applied across countries and settings and will improve the safety 
of surgical care? 2. What measurement systems can be implemented to monitor the 
progress and improvement of surgical safety resulting from these standards? To find 
answers to these questions, and develop an intervention to improve patient safety and 
teamwork in operating theatres, four safe surgery team working groups were formed. 
These team working groups were: 1. Clean surgery, 2. Safe anaesthesia, 3. Safe 
surgical teams and 4. Measurement. The objectives for the Safe Surgical Teams 
Working Group were to: 
• Determine how to improve the safety of surgery through teamwork and performance 
improvement. 
• Develop a set of guidelines to improve safety of patients undergoing surgery. 
• Determine what elements might be incorporated into the checklist to achieve this. 
• Evaluate the evidence for including such elements. 
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In April 2007, the first technical working group meeting was held where the initial draft of 
a surgical checklist, as an intervention to improve teamwork and patient safety in 
surgery, was discussed. In the second technical working group meeting, the final version 
of the surgical safety checklist was reviewed and technical documents supporting the 
evidence behind the checklist were finalised. Further information on development of 
WHO checklist is available on the WHO website.  
  
6.1.1.2 Checklist design. 
The checklist consisted of 19 item checks (Figure 6.1). The checklist was divided into 
three parts: the Sign-in, Time-out and Sign-out.  
 
Sign-in. 
The sign-in is performed when the patient enters the anaesthesia room or the operating 
theatre, prior to induction of anaesthesia. The anaesthetist and anaesthesia assistant 
perform the sign-in with the patient awake. It consists of 7 checks: 1. Confirmation of 
patient identity, procedure and consent; 2. Surgical site marking confirmation; 3. 
Anaesthesia safety checks; 4. Functioning Pulse oximeter attached to the patient, 5. 
Patient allergies; 6. Difficult airway or aspiration risk; and 7. Expected blood loss.  
 
Time-out. 
The Time-out is conducted with the anaesthetised patient on the operating table. It is 
conducted just prior to surgical incision with the surgeon, assistant surgeon, scrub 
nurse, circulating nurse, anaesthetist and ODP (Anaesthesia assistant) present in the 
operating theatre. The nurse or the anaesthetist initiates/ leads the Time-out using the 
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paper checklist and all the team members pause during this period and exchange 
information as required during the completion of Time-out checks. There are seven 
checks in this section of the checklist: 1. Confirmation that all team members have been 
introduced by name and role; 2. Confirmation of the patient’s identity, surgical site, and 
procedure;  3. Surgeon reviews critical and unexpected steps, operative duration, and 
anticipated blood loss, 4. Anesthesia staff reviews concerns specific to the patient; 5. 
Nursing staff review confirmation of sterility, equipment availability, and other concerns; 
6. Confirmation that prophylactic antibiotics have been administered ≤60 min before 
incision is made; and 7. Confirmation that all essential imaging results for the correct 
patient are displayed.   
 
Sign-out. 
At the conclusion of the procedure, team performs a Sign-Out before the surgeon leaves 
the operating theatre. It consists of five item checks performed aloud by the nurse 
conducting the checks: 1. Name of the procedure as recorded; 2. Confirmation that 
needle, sponge, and instrument counts are complete; 3. Confirmation of correct 
specimen labelling including patient’s name; 4. Whether there are any issues with 
equipment to be addressed and finally; 5. The surgeon, nurse, and anesthesia 
professional review aloud the key concerns for the recovery and care of the patient. 
The actual conduct of the checklist has been shown in the video recorded in the CD 
provided. These videos can also be accessed on the NPSA website 
(http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/nrls/improvingpatientsafety/anaesthesia-and-
surgery/implementingthechecklist/how-to-use-the-who-surgical-safety-checklist/). 
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Figure 6.1 WHO Surgical checklist. 
 
 
6.2 Aims. 
The aim of this study was: 
• To assess the effectiveness of this checklist in improving patient safety processes 
in operating theatres and in reducing postoperative morbidity and mortality. 
• To assess the impact of checklist on Teamwork in the operating theatres and 
• To assess the impact of checklist on theatre efficiency. 
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6.3 Methods. 
6.3.1 Study Design. 
Pre and post study to evaluate WHO surgical safety checklist. 
6.3.2 Participants and materials. 
6.3.2.1 Sample. 
The study was conducted in two operating theatres. One theatre was used for 
orthopaedic procedures and the second theatre was used for general surgery and 
gynaecology procedures. Data was collected prospectively for 357 surgeries in the pre-
intervention phase. Once the checklist was introduced in the theatres, data was 
collected on further 351 cases. Ethics approval was obtained from the National research 
ethics committee for this study. Written consent was taken from all the surgeons, 
nurses, and anaesthetists working in the study operating theatres. 
 
6.3.3 Data collection. 
 
6.3.4.1 Patient safety processes and clinical outcome. 
The measures used for assessing effectiveness of the checklist were classified into 
Processes and outcomes  (table 6.1). Process measures are useful in measuring the 
quality of care and understanding the areas of improvement in a system and are 
sensitive to assessing the improvements in patient safety practices at the grass root 
level. The data was collected using a standardised data collection form as shown in 
appendix 1. I distributed the form to the anaesthetist for each case to gather the 
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intraoperative data that I collated at the end of each case. For of 30% of cases, I 
remained in the theatre for the entire case and collected the data simultaneously (along 
with the anaesthetist) to assess the accuracy of data collection. This technique was 
employed to capture consecutive case data as there were multiple lists being performed 
in different theatres simultaneously and I could not have been physically present for all 
the cases for the entire procedure. Therefore this technique ensured that reliable data 
was captured for consecutive patient procedures. To collect the outcomes data, I 
retrospectively followed the patients post-operatively, until discharge, or death, or a 
hospital stay of 30 days, which ever was the earliest. In cases where the clinical 
outcomes and complications were not clear, the doctors responsible for the patient’s 
care were directly approached to confirm post-operative outcomes and complications.  
The data collection was started in November 2007 for a period of 4 months. In February 
2008, the WHO surgical checklist was introduced in the pilot operating theatres over a 
period of 6 weeks. During this period, the theatre teams were introduced to the checklist 
intervention through a lecture on patient safety and checklists and also presented the 
initial results of the pre-checklist data set. During the implementation period, the 
research team was available in the operating theatre complex to train theatre staff in the 
use of checklist. After the introduction of the checklist, data was collected until 
September 2008. 
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Table 6.1 Measures for effectiveness of checklist. 
Process measure Outcome measure 
•Appropriate antibiotic prophylaxis- antibiotics 
administered within 60 min. before skin incision 
•Airway assessment- appropriate airway 
assessment before start of procedure 
•Pulse oximetry- use of pulse oxymeter for all 
procedures 
•Confirmation of patient identity- Confirmation 
of patient identity, site and procedure collectively 
by all team members before skin incision 
•Appropriate i/v access- two large bore cannulas 
for all major surgeries or expected blood loss of 
more than 500ml 
•Swab, instrument and needle count- 
Conducting counts for all surgeries 
•Surgical site infections 
• Complications- (Defined as in American 
College of Surgeons’ National Surgical Quality 
Improvement Program):  
Acute renal failure, bleeding requiring the 
transfusion of 4 or more units of red cells within 
the first 72 hours after surgery, cardiac arrest 
requiring cardiopulmonary resuscitation, coma 
of 24 hours’ duration or more, deep-vein 
thrombosis, myocardial infarction, unplanned 
intubation, ventilator use for 48 hours or more, 
pneumonia, pulmonary embolism, stroke, major 
disruption of wound, infection of surgical site, 
sepsis, septic shock, the systemic inflammatory 
response syndrome, unplanned return 
to the operating room 
•Post-op mortality- Death within 30 days of 
surgery 
 
  
 
6.3.4.2 Teamwork measures  
For 100 cases, Intra-operative teamwork was assessed using a modified version of 
OTAS (Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery Tool) checklist. As described 
in chapter 4, OTAS tool has been previously used in operating theatres to reliably 
assess teamwork task completion. However, the original OTAS consisted of more than 
150 task checks. For this study, it was not practically feasible to complete the entire 
OTAS checklist. Therefore I organized a group of expert surgeon, patient safety 
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psychologist who designed the OTAS tool, to extract 16 teamwork item checks from the 
OTAS to represent communication task checks, patient task checks and equipment task 
checks.  
1.Team communication tasks. 
• Surgeon briefs team about procedure. 
• Anaesthetist briefs team about anaesthetic risks. 
• Team confirms patient identity. 
• Team confirms procedure. 
• Team confirms operation site. 
• Team confirms, patient position is appropriate. 
• Team communicate about Antibiotic prophylaxis. 
• Team communicate about DVT prophylaxis. 
2. Team equipment tasks 
• Nurse enquires about special instrument. 
• Surgeon informs about special instrument. 
• Surgeon checks availability of equipment.  
• Surgeon informs of special investigation. 
3. Team’s patient safety tasks. 
• Surgeon asks if he can start. 
• Scrub nurse informs surgeon of swab count. 
• Scrub nurse informs surgeon of instrument count. 
• Scrub nurse informs surgeon of needle count. 
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6.3.4.3 Theatre efficiency. 
We were also interested to know if the checklist had an impact on the efficient running of 
the operating theatres and if the checklist led to any delays due to additional workload 
for theatre staff. I compared the cancellation of surgeries on the elective lists during the 
pre-checklist phase with period where checklist was used in the theatres. Only those 
cancellations were used in the comparison, which were due to problems occurring on 
the day of surgery, such as unavailability of equipments or notes or beds and lack of 
time on the list. Cancellations due to change in medical/surgical condition of the patient 
and non- attendance were excluded. In particular, I was interested to assess any 
cancellations due to shortage of time as an additional checklist task was introduced. 
Theatre delays and inadequate utilisation of theatre time are a major concern for the 
NHS management and consultants. Therefore, to “get on” with the list without the 
researcher pestering the surgical team to use the checklist was not an uncommon 
feeling. Considering that it may take a few minutes to conduct the checklist for each 
case on the list, I compared percentage delays of more than 15 minutes in theatre list 
start and finish times. 
6.3.5 Data analysis. 
The data for this study was collected in a way that ensured anonymity of the 
participants. The data collection forms had a separate section to identify the case, date 
and name of the patient and each data form was assigned a unique number. Once 
process and outcome data was collected, the case identification sections were detached 
from the data forms and stored separately until the study was over. The data was 
entered onto excel spreadsheets. Frequencies were calculated for performance of 
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specified safety measures, major complications, and death before and after 
implementation of the checklist. Chi-square test was used identify significant differences 
between pre and post checklist implementation rates for process and outcome 
measures. Chi-square test was performed to assess significant differences between rate 
of theatre delays and cancellations.   
 
6.4 Results. 
357 patients were recruited in pre-checklist phase and 351 patients were enrolled in 
post-checklist phase. The study samples consisted of procedures from General Surgery, 
Gynaecology and Orthopaedic surgery. The procedures ranged from simple 
arthroscopies and hernia repairs to more complex revision arthroplasties and 
oesophagectomies. The percentage of emergency surgeries recruited was 18.8% in pre-
checklist phase and 14.5% in post-checklist phase. 30% of case (n=210) were parallel 
observed by anaesthetist and myself with 98% accuracy in inter-observer data 
measurement. 
6.4.1 Patient safety processes and clinical outcomes. 
There was a significant improvement in timely antibiotic prophylaxis with the use of 
checklist (Figure 6.2). There was also some improvement noted in airway assessment 
with the checklist (Figure 6.3). 
The confirmation of patient identity, site and procedure by the whole team together, in 
the operating theatre increased from 9.5% in pre-checklist period to 97.2% in post-
checklist period. In the pre-checklist period, the hospital protocol needed only the Nurse 
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and/or the ODP to confirm the patient’s identity in the theatre, which was performed in 
all cases. 
No significant difference was noticed in the use of appropriate I/V access for the 
surgeries. Conduct of swab, instrument and needle counts was uniformly high in both 
the phases of the study. 
Use of checklist also indicates a trend towards reduction in post-operative adverse 
outcomes. The Surgical site infections reduced from 2.0% to 1.7%, and post-operative 
mortality also declined from 1.1% in pre-checklist period to 0.3% in post-checklist period 
but the results did not achieve significance (P value- 0.1, chi.sq-2.56, df-1) (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.2 Adequate Antibiotic Prophylaxis. 
 
(P-value- 0.00, chi.sq-28.11, df-1) 
Figure 6.3 Airway assessment. 
 
(P-value-0.01, chi.sq-7.14, df-1) 
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Figure 6.4 Post surgery complication and death rate. 
 
 
6.4.2 Teamwork. 
In the pre-checklist phase, 33 cases were open surgeries and 17 cases were 
laparoscopic procedures. In post-checklist phase 24 cases were open procedures and 
26 cases were laparoscopic procedures. The average number of Team tasks completed 
in Pre-checklist phase were 3.88, which increased to 14.96 in post-checklist phase. 
In pre-checklist phase, the team discussed equipment needs in only 18-22% of cases. 
DVT prophylaxis was checked in only 10% of cases. Antibiotic prophylaxis was 
discussed in only 32% cases. Scrub nurses failed to inform surgeon of swab, instrument 
and needle count in 84% of cases (Table 6.2).  
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Table 6.2 Team task completion rate. 
 Team tasks Pre-checklist (%) Post-checklist (%) 
1 Nurse enquires about special instrument 18 80 
2 Surgeon informs about special instrument 22 97 
3 Surgeon checks availability of equipment  12 100 
4 Surgeon informs of special investigation 5 80 
5 Surgeon briefs team about procedure 24 100 
6 Anaesthetist briefs team about anaesthetic risks 12 100 
7 Team confirms patient identity 8 100 
8 Team confirms procedure 10 100 
9 Team confirms operation site 16 100 
10 Team confirms, patient position is appropriate 64 100 
11 Team communicate about Antibiotic prophylaxis 32 100 
12 Team communicate about DVT prophylaxis 10 63 
13 Surgeon asks if he can start 64 97 
14 Scrub nurse informs surgeon of swab count 18 90 
15 Scrub nurse informs surgeon of instrument count 16 90 
16 Scrub nurse informs surgeon of needle count 16 90 
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6.4.3 Impact of the checklist on theatre efficiency. 
The surgical checklist had a significant impact on the patient safety processes and 
surgical outcomes. However, it was believed that the additional workload introduced by 
the checklist might lead to theatre delays and cancellations due to shortage of time. On 
comparing the (on-the day) cancellation of surgeries in the period before and after the 
implementation of WHO checklist, the results were suggestive of a reduction in 
cancellations, (Figure 6.5) from 2.05% to 0.85%. In particular, cancellations due to lack 
of time on the elective sessions also showed a marginal reduction from 0.54% to 0.38% 
during the checklist phase.  Though the reduction is not significant, it suggests a trend, 
which may be confirmed once the checklist is implemented on a wider scale.  
Figure 6.5 Surgery cancellations. 
 
On day cancellations- (Chi.sq- 0.5039, df-1, P>0.1), Cancellation due to shortage of time-(Chi.sq- 0.0279 
df-1, P>0.5) 
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On comparing the number of lists with more than 15 minutes delay between the pre-
checklist and post-checklist period, I found no significant difference (Table. 6.3) in list 
delays with the use of checklist.  
 
Table 6.3 Comparison of theatre delays. 
Theatre lists Pre-checklist 
(%) 
Post-checklist 
(%) 
Significance 
Theatre lists with delayed 
start 
44.04 45.70 P- 0.76 
(Chi.sq-0.0557,df-1) 
Theatre lists with delayed 
finish 
35.70 41.05 P-0.26 
(Chi.sq-0.6051,df-1) 
Theatre lists that started 
on time but finished late 
20.08 23.90 P-0.55 
(Chi.sq-0.4243,df-1) 
 
6.5 Discussion. 
There was a significant improvement in patient safety processes with the use of the 
WHO surgical checklist. The checklist creates a culture in the OT, which encourages the 
teams to communicate and adhere to patient safety processes. As the checklist not only 
ensures certain minimum safety standards but also addresses equipment needs for 
each surgery, a few minutes well spent could over a period, reduce operative duration 
and thereby list delays. 
In the Hospital where the checklist was piloted, the Trust policy mandated that patient 
identity check be performed by Anaesthesia practitioners in the induction room and 
surgeons checked the patient identity and procedure in the wards prior to patient coming 
into theatres. Confirmation of patient identity, site and procedure in the OT was not a 
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policy. This could account for the low adherence (9.7%) to the identity confirmation 
processes in the pre-checklist phase.  There was only a marginal improvement in airway 
assessment practices, which could be due to the variability in choice of airway for 
different procedures such as use of laryngeal mask airway or endotracheal tubes.  
The global study results of the WHO checklist evaluation study showed a significant 
reduction in surgical morbidity and mortality (Haynes, Weiser et al. 2009). However, the 
UK pilot site post-operative outcomes show a trend towards improvement with the use of 
surgical checklist but the results are not significant. There was a reduction in post-
operative mortality during the checklist phase however, the postoperative mortality rate 
in the UK hospital is very low and therefore to draw any significant conclusions further 
studies may be required with larger sample size.   
The post-operative outcome data was collected only till the point of patient discharge 
therefore any complications occurring after discharge were not picked up. To assess the 
effect of checklist on theatre efficiency, seasonal trends could be a confounding factor. It 
was also observed that during the post intervention period, once the research team 
reduced intensity of checklist drive and went away from the operating theatres, the use 
of checklist dropped and as a result the researchers had to actively drive the use of 
checklist. 
For the checklist to be effective, it should be conducted regularly and systematically. 
This factor could be responsible for the persistent problems in airway assessment and 
I/V access processes. Another drawback of the study could be that the quality of 
checklist use could not be assessed but this limitation will be dealt with in my further 
studies on checklist use in the theatre. 
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The checklist clearly shows an improvement in team communication in the operating 
theatres. It can be attributed to fact that checklists create a platform for opening 
communication between team members. It encourages team members to ask questions 
and interject if in doubt thereby removing the element of ambiguity.  
DVT prophylaxis was not a check included in the surgical checklist but it is a safety 
measure relevant to NHS. It is evident that as it was not a part of checklist, the team 
discussed DVT prophylaxis in fewer cases. But it still shows an improvement from 10% 
in pre-checklist phase to 63% in post-checklist phase, which may suggest an 
improvement in safety culture in the operating theatre. As the team started talking about 
antibiotic prophylaxis, it was observed that they were more open about asking other 
relevant questions, which they considered important such as DVT prophylaxis. In the 
post-checklist phase, the teams confirmed swab, needle and instrument in 90% cases 
as compared to only 10% cases in pre-checklist phase. The 10% cases in post-checklist 
phase in which the teams did not communicate about the counts were the cases in 
which the sign out part of the checklist was not performed.  
It was also observed that during the post intervention period, once the research team 
reduced intensity of checklist drive and went away from the operating theatres, the use 
of checklist dropped and as a result the researchers had to actively drive the use of 
checklist. While the checklist use has shown a clear improvement in patient safety 
processes, some theatre staff was reluctant to perform the checklist, as they did not see 
the relevance of WHO checklist in the NHS. Therefore I conducted the next study in 
which I interviewed the theatre team members to understand the drawbacks and 
benefits of the WHO checklist and how to make the checklist more NHS specific. 
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6.6 Conclusion. 
This study shows that adherence to patient safety processes in the operating theatres 
can be variable and the WHO checklist clearly improves these processes. It also 
improves the teamwork and communication. The study also indicates a trend towards a 
reduction in surgical morbidity and mortality, but to establish significant reductions 
further studies with a larger sample may be required. Moreover, further studies are 
needed to assess how well checklists are used and how they can be made more NHS 
and specialty specific. 
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Chapter 7  
Theatre teams’ perception of impact of WHO checklist on 
teamwork and patient safety 
7.1 Introduction. 
The WHO surgical checklist was implemented and evaluated in two operating theatres 
in St. Mary’s Hospital. As described in chapter 6, WHO checklist led to increased 
adherence to patient safety processes such as antibiotic prophylaxis increasing to 77% 
and correct patient identity check increasing to 100%. I presented the study results at 
the local surgical and nursing meets to describe the purpose of the checklist and 
generate a positive attitude for its use. However, over the period of the study, I observed 
that adherence to the checklist ranged from 40-80% (Figure 7.1). I and others have 
found that the use of pre-operative checklists has to be actively driven by a dedicated 
research team (Lingard, Espin et al. 2005). Local compliance with the use of the 
checklist was found to be variable throughout the checklist phase of the study. As I, 
reduced my constant presence in the operating theatres, the checklist compliance 
dropped to 42%, and as I again moved in to drive the checklist use, it improved again.  
Therefore, I next moved on to understand the surgeons, nurses and anesthetists’ 
perceptions of the WHO checklist and the barriers to the use of WHO checklist. There 
was a need for further research on drivers and barriers to successful compliance to 
ensure successful implementation of the checklist across the NHS. Therefore, it was 
necessary to understand the perceptions of surgeons, nurses, and anaesthetists 
regarding the surgical checklist and its impact. This chapter describes an interview study 
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that I conducted to understand the perceived benefits, shortcomings, and barriers to the 
use of the surgical checklist among the theatre staff and how to ensure a sustained 
compliance to the use of checklist.  
Figure 7.1 Surgical checklist compliance. 
 
7.2 Aims. 
• To understand the benefits and shortcomings of WHO surgical checklists. 
• To understand barriers to its use and measures necessary to demonstrate its 
effectiveness. 
• To understand how to improve its compliance and resilience.  
• To modify the WHO checklist for NHS 
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7.3 Methods. 
 
7.3.1 Study design. 
Semi-structured interview study conducted to understand the theatre staff perception of 
the WHO surgical checklist. 
7.3.2 Participants and materials. 
Fifteen healthcare professionals, including 5 surgeons, 5 anaesthetists and 5 nurses 
participated in the study. Participants were selected using a qualitative sampling frame 
(Marshall 1996) to ensure a broad spectrum of demographic and professional 
characteristics. Participants were also identified by snowball sampling techniques (Miles 
MB and AM 1994). All the participants were experienced healthcare professionals with 
more than 10 years work experience in operating theatres. 
The interviews were guided using a structured topic guide (Appendix 2) with an open 
framework, which allowed for focus and two-way communication. The topic guide was 
prepared beforehand which provided a framework for the interview. The topic guide was 
designed to explore the surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses’ views on the following 
topics: 
1) The benefits and disadvantages of using WHO checklist. 
2) Barriers to the use of WHO checklist. 
3) How to improve the WHO checklist. 
4) Checklist implementation- How to ensure the durability of the checklist. 
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 Relevant topics were initially identified and possible issues between the topics or any 
contributing factors became the basis for more specific questions during the interview in 
order to explore and identify the causes of barriers to using the WHO checklists. Some 
questions were created during the interview, which allowed the interviewer as well as 
the participant the possibility to probe for details and discuss issues.  
7.3.3 Data collection. 
All the interviews were audio recorded, transcribed verbatim, and submitted to emergent 
theme analysis. Sampling ceased when categorical and theoretical saturation was 
achieved.  
Ethical code of conduct was carefully followed; participants were given an information 
Sheet (Appendix 3) and also informed verbally on the day of the interview, of their right 
to withdraw from the study at any time during the study process. They were also 
informed that their participation was voluntary and their identity would remain 
anonymous. Consent form was given and signed by the participant as well as the 
researcher prior to the interview. 
The participants were given the opportunity to see, amend or remove sections of the 
transcripts that they did not want to be included in the study. Therefore, they could either 
give their full consent on the day of the interview, which authorised the analysis of the 
data or see and agree on the transcript before proceeding with the analysis of the 
interview data collected. 
After obtaining the participant’s consent, the interview tape and transcript were 
separated to remove the possibility of establishing any link between them, thus keeping 
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the participant’s identity confidential. The transcripts were analysed only after obtaining 
a full consent from the participant. 
7.3.4 Data analysis. 
A data management software (NVIVO 8) was used to manage the interview data. Data 
from the transcripts were imported into the NVIVO 8 software. The software was used to 
organise data according to the different categories of Vincent’s framework (Vincent, 
Taylor-Adams et al. 2000), described in chapter 2, to understand the factors responsible 
for the variability in the checklist compliance. The various factors used in creating the 
NVIVO coding framework are as follows: 
1. Organisational and Management Factors: 
• Financial Resources and constraints. 
• Organisational Structure. 
• Policy standards and goals. 
• Safety Culture and priorities. 
 
2. Work Environment: 
• Administrative and Managerial support. 
• Design, availability and maintenance of equipment. 
• Protocol. 
• Staffing levels and skill mix. 
• Workload and shift patterns. 
 
3. Team Factors: 
• Supervision and seeking help. 
• Team structure. 
• Verbal Communication. 
 118	  
• Written Communication. 
 
4. Individual (staff) Factors: 
• Knowledge and skills. 
• Motivation, physical and mental health. 
 
5. Task Factors: 
• Availability and accuracy of test results. 
• Availability and use of protocol. 
• Availability of clinical information. 
• Task design and clarity of structure. 
7.3.5 Quality assurance of data analysis and interpretation.  
The consistency (reliability) and confirmability (validity) of data analysis and 
interpretation was assessed using two techniques. Firstly, external validation of all 
stages of coding and interpretation of transcripts was performed independently by three 
experienced qualitative researchers (AV, KN, DV). The results were compared to 
confirm that there were no significant inconsistencies. Secondly, member checking was 
carried out to ensure accurate interpretation of the data where the study participants 
were approached to confirm that the emergent themes were correct and represented the 
participants’ opinions.  
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7.4 Results. 
6.4.1 Benefits of the WHO checklist. 
Emergent themes demonstrated that a majority of the respondents believed that the 
checklist would improve teamwork and communication in the operating theatre. Table 
7.1 presents some of the key benefits of the WHO checklists. Another emergent theme 
was that the checklist would add redundancy to the system, preventing adverse events 
such as wrong site surgery and surgical site infections. Some nurses were very 
optimistic about the team introductions and believed that teams introducing themselves 
in the theatre will help flatten the hierarchy and clarify the roles that different people 
present in the operating theatres have to play. Many respondents felt that the conduct of 
WHO checklist I introduced an opportunity for the staff to speak up, discuss patient and 
equipment related issues prior to the start of the surgery. This would reduce ambiguity, 
clarify roles, outline the necessary tasks and ensure their completion. An important 
theme that emerged was that often the surgical team may not see themselves as part of 
one team but, surgical, anaesthetic and nursing teams coming together to perform a 
surgical procedure. The WHO checklist allocated a joint sense of ownership to the 
surgical teams to ensure that important patient safety tasks are completed and relevant 
information exchanged between team members. 
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Table 7.1 Role of checklist in the eyes of healthcare professions. 
Themes Healthcare 
professionals (N) 
Comments  
Reduces errors  
15 
“It prevents disasters in the operating department…..If you 
cut of the wrong leg, patient is going to live with it for the 
rest of his life…. Benefit is that you perform the correct 
surgery on the correct patient” 
Reduces assumptions  
4 
“When we have an adverse event and we talk to people, 
they will say....I assumed that somebody had checked” 
Improves teamwork 
and communication 
 
15 
“There is a terrible tendency for the team actually not 
being a team”.....comment regarding the Operation theatre 
and benefits of WHO checklist  
Adds redundancy to 
patient safety 
processes 
 
5 
“There is no excuse for getting halfway through the 
operation and somebody discovering that we don’t have 
the right instruments. It is unthinkable but it still happens ”  
 (Subjects: 5 Surgeons, 5 Anaesthesia Professionals, 5 Theatre nurses) 
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7.4.2 Barriers to WHO surgical checklist implementation. 
On exploring the causes of variability in compliance and barriers to the universal use of 
checklist in the operating theatres, various factors emerged. Table 7.2 summarises the 
key factors that emerged as barriers to checklist use. 
 
7.4.2.1 Organisation and management factors. 
The culture within the organisation emerged as a major barrier to implementation of 
patient safety interventions. The cultural silos that exist within a work environment may 
influence the attitudes of staff to resist change. As one participant put it: 
‘It’s changing people’s ways of doing something. and when you change people’s ways of 
doing something it’s always more difficult to do it, whereas if you try and make them do 
the same thing in a slightly different way, then it’s more adaptable.’ (Participant 3).  
It also emerged that the staff may be reluctant to change if they do not believe that the 
checklist will bring about an improvement in patient care.  
‘The barriers are the culture which is at the moment, people’s lack of belief that it will 
actually bring about a useful change, people questioning the evidence base on which 
this is built, people being resistant to change, people being resistant to introduction of 
more protocols’ (Participant 6). 
Lack of responsibility on the part of theatre teams to use the checklist may prevent its 
use. In addition, there is a lack of clarity about who should be conducting the checklist. If 
the responsibilities and accountabilities are not well defined, staff may be reluctant to 
take on the job.  
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‘and that’s also a barrier at entry, because people generally won’t do something for 
someone unless they like them’ (Participant 3). 
‘The barriers, I think, are going to be the traditional turf wars almost.  Whose job is this?  
Is this actually the surgeon’s job or?  And these barriers, they’re sort of like, it’s almost 
like trade union things.  That’s not my job.  And there is some, there are some really silly 
rules, like the anaesthetic assistant moves the lights, not the nurse’ (Participant 4). 
 
At the same time the individual team members were reluctant to take on the 
responsibility of ensuring that the checklist was used correctly. 
‘And if the nursing team are going to change halfway through the case and if nobody 
was listening anyway and I would feel it actually really frustrating.  And I would be 
concerned about the purpose of signing it off when actually doesn’t that mean that you 
taking responsibly for it?  So who would be signing it off?  And what responsibility do 
you have then?’ (Participant 6). 
 
7.4.2.2 Work environment. 
In order for staff to perform to the best of their abilities, they should be adequately 
supported in their workplace. For instance, if a copy of the checklist is not available 
when needed, then the checks performed may not be consistent or staff may completely 
miss this task. 
‘Availability of the checklist itself is another aspect; everybody has to know where it is, 
so it has to be easily accessible.  And then the question of how it’s stored’ (Participant 
3). 
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The design of the checklist may affect staff's attitudes and willingness to conduct the 
checks. In a busy theatre schedule where the staff members are pushed for time, the 
checklist has to be simple and concise so that it acts as an ‘aid memoire’ rather than an 
extra list of work needing to be ticked. 
‘I think it’s a bit messy in these boxes, and I think it would be much simpler just to have a 
checklist, a list, and you just read straight down it’ (Participant 1). 
The time spent doing the checklist was perceived by some staff members as an 
additional workload.  
‘At present it has a disruptive effect in the beginning of the operation in that everybody 
has to stop doing what they’re doing, which I think they see as being disruptive’ 
(Participant 3). 
‘I think the main barrier is that it’s, it takes people a bit more time before they, to do what 
they’re doing’ (Participant 3). 
 
7.4.2.3 Team Factors. 
Several team factors also emerged as barriers to the use of checklist in the theatres. 
Seniority gradient within the theatre team and the ability to challenge the system’s 
hierarchy can affect how the checklist is being conducted. It emerged that some junior 
nurses did not feel empowered to question the senior nurses, surgeons, and 
anaesthetists or persuade them to use the checklist. Use of the checklist during the 
operating list is particularly difficult if the senior staff in the theatre is averse to its use.  
‘but I don’t think all of the senior scrub nurses yet buy into it, or feel that they can be 
forceful enough to make everyone do it’ (Participant 5). 
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Team introductions were also seen as major deterrent to the checklist as some team 
members felt that it trivialised the importance of the checklist. Introductions were also 
perceived to question the hierarchy of the senior members.  
‘I think the bit that embarrasses people most and they’re most resistant to is introducing 
everybody.  Everybody has to go round and say their name’ (Participant 1). 
 
 ‘I think shyness and not necessarily just on behalf of junior staff, but I think it’s a very 
different way of communicating for a lot of people and a lot of people who are introverts, 
and some surgeons are introverts, find this quite difficult, and find it quite difficult to 
stand up and say hello, I’m so and so, I’m the consultant surgeon’ (Participant 5). 
‘you’re introducing yourselves and everybody’s saying who they are but then either not 
going to be there the next day, the next list, the next week or eve the next operation.  So 
not that they shouldn’t do it, I feel it’s a little bit of a negative feeling it inspires.  It puts 
you off the checklist’ (Participant 1). 
Some surgical teams were familiar with each other as they had been working together 
for some time and they did not see the rationale behind the team introductions but even 
in those theatre sessions there were many participants who were not known to the team 
such as locum staff, medical students attending the surgery or the researchers present 
in the theatres and this would on some occasions create confusion when the staff would 
not be sure about their roles. One nurse put it quite correctly that “ I always wondered 
who these people were in the theatre that I was working with sometimes but being busy 
you wouldn’t approach them but you know that they are part of team.........now (with 
WHO checklist use) I understand their role better.” 
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7.4.2.4 Individual Factors. 
Staff need to be trained in order to understand the aims of the checklist. The training 
delivered has to dissipate any doubts about when and why the checklist needs to be 
performed.  
‘Have we really got to do this and this is a bit miserable because we don’t trust each 
other and we don’t trust ourselves and we have to have a list that we have to check 
ourselves against’ (Participant 1).  
‘making sure that people understand how this works, briefing people, making sure that 
they’re aware of what’s going on and contacting them about it to make them either 
attend or understand what it’s about, that’s one aspect’ (Participant 3). 
‘And I think also some people are just going to refuse to accept that there is a need for 
it. They’ve never had that problem, so why should we do it?’ (Participant 4). 
If staff are not informed about the benefits that has been incurred after implementing the 
WHO checklist, or any surgical incidents that have been avoided in practice following 
the use of the checklist, then it will be difficult to motivate staff to use the checklist.   
‘If they can see a benefit in it then I think it makes it more worthwhile.  So if people see 
that by doing this they’re going to get a better, more attentive set of, operating team 
essentially, then I think they would do it’ (Participant 3).  
‘There are a few issues first of all people will look to evidence, so people will want to be 
convinced that what they’re doing is making a difference or is improving things, if they 
are not convinced of that they will stop doing it’ (Participant 6). 
‘The other thing is people need continual feedback, so there needs to be some reward, 
you need to feel that by doing something you’ve actually achieved a better outcome or 
you’ve actually improved the way you’ve done something’ (Participant 6). 
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The aim of the checklist is diluted if its done in a robotic way and staff is not motivated 
and does not pay attention to its objectives. Theatre teams might perform the checklist 
merely as a tick-box exercise without realizing its actual use or benefits.  
 ‘The biggest shortcoming is that actually people go through the motions without 
necessarily doing the actions, so for instance you might confirm that the nursing team 
might say yes all the equipment are in place, but actually unless you spell out what 
equipment you need are in place then the item might be yes or it could be that it isn’t in 
place’ (Participant 6). 
‘it’s going to be hard work to convince people of the need to do it without them just 
ticking the boxes and not really doing it, because there is the danger that’s that what 
they’ll do and actually we’ll have yet another form with lots of ticks down it and actually 
nobody has really done it properly’ (Participant 6). 
Staff may feel that the checks required do not apply to them, as they are not specific 
enough.  
‘So in the developed world, checking that the pulse oximeter on the, functioning, is 
almost, that’s almost superfluous, it’s almost, that’s just, that always happens.  But, it 
was actually something that anaesthesiology as a specialty pushed really hard for.  
Because there are, in large parts of Africa there’s virtually no equipment available.  In 
many ways I’d almost say that it would be better to check that you actually had oxygen, 
rather than a pulse oximeter’ (Participant 4). 
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7.4.2.5 Task Factors. 
Some elements of the task itself may prevent or discourage staff from conducting the 
checklist. Staff may feel that there is duplication of work and may not be willing to 
perform the same task over and over again. 
 
 ‘A lot of this communication does at the moment take place, but it takes place in a 
completely unregulated piecemeal way.  And so putting it all here means that there will 
be some repetition to, between the tasks’ (Participant 3).  
‘But I don’t think for us it’s necessarily beneficial in stopping mistakes happening 
because most of these things are already done somewhere along the line with 
checklisting,… so you’re doing this but you’re also doing exactly the same on another 
piece of paper which is a bit strange.’ (Participant 5) 
‘This is being introduced in addition to those which are already there, there are already a 
lot of checklists going on and this is going to be yet another layer.’ (Participant 6) 
The time of performing the checklist may also be a deterrent as the checklist tasks may 
be competing with other important tasks that the teams need to perform.  
‘And I actually think that timeout should be before the patient’s asleep, because the way 
it’s written, the surgeon doesn’t come in to this until the patients are already asleep’ 
(Participant 4). 
‘I think the equipment, particularly the equipment issues or concerns should all be done 
before the patient goes to sleep.  Again, because if you haven’t got the equipment, you 
shouldn’t put the guy, you shouldn’t anaesthetise the patient’ (Participant 4).  
‘in terms of the critical unexpected steps in an operation I would hope to have discussed 
that before with a surgeon, before you even get into the operating theatre because I 
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would need to know do I need a central line?  Do I need an arterial line?  Before the 
state that the patient’s ready to have their skin incision, I need to know that long before’ 
(Participant 6). 
 
Staff may feel that the checklist is too prescriptive; this may encourage them to cut 
corners. 
‘And so making sure that people stop and do this checklist, that’s going to be the main 
problem, is compliance,’ (Participant 3). 
There was a perception that the checklist should be more aligned to NHS practices and 
allow further flexibility for different specialties. The timing of the Time-out checks could 
potentially prove to be a challenge. Some respondents suggested that this should be 
undertaken prior to induction of anaesthesia rather than the skin incision. 
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Table 7.2 Summary of factors identified as barriers to checklist.  
Classification of contributing factors with themes and examples of verbatim quotes. No of Subjects 
who said this and 
number of quotes.  
Organisational and Management Factors 
Themes identified: 
• The culture within the organisation  
• Ill defined responsibilities and accountabilities  
‘The barriers are the culture which is at the moment, people’s lack of belief that it will actually 
bring about a useful change, people questioning the evidence base on which this is built, 
people being resistant to change, people being resistant to introduction of more protocols’ 
(Participant 6). 
S=2, A=4, N=3 
Total  
Subjects = 9 
Quotes = 12 
Work Environment 
Themes identified: 
• Availability of checklist in the notes 
• The design of the  
• Workload  
‘it’s time consuming and it’s another, for want of a better word, another checklist for the, at the 
current time it’s the nursing staff and the anaesthetist has to also fill out the form as well, it’s 
another piece of paperwork to undertake’ (Participant 9). 
S=2, A=0, N=3 
Total  
Subjects = 5 
Quotes = 7 
Team Factors 
Themes identified: 
• Hierarchy 
• Existent communication practices 
‘I think the bit that embarrasses people most and they’re most resistant to is introducing 
everybody.  Everybody has to go round and say their name’ (Participant 1). 
S=1, A=1, N=1 
Total 
Subjects =3  
Quotes =5  
Individual (staff) Factors 
Themes identified: 
• Lack of training 
• Lack of awareness of benefits of the checklist 
• Reluctance to take on responsibility 
 ‘And I think also some people are just going to refuse to accept that there is a need for it.  
They’ve never had that problem, so why should we do it?’ (Participant 4). 
S=3, A= 3, N=2 
Total  
Subjects = 8 
Quotes = 16 
Task Factors 
Themes identified: 
• Duplication of work 
• Timing of checklist 
• Additional workload 
‘I mean the biggest problem is that there’s a lot of overlap a lot of these things are on the 
anaesthetic checklist anyway’ (Participant 6). 
S=1, A=4, N=1 
Total  
Subjects =7  
Quotes = 17 
(S= Surgeon, A= Anaesthetist, N= Nurse)	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7.4.3 How to improve checklist compliance and resilience. 
The participants were asked questions on how to improve the checklist compliance and 
ensure that the checklist is resilient and does not go out of use once the initial study 
period is over. Table 7.3 presents the summary of emergent themes. 
All participants were of the opinion that for the theatre staff to use the checklist in its true 
spirit, it is essential that they are convinced of the benefits of using the checklist in terms 
of patient safety and also in improving theatre efficiency.	  
‘If they can see a benefit in it then I think it makes it more worthwhile.  So if people see 
that by doing this they’re going to get a better, more attentive set of, operating team 
essentially, then I think they would do it.’ (Participant 3) 
‘there are a few issues first of all people will look to evidence, so people will want to be 
convinced that what they’re doing is making a difference or improving things, if they are 
not convinced of that they will stop doing it’(Participant 6).	  
‘staff have got to perhaps see that it’s good and see that it works and see that it makes a 
difference to their personal practice before they will necessarily completely buy into it’ 
(Participant 12) 
Participants understood the need for patient safety interventions but at the same time 
pointed out that the checklist has to be practical and user-friendly. 
‘once you’ve refined this down to being a friendly, easy to use checklist and it becomes 
established theatre protocol, and that’s down to the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the 
theatre nurse’ (Participant 1). 
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‘Anything you do it’s got to be responsible, practical, right.  Not longwinded and not 
laughable’ (Participant 11). 
The checklist tool has to be used in the right way in order to achieve its objective and 
intended benefits. Theatre teams should be provided structured training in the use of 
WHO checklist. For example, in the absence of proper training, staff may be confused 
about the right point in time to initiate the checklist and therefore may find it intrusive in 
carrying out their routine tasks and become reluctant. 
Adequate time needs to be allocated to complete the checklist and also spread the 
awareness that two minutes well spent doing the checklist may actually improve their 
efficiency. 
‘There’s another disadvantage is it takes a wee bit of time, but in actual fact, I don’t care 
about the time in terms of utilisation because it’s a vital part of the role in getting patients 
safely treated’ (Participant 8). 
‘I know a lot of surgeons, oh I don’t want to do the checklist, because well for one thing it 
takes time’ (Participant 11)  
It was also widely believed that in order to improve checklist compliance it should be 
made mandatory and hospitals should include its use in their working policy. 
‘And I think if we’ve got, if we’re going to use it, it has to be brought in, unfortunately in 
this country people are paid a salary and they know the salary’s going to come in at the 
end of day.  Whereas for instance if you compare it to the United States, people will lose 
their ability to be able to work in a hospital if they don’t conform to the way things are 
supposed to happen’ (Participant 8) 
‘There must be a policy on that and make it, make it compulsory’ (Participant 10) 
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 To encourage staff to use the checklist, they need to be provided with regular feedback 
on how the checklist is achieving its aims. 
‘ People need continual feedback, so that there needs to be some reward, you need to 
feel that by doing something you have actually achieved a better outcome’ (Participant 
6) 
‘feeding back information to the teams is often a useful way of enthusing them.  And I 
actually think that it would be useful to highlight things that have been identified or 
prevented as a result of the checklist’ (Participant 12) 
The use of the checklist can be positively influenced if it is endorsed by professional 
institutions and is subject to media and political pressure. 
‘I think probably at least making it part of professional recommendations by the Royal 
Colleges … if we had media pressure and political pressure then that would happen.’ 
(Participant 5) 
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Table 7.3 Themes identified to improve checklist compliance and usability. 
Indentified themes and examples of verbatim quotes 	  
 
No of Subjects who said this 
and number of quotes.  
Staff should be convinced of the benefits	  
‘ I do think that once people are enthusiastic about it and 
once people have understood the benefits, or potential 
benefits of it, then I think that there will be more staff to buy 
in’ (Participant 12) 
S=2, A=2, N=2 
Total subjects = 6 
Total quotes = 7 
 
The checklist has to be practical and user-friendly 
‘once you’ve refined this down to being a friendly, easy to 
use checklist and it becomes established theatre protocol, 
and that’s down to the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the 
theatre nurse.’  (Participant 1) 
S=2, A=0,N=1 
Total subjects = 3 
Total quotes = 4 
Adequate training in checklist use 
 ‘Once we become confident in using it people won’t take 
that seriously, so I think it’s more, yes about having a 
checklist, but it’s about having the right people doing the 
right job as well’ (Participant 9) 
S=0, A=0,N=3 
Total subjects=3 
Total quotes=4 
Make checklist use mandatory 
‘There has to be a policy.  There must be a policy on that 
and make it, make it compulsory’(Participant 8) 
S=0, A=0,N=2 
Total subjects = 2 
Total quotes = 2 
Regular feedback on checklist use 
‘ people need continual feedback, so that there needs to be 
some reward, you need to feel that by doing something you 
have actually achieved a better outcome’ (Participant 6) 
S=0, A=2, N=0 
Total subjects = 2 
Total quotes = 2 
Recognition by professional institutions 
Media and political pressure 
‘I think probably at least making it part of professional 
recommendations by the Royal Colleges … if we had media 
pressure and political pressure then that would happen.’ 
(Participant 5)  
S=0, A=1, N=0 
Total subjects = 1 
Total quotes = 1 
Checklist Modifications to make it more relevant to NHS 
“It sounds a bit artificial sometimes. Its trying to be 
everything to every nation and to every  standard of 
medicine” 
S=3, A=3, N=2 
Total subjects= 8 
Total quotes= 8 
(S= Surgeon, A= Anaesthetist, N= Nurses) 
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7.5 Discussion. 
The study clearly shows that the surgical checklist is necessary to improve patient safety 
in surgery; however, it also highlights the need to ensure that its implementation is well 
planned. The NPSA has issued an alert mandating the use of checklist across the NHS 
in England and Wales. The NPSA alert will encourage the Trusts to make the checklist a 
part of hospital policy but there is also a need to ensure that the NHS staff are made 
aware of the relevance of the checklist and provided training into the checklist use. This 
training could be decisive in ensuring appropriate use of the checklist and prevent it from 
turning into a tick-box exercise. Although staff awareness and training are crucial, the 
importance of good leadership and role of champions in driving the checklist cannot be 
emphasised enough. Good leadership will ensure that hierarchy does not interfere in the 
nurses’ involvement in the checklist process and could also generate mass consensus 
on its use thereby converting individuals that may have been resistant. 
Questions remain whether “carrots and stick” would be the driving force for the checklist 
but it is clear that in the present times the attitudes of patients toward healthcare have 
undergone a transformation, which could be comparable to a renaissance in healthcare. 
The media coverage and adverse event data available in public domain has made the 
patients well informed as well as concerned. These days it is common for patients to 
question and demand better patient care. This would make healthcare personnel not 
only morally responsible for using the checklist but could also have an impact on the 
indemnity covers in future. 
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One dominant theme that emerged in this interview study was that the checklist has to 
be modified to be more relevant to NHS. Following the interview study, we suggested 
some modifications for the WHO checklist (Box 7.1). These changes have been 
incorporated in the NPSA modification of the WHO surgical checklist for England and 
Wales (Appendix 3). 
 
Box 7.1: Suggestions for modifying the WHO checklist. 
 
Sign in: 
• Omission of Pulse oximetry 
• Amalgamation of Anaesthetic checklist with the WHO checklist 
Time out: 
• Confirmation of patient identity using two point check as recommended by NPSA 
• Inclusion of DVT prophylaxis check 
• Inclusion of Patient warming check 
Sign out: 
• To be performed before any member leaves the operating theatre once the surgery is 
complete 
 
An important theme that emerged from this interview study was the need to demonstrate 
the impact of checklist on teamwork, patient safety and theatre efficiency. While, the 
international data suggested a significant reduction in post-operative morbidity and 
mortality with the use of checklist, the results from UK study (chapter 6) did not 
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demonstrate a clinically significant correlation between checklist use and clinical 
outcomes. This led me onto the next chapter that describes the design of a framework to 
measure intra-operative teamwork failures, equipment failures and technical failures as 
markers of patient safety and theatre efficiency. These markers will be used in 
subsequent chapters to assess the impact of WHO checklist.  
 
7.6 Conclusion. 
The WHO checklist has the potential to improve patient safety and teamwork in the 
operating theatre. Through this study, the checklist was modified to be more suitable for 
NHS. There needs to be some flexibility in terms of timing of some checks. The checklist 
challenges the prevalent cultures in the operating theatres and to convince theatre 
teams of its benefits, its impact on patient safety, teamwork and theatre efficiency needs 
to be further assessed. 
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Chapter 8 
 Design of an ethnographic framework of teamwork failures 
to understand patient safety and efficiency in operating 
theatres 
 
8.1 Introduction. 
The interview study described in Chapter 7, highlighted that theatre staff did not 
perceive any significant benefit of the WHO checklist on their clinical practice, theatre 
problems or efficiency. While the WHO checklist study (described in chapter 6) showed 
an improvement in patient safety processes such as antibiotic use, patient identity 
confirmation, no significant impact was demonstrated on clinical outcomes. For the 
WHO checklist to be sustainable in operating theatres, surgeons, nurses, anaesthetists 
and other theatre staff should be able to perceive a positive impact of such a teamwork 
intervention on intra-operative patient safety and theatre efficiency. There is a need, to 
develop measures of team-working and patient safety, which can be used to evaluate 
the WHO checklist’s impact on operating theatre problems and its efficiency and safety. 
These markers can be broadly identified as teamwork failures in the operating theatres, 
technical failures in the performance of surgical procedures, equipment problems and 
theatre efficiency. 
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This study uses a prospective ethnographic approach to understand surgical systems 
and study teamwork failures in operating theatres and their association to technical 
failures and equipment failures in operating theatres.  
My study aims to schematically capture various teamwork failures, explores their 
association with technical failures and equipment failures and describes the impact on 
patient safety and theatre efficiency.  
 
8.2 Aims. 
The aims of this study are: 
• Development of a framework and a methodology to study teamwork in the 
operating theatre. 
• Quantify the extent of teamwork failures in complex surgical procedures. 
• Study associations between teamwork, equipment problems and technical 
failures. 
 
8.3 Methods. 
8.3.1 Design. 
A prospective observational study was conducted to examine failures related to surgery 
in operating theatre. 
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8.3.2 Participants and materials. 
20 major gastrointestinal (GI) surgery cases were studied between December 2008 and 
July 2009. Both minimally invasive and open procedures were included. I chose to 
observe complex surgical procedures as there is already some research on the 
observations on less complex open and minimally invasive surgery (Undre, Healey et al. 
2006; Mishra, Catchpole et al. 2009) and I also hypothesized that teamwork failures 
were likely to threaten patient safety in complex GI surgical procedures.  
8.3.3 data collection. 
I developed and trialed the ethnographic observation framework and methodology. For 5 
cases another trained observer (KN) also collected data simultaneously to ensure 
reliability of data collection. The quality of such an observational study depends on the 
expertise of the observers. Both myself and KN were surgical trainees, with more than 
five years of surgical experience and more than one-year experience of patient safety 
and human factors research. I was trained and supervised by a faculty surgeon and a 
Patient safety psychologist.  
I entered the operating theatre before the patient arrived. Data collection commenced 
when the anaesthetised patient arrived in the operating theatre and ended when the 
patient was transferred off the operating table after the procedure. In the UK, it is a 
common practice to conduct anaesthesia in a separate anaesthesia room in comparison 
to the USA and some other countries where patients are anaesthetised on the operating 
table.  
I systematically collected field notes involving all the events that occurred in the theatre. 
No attempt was made at this stage to classify these events or assess their impact on 
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safety or flow of the surgery. Detailed field notes were taken for subsequent review and 
data analysis using a framework I developed for this project as described below.  
For each of the 20 procedures, surgeons were asked to rate the perceived teamwork on 
1 to 5 likert scale where 1 indicated very poor teamwork and 5 indicated very good 
teamwork.  
8.3.4 Data analysis 
Following data collection, the field notes were systematically entered into an excel 
spreadsheet. In the first instance, the field-notes were examined and the potential failure 
events were extracted from the data set. These failure events were independently 
categorised by two assessors: Myself, the primary researcher and a senior surgeon and 
patient safety expert (KM). The categories used were based on the failure events 
framework. KM was blinded to the procedure, the operating team, and the outcome of 
the procedure to establish the validity and reliability of the framework. The impact on 
safety and flow of surgery was assessed by myself and KN through consensus. This 
was done to establish the validity and reliability of the framework.   
8.3.4.1 The Operating room- failure events framework. 
Data was analysed, using systematic thematic coding of the events into failures and 
distractions. I coded the failures into three major themes: Teamwork failures, Technical 
failures, and Equipment failures. Teamwork failures were further classified into 
communication failures, co-ordination failures, situational awareness failures, shared 
mental model failures, and failures due to lack of planning and knowledge. The 
teamwork failure classification I developed for this study was based on the Dickenson 
and McIntyre model of teamwork (Dickinson 1997)(Table 8.1). External interference in 
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the form of distractions such as phone calls, non-team members entering the theatre 
etc. were also analysed.  Any discrepancies and conflict of opinions were mutually 
discussed to have a consensus on the type of failure and its impact. If an event was 
falling into more than two categories, the assessors (Myself and KM) discussed the 
event to reconstruct the event situation and classified it under the category that best 
represented the event description.  
Table 8.1 Definition of different failure events (Dickinson 1997).  
Event classification 
Communication failure: Failure in active exchange of information between two or more members of 
the team, as well as an individual team member providing information to others in the appropriate 
manner. 
Co-ordination failure: It reflects failure in the execution of team activities such that members respond 
as a function of the behaviour of others. Successful co-ordination implies the effective operation of 
other components of teamwork. In this way, the actions of individual members are merged to produce 
synchronised team performance. 
Situational awareness failure - refers to failure in ‘awareness’ of the ‘situation.’ "Situation awareness" 
is the correct term for the field of study that concerns the knowledge and understanding of the 
environment that is critical to those who need to make decisions. 
Shared mental model failure: Lack of organized way for team members to think about how the team 
will work; helps team members understand and predict the behavior of their teammates. 
Technical Failure: Failure in performing the procedural tasks appropriately. For example- slipped 
ligature, redoing a tie or an anastomosis, iatrogenic injury etc. 
Equipment failure: An equipment failure was defined, as any situation where equipment was not 
available, was not working, or staff did not know how to use it. 
Distraction: Interference from the external environment that may distract the surgical team from 
performing their primary tasks in the operating theatre. 
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Surgical equipment was any resource used to perform a surgical procedure. It includes 
the instruments needed for the procedure, any type of machinery e.g. suction machine 
or diathermy machine, and any resource such as sutures, surgical drains or irrigation 
fluids etc. An equipment failure was defined, as any situation where equipment was not 
available, was not working, or staff did not know how to use it.  
The failures were rated to assess their impact on safety and flow of surgery. I recorded 
the perceived severity of each failure for its threat to patient safety into no threat, minor 
threat, moderate threat, patient harm or potential adverse event, and adverse event 
(Table 8.2). The impact on the flow of surgery was measured in terms of time delay the 
failure event had on the procedure. There were five options: no impact, minor (less than 
5 minutes’ delay), moderate (delay of 5 to 30 minutes), severe impact (more than 30 
minutes’ delay), and surgery cancelled (Table 8.3). 
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 Table 8.2 Threat to patient safety classification. 
Threat to patient safety Example 
1. No threat 
 
Phone rings in the theatre, surgeon continues to 
operate 
2. Minor threat- failure could indirectly lead to      
patient harm 
 
Scrub nurse did not know how to assemble 
harmonic scalpel. Circulating nurse has to put on 
sterile gloves to show her how to do it. She only put 
the sterile gloves without hand washing or gowning. 
Surgeon waits while nurses sort it. 
3. Moderate threat- failure could directly lead to 
patient harm 
Surgeon wanted artery forceps, nurse gave 
scissors 
4. Patient harm or potential adverse event To repair a bleeding vessel, surgeon given taper 
cutting needle. Surgeon realised when bleeding 
from needle site. 
5. Adverse event- leading to prolonged hospital 
stay or disability or death 
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Table 8.3 Impact on flow of surgery classification. 
Impact on flow of surgery Example 
1. No impact Phone rings in the theatre, surgeon continues to 
operate 
2. Minor impact- Surgery interrupted for 
less than 5minutes 
Phone rings again, surgeon irritated asks ‘ can 
someone answer the phone.’ 
 
3. Moderate impact- Surgery interrupted for 
more than five minutes but less than 30 
min or poses frequent interruptions 
Scrub nurse did not know how to assemble harmonic 
scalpel. Circulating nurse has to put on sterile gloves 
to show her how to do it. She only put the sterile 
gloves without hand washing or gowning. Surgeon 
waits while nurses sort it. 
4. Severe impact- Surgery interrupted or 
delayed for more than 30 min. 
Patient on the table. Surgeon not happy with the 
position. Asks sister if she has a beanbag, as he will 
be tilting the patient. Nurse brings it. Patient is lifted 
off the table beanbag placed. Delay in proceeding. 
5. Surgery cancelled  
 
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS version 18.0. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients were calculated to understand correlation between teamwork failures, 
technical failures and equipment failures. Correlation coefficients were also calculated to 
assess the reliability of assessment between the two assessors in categorising failure 
events. For the 25% of cases where two observers collected data to establish reliability 
in data collection, failure events noted were compared and percentage agreements 
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calculated. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were also used to analyse associations 
between the teamwork reported by surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists and the failure 
events.	  
	  
8.4 Results. 
 
8.4.1 Case over view 
20 cases were observed. A total of 140 hours of surgical procedure observations were 
carried out. Median duration of procedure was 6.5 hours (minimum- 1hr, maximum- 
8.5hr). 13 were open procedures (including subtotal and total gastrectomies, open 
hemicolectomies) and 7 were laparoscopic procedures (Laparoscopic anterior resection, 
partial gastrectomy, fundoplication).  
A total of 364 failure events were observed with a mean of 17.80±2.39 failures per case. 
Maximum numbers of failures observed per case were 44.0 and minimum were 3.0 per 
case. Out of a total of 340 failure events observed 58.6% (n=211) were teamwork 
failures, 7.14% (n=26) were technical failures and 13% (n=47) were equipment related 
failures (Figure 8.1) and 22% (n=80) were distractions. Table 7.5 illustrates the different 
types of failures. 
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Figure 8.1 Types of failures in operating theatre. 
 
For the 25% of cases observed by two observers, there was 90% overlap between the 
recorded field notes. There was a high degree of agreement (81%) between the two 
assessors on independent thematic coding of failure events with a high inter-rater 
reliability in identifying different types of failures (Table 8.4).  
Table 8.4 Correlation between identification of different failures between 
assessors. 
Type of 
failure 
Coordination 
failure 
Shared 
mental 
model 
failure 
Communic
ation 
failure 
Situational 
awareness 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Equipment 
failure 
Technical 
failure 
Distractions 
Pearson 
correlation 
0.902 
P: 0.000 
0.570 
P: 0.009 
0.887 
P: 0.000 
0.695 
P: 0.001 
0.833 
P: 0.000 
0.936 
P: 0.000 
0.958 
P: 0.000 
     0.998 
P: 0.000 
 
 
22%	  
19%	  
7%	  5%	  5%	  
13%	  
7%	  
22%	  
Failure	  distribution	  	  
Communication	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  Situational	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  and	  planning	  Knowledge	  Equipment	  resources	  technical	  Distractions	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Table 8.5 Failures in operating theatres. 
Type of failure Example Impact on Safety Impact on flow  
Communication 
failure 
Anaesthetised patient transferred 
onto the table by nurse and 
anaesthetist. Surgeon not available 
at the time. When surgeon enters, he 
is not happy with the position. Asks 
sister if she had a bean bag as he 
will be tilting the patient. Nurse 
brings it. Patient is lifted off the table 
bean bag placed. Delay in 
proceeding. 
Minor threat: 
Anaesthetitised patient 
had to be repositioned 
posing a threat of 
dislodging 
endotracheal tube or 
intravenous cannulae. 
But threat reduced due 
to careful attention of 
theatre team. 
Severe: The 
surgery was 
delayed by more 
than half hour due 
to repositioning and 
duplication of 
associated tasks.  
Situational 
awareness 
failure 
Surgeon asks for forceps for 
ileostomy. It is a common knowledge 
that toothed forceps are not used to 
handle bowel but nurse gives him 
toothed forceps as she was not 
aware of the purpose of the forceps 
use. Surgeon notices and tells he  
wants Debakey's forceps. 
Moderate threat: Tooth 
forceps can cause 
bowel injury which 
may lead to intra 
abdominal leaks and 
peritonitis.  
No delay in 
surgery, as 
surgeon quickly 
noticed and 
corrected the error. 
Shared mental 
model failure 
Nursing staff unsure about further 
plan of surgery during a planned 
laparotomy, whether colostomy or 
end to end anastamosis would be 
performed. But prepares instruments 
for anastamosis without clarifying 
with the surgeon. 
Minor threat: This 
event would have led 
to further confusion 
and disruption but 
unlikely to pose direct 
threat to safety. 
Minor delay: as  
they had to open 
the colostomy set 
subsequently as 
the surgeon 
wanted to do a 
colostomy in 
addition to 
anastamosis. 
Co-ordination 
failure 
During the surgery nurse checks the 
cutting scissors and notices it is 
faulty but does do anything about it. 
Shortly afterwards surgeon asks for 
cutting scissor, nurse hands over the 
same scissors. surgeon tries cutting 
the suture with it but it doesn't work. 
Tells her its not working, and asks 
him to give him another pair of 
scissors. Nurse requests circulating 
nurse to provide another pair of 
scissors. 
No threat: This event 
did not pose any threat 
to the safety. 
Minor delay: The 
surgeon had to 
request another 
scissor and wait for 
it to be made 
available.  
Technical failure Surgeon had to open and redo the 
suturing of abdominal wound as he 
forgot to mark site of local invasion. 
No threat: This event 
did not pose any threat 
to the safety. 
Severe delay: as 
the surgeon had to 
redo a part of the 
surgical procedure. 
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8.4.2 Teamwork failures. 
 More than half of the failure events observed in the theatres were due to failures in 
teamwork. Teamwork failures were further classified into its various components; of 
which communication failures were the commonest (40.63%, n=78), followed by co-
ordination failures (35.92%, n=69), situational awareness failures (14.06%, n= 27), 
shared mental model failures (9.38%, n=18) and planning and knowledge failures (9.4%, 
n=19).  
8.4.3 Communication failures. 
Communication failures were common in the theatre. They were responsible for 22.94% 
of all failure events. 24.35% of these failures had a moderate threat to safety in the 
operating theatre but did not lead to any harmful events. 24.35% of failures had a minor 
threat to patient safety and 47.44% of communication failures did not pose any threat to 
patient safety. One communication failure had a severe impact on flow of surgery 
causing a delay of more than half hour. 7.69% of communication failures lead to a 
moderate delay, 44.87% lead to a minor delay and 39.74% did not cause any delay in 
flow of surgery.  
8.4.4 Co-ordination failures. 
Co-ordination failures were the second commonest failures in the theatre responsible for 
20.29% of all failure events. 14.49% of these failures had a moderate threat to patient 
safety, 34.78% posed a minor threat to safety and 49.27% did not threaten patient 
safety. On assessing the impact on flow of surgery, 13.04% of co-ordination failures led 
to moderate delays in the flow of surgery but majority (73.91%) led to minor delays and 
11.59% caused no delays.  
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8.4.5 Situational awareness failures. 
Failures of Situational awareness were responsible for 7.94% of all failure events but 
14.83% of these failures lead to patient harm and 37.03% had a moderate threat to 
safety in the operating theatre, 14.81% of these failures had a minor threat to safety and 
33.33% did not pose any threat. One failure lead to a severe delay in progression of 
surgery, 7.40% failures lead to a moderate delay, 51.85% lead to a minor delay and 
25.92% did not cause any delay. 
8.4.6 Shared mental model, planning failures and Knowledge based failures. 
Shared mental model failures were uncommon, responsible for only 3% of all failures 
but 36.36% of these failures led to a major delay in case progression. Lack of 
knowledge/ training failures accounted for 5.59% of all failures. On one occasion they 
led to a severe delay in surgery. 
8.5.7 Technical failures. 
Technical failures were failures in performing the procedural tasks during the surgery. In 
20 cases, 26 technical failures were observed, accounting for 7.65% of all failures 
observed. The average number of technical failures was 1.30±0.24 (range 0-3). Of the 
technical failures noted, 30% (n=8) had an underlying non- technical failure. Situational 
awareness failure was the most common underlying non- technical failure with co-
ordination, communication, lack of planning and knowledge, and equipment failure 
responsible for one technical failure each. 23% of Technical failures led to patient harm, 
34.61% had a moderate threat to safety. On two occasions they led to a severe delay in 
surgery and moderately delayed the surgery on as many as 42.30% of occasions. 
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8.4.8 Distractions. 
Distractions are common during surgical procedures. As many as 23.52% of all failure 
events were distractions in the theatres. Most of the distractions (92.50%) did not 
threaten patient safety. 58.75% of distractions did not obstruct the flow of surgery but 
40% led to a minor or moderate delay in surgery and one event severely delayed the 
surgical procedure. 
8.4.9 Equipment problems. 
An item of surgical equipment is defined as any resource, which is used to perform a 
surgical procedure. It includes the instruments needed for the procedure, any type of 
machinery e.g. suction machine or diathermy machine, and any resources needed for 
the progression of surgery such as sutures, surgical drains, irrigation fluids etc. 
Equipment problems occurred routinely during surgical procedures. Equipment 
problems were classified based on lack of availability, faults, wrong usage and 
knowledge based failures. A total of 47 problems were noted accounting for 14.11% of 
all failures in the theatre with a mean of 2.40±0.62 equipment failures per case. These 
equipment failures have been further described in detail in chapter 8.  
8.4.10 Correlation between observed and self-reported teamwork. 
There was a moderate correlation between surgeon’s reported teamwork with the nurse 
and the observed number of teamwork failures (Pearson’s correlation -0.69, P-0.001). 
There was also a correlation between reported teamwork and Equipment problems in 
the operating theatres (Pearson’s correlation -0.519, P- 0.019). But there was no effect 
of Surgeon’s or nurse’s grade and number of failures. There was also no correlation 
found between teamwork failures and familiarity of the operating team. 
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8.5 Discussion. 
This study shows that teamwork and technical failures are common in operating theatres 
especially in complex procedures. They lead to disruptions in workflow and patient 
harm. Furthermore, teamwork failures can potentially have a negative affect on technical 
performance.  
Gawande et al have shown that communication errors are responsible for 70% of 
preventable harm in healthcare (Gawande, Zinner et al. 2003). Just as Lingard et al 
have shown, our study also shows that communication failures are very common in 
operating theatres and that these vary from those where communication did not occur to 
those where communication was not between the appropriate persons and on some 
occasions, untimely.  
Similarly, coordination failures were found to be very common in the operating theatres 
and can lead to technical failures, equipment failures, disruptions and harm. In acute 
patient care settings, coordination is essential as teams may be put together on ad-hoc 
basis and may be working together for only a few cases (Manser, Howard et al. 2008). 
In addition, the teamwork in theatres may be seen as various crews interacting together 
(Gaba 2000) thus requiring a higher degree of coordination. Xiao et al conducted a 
video analysis of coordination tasks during emergency intubations and found that 
complex tasks were linked to higher degree of coordination needs and increased risk of 
coordination failures (Xiao, Hunter et al. 1996). In my study, I noted that coordination 
failures occurred between the surgeons and nurses during the swab/ instrument counts. 
Swab and instrument counts although necessary, often compete with other procedural 
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tasks. On occasions, the surgeon had to wait for an instrument while the nurse 
completed the counts or the nurse had to interrupt the counting to assist the surgeon 
with instruments. Christian et al in their observation study also found that auxiliary tasks 
such as swabs and instrument counts often competed with the primary tasks of other 
theatre team members (Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). 
Situational awareness was also found to be of key importance in this study as on a 
number of occasions, it posed a threat to the safety of patients. During the course of the 
study, I observed that these failures were associated with unwanted changes to 
equipment settings; specimen problems such as mislabelling and the potential for 
retained swabs and specimens.  
This study shows that technical failures are common in operating theatres. Technical 
failures have traditionally been associated with the surgical skills of the surgeon; 
however, this study describes how technical failures may arise due to teamwork failures 
in the operating theatres. Situational awareness failures were the commonest cause of 
technical failures. In their observations of 50 laparoscopic cholecystectomies, Misra et al 
found a strong inverse correlation between technical errors and situational awareness 
scores of the surgical teams (Mishra, Catchpole et al. 2009).  
Equipment failures emerged as a very important theme in this study. They were found to 
be common, occurring at a rate of 2 failures per procedure. Previous studies show that 
equipment problems may force the surgeons to work around the equipment problems, 
which could lead to technical difficulties and even patient harm (Christian, Gustafson et 
al. 2006). I also found a correlation between equipment failures and technical failures. 
Most of these failures can be minor and sometimes irritating but on occasions, they can 
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lead to harm and disruptions. On one occasion, the forceps being used by surgical 
assistant were faulty and punched out a minor hole in the glove. Although the assistant 
could feel the forceps digging into the thumb, did not pay attention to it and continued. 
When the surgeon applied diathermy to the forceps, it led to burn on the assistant’s 
thumb. This situation not only led to harm to the staff but also resulted in surgery being 
interrupted for more than 5 minutes while the surgical assistant washed and changed 
her gloves. I observed that the theatre teams appeared to be accustomed to having 
equipment problems and considered some of them to be a part of normal occurrence 
and did not pay attention to them. To understand the type of failures more closely, I 
discuss some of the failures in table 8.5.  
 
Though not a major focus of this study, I found that distractions occur frequently in the 
operating theatre. These findings echo previous research from our unit (Sevdalis, 
Healey et al. 2007) and suggest that they can be prevented to a large extent by a 
system of protocols for managing bleeps and phone calls. Other observed reasons for 
distractions are staff from other theatres seeking equipment and the simultaneous 
performance of administrative tasks that distract the circulating nurse and scrub nurse 
from their primary tasks. This often resulted in poor coordination between the operating 
surgeons and nurses.  
This study successfully highlighted that teamwork failures, technical failures, and 
equipment failures are closely linked with each other, often resulting from a chain of 
events in a complex surgical system that could ultimately lead to patient harm and 
delays. Retrospective review of adverse events has been a commonly used approach to 
understand these failures and the associated system factors. However, a retrospective 
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analysis is only possible once patient harm has actually occurred. Increasingly, the 
feasibility of prospective observations of teamwork and patient care in the operating 
theatre is being explored in order to learn more about the factors that commonly 
underpin adverse events in surgery (Catchpole, Giddings et al. 2006; Christian, 
Gustafson et al. 2006; Lingard, Regehr et al. 2006). 
In surgery, the scope of direct observations, either through people or via video capture 
and playback, is being explored. Our study shows that prospective observation and the 
use of a coding framework is a valid and reliable method of measuring teamwork and 
patient safety in theatres. However, these techniques require an open culture in the 
healthcare, where staff is not resistant to being observed for the fear of disciplinary 
action or litigation. Observation and recording offer us the opportunity to understand 
team interactions and communication barriers, which may not be revealed in 
retrospective case record reviews.  
One limitation of an observation study is that it is time consuming and relies on the 
expertise of the observer. However, this study demonstrates the feasibility of training 
less experienced personnel to undertake observations with a high degree of reliability. 
Hawthorne effect, another limitation in this study, as with all observational research, has 
not been a significant factor in our research so far. Our experience has been that the 
personnel in our hospital have become accustomed to being observed for research 
purposes and it does not significantly affect the way they behave.  
With this study, I aimed to identify a framework that can be used to assess quality of 
care in operating theatres. I have identified that intraoperative teamwork failures, 
equipment failures and technical failures are representative markers of patient safety 
and efficiency in operating theatres. They can be used to evaluate patient safety 
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interventions such as WHO surgical checklist. Using these surrogate markers, we can 
put forward a better case for theatre staff to use safety interventions and assess their 
impact locally. These could be more sensitive markers of patient safety than clinical 
outcomes. Theatre equipment failures emerged as an important factor associated with 
theatre teamwork. Given the paucity of literature on equipment failures, it is essential to 
further explore these failures in this thesis to understand their nature, prevalence and 
association to teamwork failures. This led me onto my next study that is described in the 
next two chapters. First I explore the prevalence and nature of equipment failures in UK 
through a multicentre survey and observation study and then I investigate the factors 
underlying these failures and their implications through an interview study. 
 
8.6 Conclusion. 
This study describes the failures in the operating theatres and their impact on flow of 
surgery and patient safety. It also gives us an insight into the markers of teamwork and 
patient safety in the theatres that can be used to design measures of patient safety in 
surgery. It also establishes that prospective method of observation can highlight areas of 
improvement in the operating theatres. 
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Chapter 9 
 Understanding teamwork related equipment problems and 
their impact on patient safety in operating theatres- a 
multicentre study 
 
 
9.1 Introduction. 
Teamwork failures play a major role in the operating theatre and they compromise 
patient safety. From the study described in chapter 8, it emerged that equipment 
problems are common in operating theatres and may arise due to underlying teamwork 
and communication factors. Therefore, it is essential that in order to understand the 
complex interplay of teamwork factors in theatre, I study these equipment problems in 
detail to understand their causation, role of contributory systems factors and impact of 
these problems on patient safety. In this chapter, I study the prevalence of equipment 
problems, their association with teamwork failures and impact on patient safety.  
With this study I explore the reliability of equipment availability in the operating theatres, 
together with their implications on patient safety and flow of surgery. 
 
9.2 Aims. 
With this study, I aimed to achieve the following objectives: 
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To create a process map and task analysis describing how equipment is ordered and 
supplied to operating theatres. 
To describe equipment problems in operating theatre. 
To identify any variation between sites. 
To explore the systems factors involved and underlying teamwork failures. 
 
9.3 Methods. 
I used a novel approach to understand equipment problems in the NHS by mapping out 
the equipment process, doing a self-report survey at multiple sites to understand the 
prevalence of problem and observing major surgeries to analyse the factors underlying 
equipment problems.  
9.3.1 Study design. 
A multicentre survey and observational study to understand equipment problems. 
 
9.3.2 Participants and materials. 
9.3.2.1 Sample. 
The study was conducted in three hospital sites across the UK. Table 9.1 describes the 
site demographics. The sites were chosen to represent all types of NHS organisations in 
England in terms of size, quality of care and adverse incidents.  
Theatres were recruited from each site to include different specialties: trauma and 
orthopaedics, general surgery and paediatric surgery. The study was conducted in three 
theatres at site A, and five theatres at sites D and four theatres at site F. The theatre 
managers on each site were initially approached regarding access and initial 
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management approval, together with a discussion of data collection strategies. Ethics 
approval was obtained from local research and development office at each site, to 
conduct the study.  
 
9.3.2.2 Definitions. 
An item of surgical equipment was defined as any resource which is used to perform 
a surgical procedure. These included the instruments needed for the procedure, any 
type of machinery (e.g. suction or diathermy machines), and any other resources 
needed for the progression of surgery such as sutures, surgical drains, irrigation fluids 
etc. It did not include drugs administered to the patient.  
An equipment failure was defined, as any situation where equipment was not 
available, was not working, or staff did not know how to use it. A patient adverse event 
was defined as an undesired patient outcome that may or may not be the result of errors 
(Vincent 2001).  
The impact on the flow of surgery was measured in terms of the time delay the 
equipment problem caused during the procedure. There were five options: no impact, 
minor (less than 5 minutes’ delay), moderate (delay of 5 to 30 minutes), severe impact 
(more than 30 minutes’ delay), and surgery cancelled.  
The impact on patient safety was assessed using a five-point likert scale in increasing 
threat to patient safety: no threat, minor threat, moderate threat, potential adverse event, 
and potential severe adverse event.  
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9.3.2.3 Process mapping. 
I conducted visits to the operating departments at each site with the help of a Research 
assistant (DV) and conducted one to one and group sessions with operating theatre 
staff. The research assistant’s role was only to facilitate the meetings and networking for 
data collection at various sites, as he was involved in separate projects at those sites 
and helped in establishing the research network. I used the information received to 
design a process map detailing surgical equipment ordering and procurement process at 
each site. The main objective of the process map was to understand how the equipment 
was requested, ordered, and received and the related communication between the 
surgeons, nurses and the sterilisation services. The process map was circulated among 
the theatre staff to make additions and remove discrepancies.  
9.3.3 Data collection. 
Data was collected over a period of eight weeks, including weekends, in selected 
operating theatres on all sites.  
 
9.3.3.1 Equipment Self report. 
To measure the incidence of equipment failures in operating theatres, data collection 
forms were designed (Appendix 4) for the theatre staff to complete after each procedure. 
After each operative procedure, scrub nurses and surgeons were asked to discuss 
equipment problems and record them on the data form after each procedure, regardless 
of whether or not any equipment failures were identified. The forms were distributed to 
all the participating theatres and I regularly collected them and recorded the data on 
spreadsheets for subsequent analysis.  
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The form comprised the following sections:  
  
Equipment Problem: Under this section, the theatre team was asked to document which 
item of equipment was the problem related to and which surgical procedure was being 
observed.  
 
Type of equipment problem: There were four categories: not available, faulty, wrong use 
of equipment, and lack of knowledge on how to use the equipment.  
 
How was the problem dealt with: This section was included to understand how 
equipment problems are dealt with in operating theatres. There were three options: 
equipment added, equipment replaced/ fixed, and work around the problem.  
 
Did the problem impact on flow of surgery: The impact on the flow of surgery was 
measured in terms of the time delay the equipment problem had on the procedure. 
There were five options: no impact, minor (less than 5 minutes’ delay), moderate (delay 
of 5 to 30 minutes), severe impact (more than 30 minutes’ delay), and surgery 
cancelled. 
 
Did the problem threaten patient safety .In this section the theatre team discussed and 
recorded the perceived severity of each failure using a five-point Likert scale in 
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increasing threat to patient safety: no threat, minor threat, moderate threat, potential 
adverse event, and potential severe adverse event.  
 
9.3.3.2 Exploring the systems failures involved. 
I independently observed a separate set of twenty major gastrointestinal surgeries to 
understand equipment problems and underlying human factors such as teamwork 
failures. I recorded field notes that were later analysed into emerging factors. Two expert 
reviewers (Myself and KM) systematically coded the field notes into emergent themes. 
This technique was also beneficial in understanding the under-reporting of equipment 
failures by theatre staff. The surgeon and the nurse were each given the equipment self 
report forms to individually report the equipment problems to assess under reporting and 
differences in the perceived impact of these problems on patient safety and flow of 
surgery. The detailed methodology of the observational part of the study has been 
described in detail in Chapter 8.  
The theatre teams were also asked to rate the teamwork during that procedure on a 
likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 was very poor teamwork and 5 was very good teamwork.  
9.3.4 Data analysis 
The data from the self-reports was collected and analysed anonymously with only the 
sites being identified. The individual cases, theatres and teams were anonymised 
through a system of case coding at the data entry stage. The data was analysed using 
SPSS 18.0 statistical software to calculate frequencies of problems and their categories. 
Intersite variations were evaluated using Kruskal Wallis test. Pearson’s correlation 
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coefficient was used to assess correlations between observations and self-reports; and 
equipment problems and teamwork failures.  
 
9.4 Results. 
The sites were a mix of variable characteristics such as number of beds. Similarly, 
national reporting and learning system data on incidents per 100 patient admissions 
have been presented in table 9.1 to demonstrate that the sites were representative of 
the variability in the NHS. 
Table 9.1 Description of the three sites. 
Site Number of beds Theatres recruited NRLS report 
Site A 358 3 2.81 
Site D 950 5 7.53 
Site F 530 3 1.39 
NRLS: National Patient Safety Agency’s national reporting and learning system. Data presented per 100 
admissions. 
	  
9.4.1 Process map. 
The process map relating to all three sites is shown in Figure 9.1. All theatres had 
similar processes for the ordering of surgical equipment. Some equipment was ‘owned’ 
by the surgical department and some was acquired on loan when needed. Some 
equipment was obtained directly from the manufacturers (e.g. prostheses). All sites had 
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an onsite storeroom where equipment was stored and made available when required. 
Reusable equipment has to be sterilised before it can be used again. The sterilisation 
unit on site F was in-house while on sites A and D the sterilisation units were 
outsourced. Figure 9.1 also highlights the various problems (highlighted in red text) that 
may occur at various steps in the process.  
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Figure 9.1 Flowchart of process for obtaining surgical equipment. 
Start
Patient put on list
List goes to 
waiting list officer
Schedulers put 
patient on the 
system
List of patient sent 
to Theatre Sister
Theatre Sister 
orders/ collects 
equipment
Collect equipment 
from store room
Is equipment 
available onsite?
Is equipment 
from disposable 
supply?
Equipment 
collected from 
disposable supply 
store room 
Equipment collected from non- disposable 
supply (see sterilisation pathway)
Hire equipment 
from company or 
other Hospital
Loan equipment 
obtained and sent to 
IHSS (see sterilisation 
pathway)
Equipment reaches theatre
FINISH
Consultant 
requiring special 
equipment
If special 
equipment 
required, list 
officer speaks to 
theatre sister
If special 
equipment 
required, 
consultant 
speaks to theatre 
sister
If special 
equipment 
required, 
consultant speaks 
to waiting list 
officer
Not enough or 
wrong info on 
equipment needed
Gets delayed or 
lost
Wrong equipment 
or equipment not 
available from 
company
Not enough time 
to order/ collect 
the day before
Not available, not 
enough notice, not 
enough info
Might not be 
experienced 
enough
Not arrived from 
IHSS
Not available 3 
days prior to use 
to get autoclaved
Not ordered or run 
out of stock
Someone has used 
the equipment 
unexpectedly
Hole in the set
Wrong equipment 
in the set
Yes No
Yes No
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9.4.2 Prevalence of equipment problems. 
A total of 490 operations were included in the study, including 258 on site A, 67 on site 
D and 165 on site F. The different types of operations studied on each site were trauma, 
orthopaedics, general and paediatric surgery.  
A total of 103 instances of equipment failure were reported with 19.2% (n=94) of 
surgeries affected with minimum of one problem and maximum 2 problems (average 
problem rate-1.09, median-1, range 1-2).  
Types of equipment failures and how they were dealt with are summarised in Figure 9.2 
and Figure 9.3 respectively. Of the 103 equipment problems, non-availability of 
equipment was the commonest problem (56%) followed by faulty equipment (38%). 
Equipment problems arising due to lack of knowledge were the least common 
accounting for only 1% of errors. In 52% of instances, surgeons had to work around the 
problem and equipment was added or replaced in 48% of occasions. 
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Figure 9.2 Types of equipment problems identified across all three sites. 
 
 
Figure 9.3 How the equipment problems were identified, across all three sites. 
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The flow of surgery was affected by the equipment problem, resulting in varying 
amounts of delay in 51% of instances with equipment problems. Most delays were minor 
(30%) (Less than five minutes), 14% moderate (5-30 minute delay) and 7% led to 
severe delays of more than 30 minutes. No operation was cancelled due to equipment 
problems during the course of the study. Most of the errors were reported to pose no 
threat to patient safety (79%), 13% and 5% posing minor threat and moderate threat 
respectively and 3% led to patient harm.  
9.4.3 Variability between sites.  
Figure 9.4 shows the extent of variation between the three sites in terms of the 
prevalence of equipment failures. Site D had the highest incidence with 37% of 
operations having one or more equipment problems followed by site A and site F with 
19% and 12% operations with equipment problems. Figure 9.4 shows the types of 
equipment failures at each site. Kruskal Wallis test was used to confirm that the 
differences were statistically significant (Chi-Square-18.659, df-2, P-0.000). 
Figure 9.5 shows that at sites A and D, staff were most likely to cope with the equipment 
problem by working around the problem. At site F, the most common response was to 
replace the equipment or fix the item.  Figure 9.6 shows that at sites A and F, the 
majority of equipment problems did not cause any delay on the flow of the surgery. 
However, at site D, the equipment problems most commonly caused a minor delay (less 
than 5 minutes). As figure 9.7 suggests, at all sites, most of the problems had no impact 
on patient safety however, at site A and D, they led to adverse event in 2% and 7% of 
instances.  
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Figure 9.4 Types of equipment problem at each site. 
 
Figure 9.5 How the problem was dealt with at each site. 
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Figure 9.6 Effect on the flow of surgery, at each site. 
 
Figure 9.7 Threat to patient safety at each site. 
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9.4.4 Observational analysis equipment problems. 
A total of 140 hours of observations were carried out. Mean duration of procedures was 
6.5 hours. 13 were open and 7 were laparoscopic gastrointestinal surgeries. Equipment 
problems occurred routinely during surgical procedures. A total of 47 equipment 
problems were noted by the observer accounting for 14.11% of all events in the theatre 
with a mean of 2.40±0.62 equipment errors per case. The maximum number of 
equipment problems observed per case was 12.00 and minimum was 0.0. Surgeons 
and nurses collectively reported 42.56% (n= 20) of the observed problems with 
surgeons reporting 70% and nurses reporting the remaining 30% of problems.  
On further analysis into the causes of these equipment problems, 40.42% had an 
underlying teamwork failures leading to the equipment problems. (Figure 9.8) shows the 
distribution of underlying teamwork failures responsible for the equipment problems. 
There was a moderate correlation between all equipment problems and teamwork 
failures (Pearson’s correlation 0.575, P-0.008). There was also a correlation between 
reported teamwork scores and equipment problems in the operating theatres (Pearson’s 
correlation -0.519, P- 0.019). But there was no effect of Surgeon or nurse’s grade on 
number of errors. The observer’s perceived impact of equipment problems on patient 
safety and flow of surgery was compared to surgeons’ and nurses’ perception. I found 
that there was a strong correlation between observer and surgeon’s perception of 
impact on patient safety (Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.827, P- 0.000) but no 
correlation on impact on flow of surgery (Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.110, P-0.7). 
Nurses’ perception of impact on patient safety did not correlate with the observer’s 
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perception but there was a moderate correlation in nurses’ perception of impact on flow 
of surgery with that of the observer but it did not achieve significance (Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient 0.539, P 0.6). Table 9.2 illustrates some equipment problems and 
underlying teamwork failures.  
 
Figure 9.8 Teamwork errors leading to equipment errors. 
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Table 9.2 Examples of equipment failures their impact and underlying systems     
factors. 
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9.5 Discussion. 
This study shows that equipment problems affected one fifth of the operations and often 
surgeons had to work around these problems, which not only leads to delays, but also 
threatened patient’s safety.  
Analysing the data acquired in this investigation produced a variety of interesting results, 
some as predicted and some unexpected. I suspected that equipment failure would be 
common. The data supported this: 19% of procedures were associated with one or more 
equipment problem. The majority of equipment problems related to equipment not being 
available. This was unexpected as the team had previously suspected that faulty 
equipment would be the main type of equipment problem. However, the picture was not 
the same on all the sites. Most equipment problems on site A were due to equipment not 
being available, while on sites D and F, most equipment problems were due to faulty 
equipment. Unavailability of equipment may signify a bigger problem in theatres e.g. 
miscommunication between doctors and nurses, especially if scrub nurses were not 
aware of all the equipment required for the procedure. 
It is concerning that in most cases, staff had to work around the problem, possibly 
contributing to an already stressful environment.  The surgeons had to cope with the 
missing surgical equipment and deliberately deviate from the way they intended to 
perform the procedure in case the equipment was available. For example, I observed 
that a faulty tourniquet strap used in a knee replacement had to be worked around when 
it came undone in the middle of surgery. This could have increased the risk of bleeding 
and put the patient’s life in danger. Some other examples of equipment problems and 
their impact are described in Table 9.2. 
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Workaround is a necessary violation whereby an operator has to improvise in order to 
get the job done. According to Reason, necessary violations are commonly provoked by 
the organisation failing to provide the adequate working condition for the staff at the 
sharp-end, for example not providing adequate tools and equipment when and where 
needed (Reason 1997). In other High Reliability Organisations (HRO), working 
conditions that provoke staff to workaround and improvise have been found unsafe and 
have led to some major incidents (Aviation Safety Network). In order to reduce 
workarounds, HROs have implemented Safety Management Systems whereby 
emphasis is placed on learning from critical incidents and implementation of actions to 
reduce the recurrence of those incidents. In cases where incidents and near misses 
occur frequently, the processes implemented through a Safety management System can 
be relied upon to produce continuous improvement and achieve reduction in associated 
risks (Reason 1997). In healthcare there is a lack of such systems and theatre staff are 
used to coping with equipment problems by working around them.  
 In addition to the potential threat to patient safety, equipment failures can have a 
detrimental economic impact, which has not yet been studied. Estimating that the mean 
cost of an hour of operating theatre is £1055 in UK (Scotland 2009) and from our study 
where I found that 7% of operations with equipment problems were subjected to a delay 
of 30 minutes or more; we can extrapolate the equipment failures cost the NHS close to 
£57.6 million per year. This is without taking into consideration the indirect costs of 
patient harm from equipment failures. 
 Lack of knowledge on how to use equipment only caused 1% of the problems, allowing 
one to conclude that most staff was adequately trained in using the relevant surgical 
equipment. Wrong sutures and needles were common types of equipment failure and 
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these put patients at risk of having complications after surgery. Scissors and blades not 
cutting properly delay the flow of the procedure and add unnecessary stress upon all 
staff. Due to the inevitability of equipment failure, it is essential that staff is prepared for 
these situations. In most cases, staff had to work around the problem, possibly 
contributing to an already stressful environment.  
 From this study many factors were identified that led to these equipment problems. The 
causative factors behind equipment problems were a complex interplay of 
communication errors, lack of training and orientation and organisational factors such as 
design and technology. There is a need for further exploratory study to understand the 
contributory factors and solutions to these equipment failures, which will be addressed in 
the next chapter. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study that describes equipment problems in operating 
theatres in such detail and assesses their impact on flow of surgery and patient safety. 
The study covered multiple centres representing the surgical systems across the UK, 
thereby supporting generalisability of the findings. There may potentially have been an 
under reporting by hospital staff as suggested by the observational data. Staff may have 
been more likely to fill in the data sheet when they have encountered major equipment 
problems (as they are used to filling in incident forms) and may have forgotten to 
complete the data sheets when they encountered any minor problems. This would also 
highlight the prevalent culture in healthcare where we are so used to errors that some of 
them may not even be perceived as problems but a part of the system.  
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9.6 Conclusion. 
Equipment problems are common in operating theatres and often surgeons have to 
work around these problems, which compromise patient safety and cause disruptions in 
operating theatres. There is a need to put in place interventions that add redundancy to 
the system and provide training support to team members. 
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Chapter 10 
Addressing equipment problems in operating theatres- an 
interview study to explore underlying factors and solutions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9 describes the nature of equipment problems in operating theatres. It 
highlights the association between teamwork failures, equipment problems, and their 
potential for patient harm. However, I needed to understand the factors that cause 
equipment related problems. Therefore, alongside the equipment problem self report 
study, I conducted an interview study at the three sites to further explore these problems 
and the contributory factors, understand the surgeons’, nurses’, and anaesthetists’, 
perceptions regarding equipment problems and discuss possible solutions to these 
systems problems and the role of WHO checklist in addressing these problems..  
 
10.2 Aims. 
To explore factors underlying equipment problems occurring in operating theatres. 
To understand theatre teams’ perceptions regarding the occurrence of these 
problems. 
To make recommendations and propose systems interventions for reducing 
equipment problems.  
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10.3 Methods. 
10.3.1 Study design. 
Semi- structured interviews were conducted with surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists to 
explore equipment problems in the operating theatres.  
10.3.2 Participants and materials. 
13 healthcare professionals participated in the interviews, of which four were surgeons, 
three were anaesthetists and six were nurses. Nine staff members were interviewed at 
site A (4 Surgeons, 3 Anaethetists and 2 Nurses), two staff members from Site D (2 
Nurses) and two staff members from site F (2 Nurses). The sites were the same as 
described in the previous chapter. This study sample was chosen to cover the different 
phases of the surgical equipment pathway and to capture the staff perception on various 
contributing factors at different stages of the process that may influence surgical 
equipment problems in theatres.  
Ethical approval was granted initially for the quantitative data collection for chapter 9 
study. For the qualitative data collection a separate substantial amendment form with 
further details of the interviewees, interviewers, and interview questions was 
subsequently submitted and approved. I gained approval from each local research and 
development office to conduct the study at each site.  
10.3.3 Data collection. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted using a topic guide that I developed to 
explore the factors underlying equipment problems. I carried out all the interviews at site 
A (n=9) and research assistant (DV) carried out the interviews at site D and F (n=4). DV 
had received prior training in interview techniques and attended 5 interviews that I 
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conducted to attain a common understanding of the topic guide and interview questions. 
The reason to choose DV to conduct interviews at the two sites was his familiarity with 
the theatre staff at the sites. Therefore they were more likely to be at ease with and 
answer the questions without any inhibitions and fears. Thirteen healthcare 
professionals of varying levels of experience, including surgeons, anaesthetists and 
theatre nurses participated in the study. Participants were selected using a qualitative 
sampling frame (Marshall 1996) to ensure a broad spectrum of demographic and 
professional characteristics and were also identified by snowball sampling techniques 
(Miles MB and AM 1994). Sampling ceased when saturation was achieved (i.e., no new 
themes were emerging from the interviews). All interviews were audio taped and 
transcribed.  
I prepared a topic guide, which provided a framework for the interview (Appendix 5). The 
topic guide was designed to explore the surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses’ views on 
the following topics: 
1) Common equipment problems faced in the operating theatres. 
2) Factors and underlying causes for these problems. 
3) Possible solutions to address equipment problems. 
 Relevant topics were initially identified and possible issues between the topics and any 
contributing factors became the basis for more specific questions during the interview in 
order to explore and identify the causes of equipment problems.  
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10.3.4 Data analysis. 
I used Data management software (NVIVO 8) to manage the interview data. The 
software was used to classify, sort and arrange data according to the different 
attributions under the adapted Vincent’s framework described in chapter 2 (Vincent 
1998) to understand the systems factors underlying equipment problems. The List of 
Attribution coding (Tree Nodes in NVIVO 8) was as follows: 
1. Organisational and Management Factors. 
2. Work Environment. 
3. Team Factors. 
4. Individual (staff) Factors. 
5. Task Factors. 
10.3.5 Coding reliability. 
 The consistency (reliability) and confirmability (validity) of data analysis and 
interpretation was assessed using two techniques. Firstly, external validation of all 
stages of coding and interpretation of transcripts was performed independently by two 
experienced qualitative researchers (myself and DV). The results were compared and 
there were no significant inconsistencies. Secondly, member checking was carried out 
to ensure accurate interpretation of the data.  
 
10.4 Results. 
The interview coding of the causes of surgical equipment problems was performed in 
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accordance with the classification of contributory factors proposed by Vincent et 
al.(Vincent 1998) Most of the causes, I identified fell within the levels as proposed by the 
framework. Table 10.1 summarizes the main findings from the interviews.  
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Table 10.1 Equipment problem contributory factors. 
Classification of contributing factors with examples and verbatim quotes No of Subjects 
who said this and 
number of 
themes.  
Organisational and Management Factors 
Limited resources and funding. Complex service agreements and tiers in the 
procurement and service process. 
Outsourcing of services such a Sterilisation services, Staff culture and priorities. 
 
‘Lack of funding, we’ve got, the equipment, we’ve got some very old equipment and 
some of it is really ancient and it’s really hard to get service contracts on some of them 
and we find the service contracts are worth more than the equipment itself’ 
S=1,N=3 
Total  
Subjects = 4 
Themes = 8 
 
Work Environment 
Design, availability and maintenance of equipment 
Workload and shift patterns, Lack of specialized staff 
‘probably not having enough staff really and they feel pressured to just get doing things 
that they’re not really ready to do because there aren’t enough people and they’re 
another number, which they're accounted for in the theatre.  So if they’re there they 
feel like they have to just get on and do it, get on with it’  
S=2, A =1, N=7 
Total  
Subjects = 10 
Themes = 5 
Team Factors 
Poor communication between surgeons and nurses 
‘A basic mention of surgical equipment because surgical equipment like, the common 
problems we have is that the diathermy isn’t working or the patient has, these days we 
use devices like LigaSure, it’s not available, or there is a laparoscopic instrument that 
isn’t required on this set and it’s not there or the suction’s not working.’  
S=2, N=3 
Total 
Subjects = 5 
Themes = 8 
 
Individual (staff) Factors 
Knowledge and skill of the staff 
Lack of training 
‘really gynaecology trained theatre nurses, I think that would be the biggest advantage 
because very often they can’t find the equipment we need so we have to compromise 
and use something which is probably not unsafe but maybe not as good and I think’  
S=2, N=4 
Total  
Subjects = 6 
Themes = 6 
 
Task Factors 
Lack of checks to detect or highlight equipment problems 
Lack of clear task distribution 
‘No-one ever checks the diathermy, to make sure it works, before they need it.’  
S=2, A=2, N=3 
Total  
Subjects = 7 
Themes = 4 
(S= Surgeon, A= Anaesthetist, N= Nurses)	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10.4.1 Organisational and Management Factors. 
Organisational and financial constraints were perceived to be a limiting factor for the 
availability of up to date surgical equipment. Some expensive equipment gets damaged 
easily and poses a financial burden for its replacement. These instruments may be in 
limited circulation and need to be shared between different theatres during surgery. As a 
result timely availability of these equipments also emerged to be a problem. Further, 
prior clear communication was necessary for booking such equipment and often it was 
not available for surgery due to lack of communication between surgeons and nurses or 
short notice as during an emergency surgery. In areas where equipment sterilisation has 
been outsourced, it was not clear whether theatres or the sterilisation units were 
responsible for replacing broken or missing equipment from the trays. Consequently, 
missing equipment was not replaced and incomplete surgical trays were packed and 
dispatched to theatres for use.  
Financial resources and constraints may affect the availability of certain equipment. Due 
to financial restrictions, up to date and occasionally used equipment cannot be procured 
which may pose safety risks.   
‘It could be old equipment, we don’t have the most up to date things that are available 
because of expenditure.’ (Nurse 1 Site F) 
‘Occasionally you will find that if you’ve got somebody who comes in with a trauma 
injury, and it will be unique stuff that we use may be two or three times a year that we 
wouldn’t buy to have on the shelf, but that you would hire in.  That would be the 
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occasional time whenever you should have something that’s not available.’ (Nurse 2 Site 
A). 
In the current economic climate, NHS is being transformed to reduce costs. Some of 
these involve merging trusts and outsourcing service provisions. Some trusts have 
outsourced their sterilisation unit. On site D, the responsibility for replacing missing 
equipment is blurred between sterilisation unit and the theatres, which leads to problems 
and confusion. There is a mismatch between the goals of the outsourced sterilisation 
unit and the needs of the operating theatre. There was certain resentment among 
theatres staff to the outsourcing as it prevented them from having a control over the 
equipment turnover and dependence on an outside organisation for equipment repair 
and timely sterilisation. Further, the system was primarily working towards identifying 
and documenting the problems, rather than finding a solution. There was lack of shared 
responsibility in ensuring that correct equipment is available.  
‘they are there to do a certain job of making sure that it's sterile for us and that tray is 
like it should be, but they have no interrelation of what the surgical need is.’ 
……………… 
‘So as a scrub practitioner you've got to be adaptable to start with, but say you’d open a 
tray and the diathermy lead’s there but with no forceps, you can't use it, you cannot use 
the diathermy without the forceps, they go together.  But on the outside it’ll say 
diathermy forceps missing.  What you want is a system in place that if the diathermy 
forceps are damaged or missing, replace them, set out, it's simple to me.’ (Nurse1 Site 
D) 
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Some problems are recurrent. Learning from mistakes is not part of the staff culture and 
priority or often-new information regarding equipment is not passed on. As a result 
similar problems arise repeatedly. This can be particularly frustrating for the surgeons 
who then had to face the same technical difficulty time and again due to the unavailable 
or faulty equipment.   
‘we always need a colposcope with that list, and time and time again it isn’t there or it’s 
broken or it isn’t back or nobody knows where it is and-----------,’(Surgeon Site A) 
10.4.2 Work environment. 
The availability of on-site storage space limits the amount of items and equipment that 
can be made available in theatres. Equipment is shared between several theatres and at 
times, its availability is on a first come basis. Replenishment and topping up is not 
always adequate and can consequently lead to depleted stock and unavailability of 
minor items such as surgical swabs.  
‘You have three theatres needing particular equipment.  Shall we say you’ve got three 
theatres, you’ve got only two sets of total hip replacement kits, ……If you’ve got three 
theatres who needs that, what would happen with the third theatre if you got only two?  
So it has to, someone in charge has to check the list first, not only your own list but 
what’s going on to other theatres.’ (Nurse 2 Site F) 
‘It’s a nightmare.  I shouldn’t say that but it’s not it’s suboptimal.  Not very good as in we 
don’t have enough space I think, but perhaps that’s always going to be a 
problem.’(Nurse 3 Site A). 
 186	  
Lack of storage space led to chaos and disorganization in storage system as a result 
equipment would go missing or get damaged. This was a reason for discontentment 
among theatre teams and could also lead to hot arguments and hostility. 
‘No, none at all, none at all.  You have it all in the corridors, as you can see out there, 
and everything goes on the shelf and instrument trays get ripped where they’ve been 
slapped on top of each other and there’s no other place to store them so.’ (Nurse 1 Site 
F) 
Some participants also reported that teams are often understaffed and rushed between 
procedures and not enough time is allowed between procedures for pre operative 
equipment checks. As a result often equipment problems were detected during the 
surgery leading to stress and delays. Endoscopic procedures were particularly 
vulnerable due to high turnover and short patient transfer and anesthetic time.  
‘I think if people are very rushed for whatever lack of staff, maybe it’s not, people have 
been cleaning from the case before and they’ve quickly got to set up for the next case.  
That might be one reason why someone might not, not that it’s an excuse or a reason 
not to, but this might be why people might feel pressure, under pressure and may skip 
that step.’ (Nurse 3 Site A)  
 
10.4.3 Team Factors. 
In theatres, staff works within teams and with other teams of staff (e.g. administration 
staff, nurses, surgeons and anaesthetists). Verbal and written communication 
breakdown can affect the flow of information and eventually things are not done. There 
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is a lack of communication at the planning stage of the procedure. In case of changes in 
patient list, sometimes the information is not passed on to the person in charge of the 
theatre and the required equipment is not ordered.  
Operating theatre staff is unaware of any faulty or missing equipment in a sterilised tray 
before they open that tray for an operation. Inadequate labelling of the surgical trays 
from the sterilisation unit may be the source of some confusion when the tray reaches 
theatre.  
‘And have you had an example of those things happening, like the whole laparoscopic 
incident? Oh yes where it's been rewrapped and said it's fine when actually when you 
open it, it is damaged and you cannot use it.’ (Nurse 1 Site D) 
‘What we struggle with from sterile supplies, is they don’t always label it perhaps quite 
rightly, and perhaps we need to be more explicit about what we ask them to label it as.’ 
(Nurse 2 Site D) 
Some surgeons were concerned about not being informed prior to the commencement 
of a procedure, about a piece of equipment that is likely to be needed for that operation, 
but is broken or not available. On the other hand, the same surgeons recognise that 
theatre nurses are often not informed about the possible need of any specific 
equipment. Surgeons delegate job to junior surgeons who then may not communicate 
the exact information to the teams in the theatre. In case the patient list changes, 
sometimes the information is not passed on to the person in charge of the theatre. 
Sometimes surgeons do not have control of their own list and changes may not be 
communicated to the surgeons or theatre teams. 
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‘So they don’t take ownership of it, and they don’t take responsibility for it, and what you 
need is the surgeon to take responsibility and ownership, and then to be communicating 
out to different people.  And one of the things that you have to be very careful about is if 
they give it, if they give a job to one of their juniors, something gets lost in the 
translation, and it’s like Chinese whispers.  So I think it’s really important that he 
(surgeon) communicates, or she communicates with whoever’s in charge of that 
particular area, and then there’s a communication to the entire team in theatre.’ (Nurse 2 
Site A) 
‘I don’t think the surgeons are particularly good at communicating, and I think a lot of it 
revolves around the fact that they’re not in control of their own lists, and they have 
somebody else deciding what’s going on their list.’ (Nurse 2 Site A) 
However, according to two surgeons, relying only on a theatre list to determine which 
equipment may be needed may not be sufficient. The system should allow for enough 
flexibility in order to provide the surgeon with the specific equipment he/she may require 
at the point of need. One nurse identified that experience and knowledge of the nursing 
staff may help to overcome this. 
‘I mean, if you’re working with all the experienced people, I mean, it does affect as well, 
because at least they know where to get the things from, they can anticipate delay and, 
like this, we can minimise this problem. (Nurse 2 Site F) 
10.4.4 Individual Factors. 
Surgeons, anaesthetists, locum staff and at times theatre nurses are expected to work 
on different sites within the same trust. One surgeon and two nurses pointed out that 
induction training and familiarisation with different sites within the same trust is not 
 189	  
adequate and may lead to staff not knowing which equipment are available at that site 
and where they are stored. Surgeons had individual preferences for certain equipment 
and techniques and while working with unfamiliar staff, there could be confusion 
regarding the equipments needed. There was also some discontentment expressed by 
nurses over being shuffled around from on specialty theatre to another without taking 
into consideration their preferences and expertise. Often these were management 
driven changes in the wake of staff shortages and redistribution of workforce. 
‘Just the way the work plans are, they’ve just changed things around, and it may be that 
they predominantly have done a list in one of the sites, and now through various 
changes, they’re doing the list somewhere else.  But it’s not that frequent, and obviously 
they may not be as familiar with what they’ve got on that other site as their normal base 
site.’ (Nurse 1 Site D) 
10.4.5 Task Factors. 
Protocols for specific tasks are not always adhered to. One surgeon, two anaesthetists 
and two nurses remarked that equipment is not tested or checked before the procedure. 
The task that the staff is meant to perform may itself be designed in such a way that it 
may affect the safety of the whole process. For instance, it is difficult to check sterile 
equipment before starting an operation because in order to maintain a sterile field the 
set will only be opened during an operation. The more complex the technology involved 
in a procedure, the more likely it is to have equipment problems. During endoscopic 
procedures, often the visual displays would be malfunctioning or the scope cameras not 
functioning properly. These problems were often detected only once the procedure had 
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begun. The staff had not checked or did not know how to operate the equipment if it had 
a software/ operational error.  
‘there is an intrinsic problem in that you can’t actually check they’re working before 
you’ve opened the set.  But there is a step missing there in checking sterile equipment 
before it’s used.  Probably the only way you can do it is to actually open the sets before 
the patient’s asleep and check the equipment’s working.’ (Anaesthetist 1.4 Site A) 
'Well I think eventually it comes down to the surgeon, you’re responsible for the 
equipment but obviously there are situations, so you’re supposed to test everything 
before you start but no-one, including me, is doing that probably all the time, because 
these are routine things and you just assume that these things are set up properly by the 
team, but then not’ (Surgeon 1 Site A) 
‘No-one ever checks the diathermy, to make sure it works, before they need it.’ 
(Anaesthetist 1.4 Site A) 
 
10.4.6 Proposed solutions for equipment problems. 
All the participants agreed that equipment problems are unacceptable and solutions and 
interventions should be put in place to prevent them. Box 9.1 highlights the key proposal 
for preventing equipment problems 
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Box 10.1 Proposed solutions. 
 
 
 
All respondents believed that there should be a good communication between surgeons 
and nurses during the period before the day of surgery. It emerged that theatre team 
briefings and surgical checklist “Time-out” can be a last minute communication check to 
discuss any equipment related problems and ensure that any specialised equipment 
needed for surgery is available and ready before the start of the procedure. 
‘A lot of it’s down to communication, and if you have a member of the theatre team, and 
the consultant surgeon who’s doing the operations communicating with each other, the 
week before the patients are due to come in.  If the list changes, then I would expect the 
surgeon to be contacting the person in charge of that theatre to talk to them about the 
equipment that’s required for the following week’ (Nurse 2 Site A) 
Another recurring problem was the communication and coordination between theatre 
staff and sterile services unit. Various proposals were suggested to improve supply and 
demand chain and improve the reliability of the system. 
There should be correct and appropriate labeling of the equipments and faulty 
equipment should be labeled so that it can be picked up and rectified or replaced. 
• Standardised communication protocol between surgeon, nurses and managers while 
planning an elective surgery. 
• Checklists and briefings on the day of the surgery 
• Structured training of nurses for equipment set up and organisation. 
• Training Sterilisation unit staff 
• A robust system of communication between sterilisation units and theatre staff 
• Intelligent design of equipment trays to detect missing items and report faulty 
equipment 	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‘What we struggle with from sterile supplies, is they don’t always label it perhaps quite 
rightly, and perhaps we need to be more explicit about what we ask them to label it as.’ 
(Nurse 2 Site D).  
‘I have been working in hospitals where they were putting on a tape or something on to 
the faulty equipment and so when the operation was finished, they sorted it out and they 
took it to the manufacturer or wherever to fix it’ (Surgeon 1 Site A) 
Tray design modifications such as transparent sterile sheets and graphic tray were 
proposed for sterilisation unit staff in order for them to better understand what is required 
by the theatre staff which will help the theatre staff to identify missing equipment quickly 
without opening the sets. 
 ‘The companies that you tend to get loans from are very good, because they’ll send 
diagrammatic pictures as well, so it’s very clear when you’re checking things off, those 
are the things that you should have on your trays, and they’re all the graphic trays, so 
it’s quite easy to see if you’ve got a gap, what should have been there.’ (Nurse 2 Site D). 
Better and more specific scanning system may help to pick up missing equipment, 
locate various equipment and also help in maintaining correct counts of the instruments 
in the sets. 
‘Because you can get bar coders that you can just zap all the way down all the 
instruments.’ (Nurse 2 Site A).  
‘I think there’s probably something around scanning as well, because our trays are 
scanned when they leave the site, and they’re scanned to say that they’re in sterile 
supplies, and then they’re scanned coming back out.  But they’re not scanned to 
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individual theatres or individual even sites, all we will know is that it’s left sterile supplies 
and it’s at Hospital A.  Well, Hospital A’s got ten theatres, and there’s only five that are 
clustered together, the other five are quite separate.  So that’s been quite difficult for 
people, to find out well, where in the ten theatres has it gone back to?  And even it may 
not have gone back to a theatre, it may have gone to an outpatients facility.  So I think, 
and we are currently doing that work around doing almost that secondary scanning so 
that we can be more precise about where things are.’ (Nurse 2 Site D) 
Need for quality and structured training emerged as a major factor proposed to resolve 
equipment problems. Better training and exposure for sterilisation unit staff is need to 
improve their understanding of equipment needs of surgical procedures. Also better 
training of nurses is needed to ensure that the all equipment is assembled correctly and 
is running properly in the theatres. 
‘But on the back of that people have come and visited from CSSD (Sterile services unit) 
and that has helped.  And it's a two way process, they’ve asked us to visit them as well.  
And I'm very much the, making sure that that happens.’ (Nurse 1 Site D)  
Allocation of tasks to specific person was suggested to maintain the storeroom. This 
would assign responsibility and establish a channel of communication the teams need to 
follow in securing equipment from the store. 
‘I think it’s also the fact that, well in my opinion, a few people will share this, we don’t 
actually have one person allocated to do that, to actually sort out the storeroom, neaten 
it up, unpack boxes, do this kind of thing, organise it really.  I think the expectation is that 
everyone kind of does it and that doesn’t work, doesn’t seem to work at the moment 
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anyway.  If we actually had, say, one person to do that then it would work.  So there may 
not be lack of space if it was better organised.’ (Nurse 3 Site A). 
 
10.5 Discussion. 
This interview study has identified some serious issues surrounding the equipment 
problems. As discussed in the chapter 9, equipment problems are very common in UK 
operating theatres and theatre staff, although accustomed to these problems, see them 
as a source of considerable inconvenience to the flow of surgery and a threat to 
provision of safe patient care.  
Various organisational and work environment associated factors were highlighted in this 
study. There was the lack of a reliable system to process and circulate equipment for 
use in the operating theatres. In order to maintain a sterile field, nurses can only open 
the equipment pack just before the start of the operation and therefore may not be able 
to predict, if equipment is faulty or missing. In the interviews it emerged that outsourcing 
of the sterilisation services may also be responsible for certain missing equipment in the 
sets as there is a lack of appropriate communication channels between the theatre staff 
and sterilisation units. Nurses also reported that on a number of occasions, the 
instruments were missing from the sets. This was largely put down to incomplete sets 
being sent out from the surgical sterilisation units, as the staff there may not be 
adequately trained. Lack of training into the equipment needs of a procedure also came 
up as a contributory factor. 
There is a lack of communication between surgeons and nurses regarding equipment 
needs for the procedures on the list. The nurses use an equipment kardex that lists each 
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surgeon’s required equipment for a specific surgery but often these kardex are not 
updated. This may cause ambiguity and the surgeon may assume that the nurse would 
know his preferred choice of equipment. Locum and floating theatre staff members may 
not be adequately oriented to the operating theatre complex as a result of which they 
may not be able to locate the equipment required for the surgery. This was an 
underlying problem in a number of procedures when the surgeon needed equipment 
and he had to wait or work around while the theatre staff tried locating the required 
equipment. 
Online portals may be useful to surgeons in communicating the equipment needed for 
their elective lists. This would not only remove assumptions but also be a learning and 
audit tool. To ensure that the equipment sets are not missing any instruments, there is a 
need to redesign the procurement system and the instrument sets to reduce human 
error by putting in place checks to ensure that the sets dispatched are complete. To 
ensure that the equipment available in the operating theatre suits is easily located and 
readily traceable, there is a need to redesign the storerooms where equipment is easily 
identified and located. GPS technology can be considered in locating expensive 
equipment that is shared between different theatres. To reduce human error it is 
essential that responsibilities are clearly assigned and redundancy added to the system 
supported by a training and orientation structure that supports new members of staff. 
Where the equipment is found to be faulty, a system should be in place to report these 
errors and ensure that faulty equipment is replaced or repaired. Also, the staff 
distribution should be such that in each theatre there should be members who are 
familiar with the equipment’s functioning. 
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To resolve the problem of missing equipment there is clearly a need to improve the 
communication between the surgeons and nurses prior to the surgery. Verdaasdonk et 
al showed that a structured checklist could halve the incidence of laparoscopic 
equipment problems (Verdaasdonk, Stassen et al. 2008). Recently WHO surgical 
checklist has been mandated in UK, which provides an opportunity for theatre teams to 
ensure that the required equipment is available before initiating the surgery (Vats, 
Vincent et al. ; National_Patient_Safety_Agency(UK) 2009). The WHO checklist requires 
the theatre teams to discuss the equipment needs and ensure the availability of the 
required instruments before the surgery begins. The equipment studies described in this 
and the previous chapters have established equipment failures as a very sensitive 
marker for teamwork in operating theatres. Equipment failures arise as a result of poor 
teamwork and communication between theatre teams. As suggested in this interview 
study, the WHO checklist can improve communication between team members and 
reduce the incidence of equipment failures.  
 
10.6 Conclusion. 
Equipment problems are common in operating theatres. They are systems failures 
associated with poor teamwork and communication. These problems can be addressed 
by designing a system that maintains standard channels of communication, identifies 
errors and ensures certain checks for a reliable and consistent availability of equipments 
to perform safe surgery. Having established the framework of teamwork failures in 
operating theatres in chapter 8 and determined equipment failures as a sensitive marker 
teamwork and patient safety in theatres, in the next chapter, I present a study re-
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evaluating the WHO checklist and its impact on teamwork failures and other markers of 
patient safety.  
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Chapter 11 
Effective WHO checklist use and its impact on teamwork, 
problems in operating theatres and patient safety 
 
11.1 Introduction. 
On 15th January 2009, National Patient Safety Agency rolled out a patient safety alert 
making the WHO surgical safety checklist mandatory for NHS. The purpose of the 
checklist is to improve teamwork and communication among the surgical theatre teams 
and to act as a memory aid to ensure that all tasks important for patient safety are 
carried out. The global WHO checklist study results showed a significant drop in 
postoperative morbidity and mortality: however, the UK site data did not show such 
significant reduction in post surgical morbidity and mortality. Therefore, as described in 
previous chapters, there was a need to develop a framework of surrogate markers of 
patient safety as described in Chapter 8, 9 and 10 to further evaluate the checklist use 
against these measures rather than clinical outcomes such as morbidity and mortality.  
Currently the checklist is being implemented across the NHS but in the absence of any 
structured training for the healthcare staff, the use of checklist in the theatres can be 
variable. As discussed in Chapter 6, the WHO checklist can improve teamwork and 
patient safety practices in the operating theatres, if it is used appropriately. If the 
checklist were used merely as a tick box exercise, surgery would remain prone to the 
communication and equipment failures. If during the Time-out, the surgeon performs the 
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checklist but fails to inform the team about equipment needs or the plan for surgery, or 
the anaesthetist fails to inform the team about critical patients, the checklist may not 
have any beneficial effects. Therefore, it is important to assess the quality of information 
exchanged during Time-out. There is a need to further study the dynamics of the 
checklist use and understand its impact on theatre environment, failure profiles and 
pitfall in the use of checklist so that these issues can be addressed through structured 
training to improve checklist use and monitor its effectiveness in the NHS. The study 
described in this chapter fill this gap in the understanding of the checklist use. 
 
11.2 Aims. 
With this study I evaluate:  
• The relationship of quality of checklist use to intra-operative failures. 
• The relationship of quality of checklist use to theatre teams’ perceived benefits of 
WHO checklist. 
• The relationship of quality of checklist use to the theatre teams’ perceived level of 
teamwork. 
In order to assess the above relationships, I aimed to evaluate the use of checklist in the 
operating theatres to: 
• Assess the variability in the use of the checklist in operating theatres.  
• Assess the quality of information exchanged during the Time-out. 
• Adherence to the use of checklist.  
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• Assess the impact of the checklist on teamwork failures, technical failures and 
equipment problems. 
• Assess the impact of checklist on the team’s perception of the benefits of 
checklist, teamwork and intra-operative complications. 
 
11.3 Methods. 
11.3.1 Study design. 
Prospective observational study, which used field notes in combination with structured 
data forms and self report forms to assess use of WHO checklist and its impact.  
11.3.2 Participants and materials. 
The study was carried out at St. Mary’s Hospital, London, in vascular surgery theatres.  
 
11.3.2.1 Sample. 
Sixty-five vascular surgery procedures were recruited for this study. The procedures 
included in the study ranged from lower limb thrombolectomies to aortic aneurysm 
repairs, open as well as endovascular procedures were included. Vascular surgery 
procedures were chosen for observation as they provided a good mix of short 
procedures such as lower limb thrombolectomies and more complex and high-risk 
procedures such as abdominal aortic aneurisms. These cases involved complex 
interactions between surgeons, nurses, anaesthetists and also radiologists in many 
instances, therefore the chances of teamwork failures were high. These failures could 
be studied and impact of WHO checklist would have been easier to assess as compared 
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to other surgeries where teamwork, communication and coordination is relatively 
infrequent. These cases were also commonly performed and easily recruited for the 
study. Advice was sought from the National research ethics committee and it was 
advised that as the project is a quality improvement programme to assess the 
adherence to the use WHO checklist which is an established patient safety intervention 
in the NHS, ethics committee approval was not necessary. Theatre teams were 
individually recruited for the study. The consent of the patients was not necessary as all 
data was kept anonymous and staff gave their implied consent by providing the 
information. 
	  
11.3.3 Data collection. 
 
11.3.3.1 Observations. 
As the WHO checklist is used in all operating theatres at St. Mary’s Hospital, during the 
checklist Time-out, I collected the data on quality of checklist use through a 
standardised data sheet (Appendix 6). The data form collected information on the timing 
and duration of the Time-out, absence of members during the Time-out, adherence to 
checklist items, quality, and completeness of information exchanged between surgeon, 
nurses, and anaesthetists. The quality of information exchanged by the surgeons, 
nurses and anaesthetists was rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented: exchange 
of information with resistance to checklist use, 2- minimal exchange of information with 
team members distracted by tasks at hand, 3- some information exchanged, 4- relevant 
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information exchanged and 5- good information exchange and encouraging other team 
members to share information.  
I decided to study the Time-out part of the checklist in detail as it was the most critical 
part of the checklist and involved the entire theatre team. During the Time-out most of 
the information relevant to the pending surgical procedure is exchanged, therefore it 
provided a good opportunity to study the team interactions and dynamics. Also my 
previous study described in chapter 6 had suggested that, the ‘Time-out’ part of the 
checklist was the most poorly performed part of the checklist as it involved not just 
ticking the boxes but also an element of team briefing.  
For 62% of sample cases (n=41), I also collected free hand field notes using the 
methodology described in chapter 8. The operative duration was noted as the time point 
when the patient entered the operating theatre until patient was transferred from the 
operating table. There were three primary observers (Myself, GB and MA). Both GB and 
MA were medical students who were keen to gain experience in research methodology 
under my supervision. GB was a 4th year medical student with a previous experience as 
theatre nurse and MA was a 4th year medical student. Both GB and MA received training 
in theatre observation methods and human factors under my (AV) supervision. I 
collected data for 31 cases. Of these, GB and MA co-observed 10 cases each with me. 
Therefore, reliability of the observations was assessed by parallel independent 
observation by myself for these with a 90%overlap in field note identification between 
observers. Once adequately trained, they independently collected data on 5 cases each.  
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11.3.3.2 Self report questionnaire. 
For the 65 cases, surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists were asked to complete a self-
report questionnaire (Appendix 7). The questionnaire was designed to collect 
information on staff’s perception of usefulness of WHO checklist for the related surgical 
procedure. After each procedure the surgeon, nurse and anaesthetist were asked if they 
found the checklist useful in understanding: a) the surgical procedure being performed, 
b) the equipment needs for the procedure, c) the patient’s condition and risks, and d) in 
running the operating theatre efficiently. They were also asked to individually rate the 
quality of information exchanged by the surgeon, nurse and anaesthetist during the 
time- out on a scale of 1 to 5. The teams were also asked to rate the teamwork in the 
operating theatre on a scale of 1 to 5 after each procedure.  
 
11.3.4 Data analysis. 
The field notes were analysed to classify them into various failure events using the 
theatre observation framework described in chapter 8. These were teamwork failures, 
equipment failures, and technical failures. WHO checklist usability score was calculated 
to assess the WHO surgical checklist use by theatre teams. The checklist score was 
calculated using 19 items on the checklist usability data form with the highest possible 
score of 30. The items included in the checklist score including patient identification, 
procedure and site verification, discussion of equipment needs, patient concerns, 
surgical procedure, anaesthetic risks and quality of information exchange. The quality of 
information was assessed using a Quality of information transfer score calculated by 
adding ratings for information exchanged by surgeon, nurse and anaesthetist during the 
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Time-out. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS version 18.0. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were calculated to understand correlation between the checklist 
and information scores and the failure events observed in the operating theatres. 
Correlations between perceptions of checklist benefits, reported teamwork, checklist 
usability score, information transfer scores and observer’s information scores were also 
analysed. 
 
11.4 Results. 
11.4.1 Quality of checklist use correlates with intra-operative failures. 
 
11.4.1.1 Variability in checklist use in operating theatres. 
Sixty five surgical procedures were included in this study. The cases included carotid 
endarterectomies, femoropopletial bypass, lower limb arterial thromolectomies, and 
repair of aortic anerysms. I observed that the Time-out was performed in 94% of cases. 
The time of performing the checklist time- out varied between different cases. In most 
cases (55.7%) it was performed before draping the patient for the procedure of cases 
and just before the skin incision in 42.6% of cases. On one occasion, the Time-out was 
performed after the surgical procedure had started. The mean duration on the time- out 
was 2.5 min (minimum- 1.5 min, maximum- 10.5 min). In 78% of cases, the checklist 
was led by the circulating nurse, followed by ODPs in 6.6% of cases. Surgeons and 
anaesthetists led the checklist in only 2 (3.3%) cases each. Variability in the use of 
checklist is discussed Table 11.1.  
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Table 11.1 Variability in checklist use between surgical cases. 
Variability measures Percentage 
of cases 
All items on the checklist completed	   30.70%	  
Checks completed in correct order of the checklist 33.90%	  
All team members present at ‘Time-out’	   34.00%	  
Team members present in the theatre paused to listen and contribute to the Time-
out	   27.70%	  
Antibiotic prophylaxis discussed 	   69.20%	  
Venous thrombo-embolism prophylaxis discussed 52.30%	  
Equipment needs of the surgical procedure were discussed	   66.20%	  
Information relating to anticipated difficulties, patient specific concerns discussed	   78.50%	  
 
11.4.1.2 Quality of checklist use. 
Over all WHO checklist usability scores were calculated using nineteen parameters from 
the checklist usability data form. The maximum score was 30. The mean checklist 
usability score was 18.83 (minimum score- 8, maximum score- 29). There was a marked 
variability in the quality of information transfer by surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists at 
‘Time-out’. The quality of information exchanged by these team members was rated on 
a scale of 1 to 5. The surgeons were rated lowest with a mean score of 2.9, nurses 
mean rating was 3.2 and anaesthetists were rated the highest for quality of information 
exchange with a mean of 3.4. In 12.5% of cases, surgeons were noted to be resistant to 
 206	  
the Time-out and did not volunteer any information to other team members. After the 
procedure surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists were also asked to individually rate the 
information transfer on a scale of 1-5 and it was observed that they generally gave a 
higher rating to the team members. Table 11.2 summaries the mean quality of 
information transfer ratings as rated by observer, surgeon, nurse, and anaesthetist. 
 
Table 11.2 Summary of mean quality of information transfer scores. 
 Observer 
rating 
Surgeon 
rating 
Nurse 
rating 
Anaesthetist 
rating 
Mean team 
rating 
Surgical information 
transfer 
3.20 4.09 4.14 4.07 4.10 
Nursing information 
transfer 
3.20 3.82 4.09 3.75 3.88 
Anaesthetic information 
transfer 
3.38 3.98 4.16 4.03 4.05 
 
The individual surgical, anaesthetic and nurse ratings of the observers were summed up 
to calculate the overall quality of information transfer score with a maximum possible 
score of 15. The mean score was 9.63 (minimum score- 6, maximum score- 14). Similar 
scores were also calculated for the self reported ratings. Again, the teams’ self reported 
information scores were higher than the observer’s with a mean score of 13.0 (minimum 
score- 8.33, maximum score- 15).  
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11.4.1.3 Observed events and failures in operating theatres. 
For 41 cases, extensive field notes were collected and analysed to identify failure events 
associated with the surgical procedures. A total of 117 hours of observations were 
carried out identifying 365 events. Of these events, 257 were identified to be failures 
directly related to the surgical procedure of which, 61.1% were teamwork failures, 32.7% 
were equipment failures, and 6.2% were technical failures. Teamwork failures occurred 
at a mean rate of 1.3 failures per hour (minimum- 0 and maximum- 12 failures per case). 
Equipment failures occurred at a rate of 0.72 failures per hour (minimum- 0, maximum- 5 
per case). Technical failures being least common occurred at a rate of 0.14 failures per 
hour (minimum- 0, maximum- 2 per case). There was a moderately strong correlation 
between number of failure events and the duration of the surgical procedure (Pearson’s 
correlation-0.612, P- 0.000). A mild to moderate correlation was also noticed between 
equipment failures and teamwork failures (Pearson’s correlation-0.347, P- 0.02) and 
equipment failures and technical failures (Pearson’s correlation-0.0.386, P- 0.00.013). 
On comparing the impact of checklist use on theatre failures, the WHO checklist 
usability scores and the quality of information transfer scores correlated well with the 
equipment failures in the operating theatres (Pearson’s correlation-0.0.554, P- 0.000). 
Lower checklist scores were associated with higher number of equipment failures. 
Therefore, it is evident that the quality of checklist use correlates with intra-operative 
failures. 
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11.4.2 Quality of checklist use correlates with theatre teams’ perceived benefits of 
WHO checklist. 
At the end of each procedure, surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists were asked if they 
found the checklist useful for that procedure. Their perceptions are summarised in table 
11.3. 
Table 11.3 Perceived benefits of the WHO checklist during a surgical procedure. 
 
From the table, it is clear that the nurses found the checklist very useful in 
understanding the equipment and patient needs and it helped them in running the 
operating theatre smoothly. The nurse found the checklist to be most beneficial in 
understanding the patients’ condition and risks, which would otherwise have not been 
discussed with the nurses. Surgeons found the checklist use most beneficial in running 
the operating theatre efficiently. Anaesthetists found the WHO checklist the least 
Question: Did you find the 
WHO surgical checklist useful 
for this case 
Cases surgeon 
found the checklist 
beneficial (n=61) 
Cases nurse found the 
checklist beneficial 
(n=61) 
Cases 
anaesthetist 
found the 
checklist 
beneficial (n=60) 
In understanding the surgical 
procedure being performed 
62.30% 81.90% 31.70% 
In understanding the 
equipment needs for the 
procedure 
52.50% 81.90% 23.30% 
In understanding the patient’s 
condition and risks 
65.60% 91.80% 45.00% 
In running the operating 
theatre efficiently 
67.20% 83.60% 48.30% 
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beneficial. To assess if the perceived benefits of the WHO checklist were associated 
with the quality of checklist I performed Pearson’s correlation test. There were moderate 
correlations between the reported benefits of the checklist and WHO checklist usability 
score (Pearson’s correlation coefficient- 0.490, P-0.000) as well as with the information 
transfer score (Pearson’s correlation coefficient- 0.517, P-0.001). Therefore, the team 
members found the checklist most beneficial when it was performed well.  
 
11.4.3 Quality of checklist use correlates with the theatre teams’ perceived level of 
teamwork. 
Surgeons, nurses, and anaesthetists rated the teamwork in operating theatres for each 
case on a scale of 1 to 5 (1- very poor teamwork, 5- excellent teamwork between the 
surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists). Overall, nurses rated teamwork highly (mean 
teamwork rating – 4.11) followed by anaesthetists (mean teamwork rating – 3.90) and 
surgeons gave the lowest rating with a mean teamwork rating of 3.85. However, good 
correlations were observed between surgeons’ and nurses’ (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient- 0.442, P- 0.000) and surgeons’ and anaesthetists’ (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient- 0.606, P- 0.000) teamwork ratings. Although no significant correlation was 
seen between the reported teamwork ratings and observed teamwork failures, there was 
a moderate correlation between teamwork ratings and Quality of information transfer 
scores (Pearson’s correlation coefficient- 0.537, P- 0.000) and also with the perceived 
benefits of the WHO checklist (Pearson’s correlation coefficient- 0.577, P- 0.000). 
Therefore, the quality of checklist correlated with the perceived teamwork in the 
operating theatres. 
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11.5 Discussion. 
11.5.1 Variability in checklist use. 
Effectiveness with which the checklist was used was found to be variable. Checks may 
often be overlooked or may be done hurriedly without a pause for input from other team 
members. It was noted that checks might not be completed in order. This was more 
common when the checklist was performed mentally without a paper checklist in hand or 
there was a lack of attention towards the checklist items due to other competing tasks 
such as, setting up the instruments or preparing the patient on the operating table. 
Although it may seem to be inconsequential but the purpose of using a checklist is to 
add redundancy to the system and reduce the reliance on memory recall. If the checks 
were not completed, the beneficial elements of the checklist are dampened and it simply 
becomes a tick box exercise. 
11.5.2 Impact of checklist use on failures in operating theatres. 
This study showed that the quality of checklist use correlates with the intra-operative 
failures such as teamwork failures and equipment failures. Time-out is a team exercise 
and it is essential that all team members should be present for it. The Time-out creates 
an opportunity for the team to exchange important information related to the surgery and 
promotes shared mental model. However, if the team members are absent during the 
Time-out, the failures in teamwork due to lack of communication and shared mental 
model could still occur. The checklist has an element of briefing where surgeons, 
nurses, and anaesthetists can exchange important information regarding the patient and 
the surgery. This study shows that there is a significant association between the quality 
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of information exchanged and equipment problems faced during the surgical procedure. 
As discussed in previous studies (Chapter 8 and 9) these equipment problems are 
closely associated with teamwork failures. It is important that the team members are 
keen to use this opportunity to exchange important information during the Time-out. If 
the information relating to equipment needs is not communicated, it may lead to 
unavailability of equipment during the procedure in turn leading to delays and even 
patient harm. I found that severe delays during the surgical procedure show a moderate 
and significant association with teamwork. It confirms the common knowledge that most 
of the procedural delays are due to poor teamwork and coordination between the team 
members. It is also evident that checklist is beneficial in not only reducing these delays 
but also preventing some last minute planning failures due to unavailability of necessary 
equipment detected during the procedure.  
11.5.3 Perceived benefits of WHO checklist. 
Table 11.2 shows the usefulness of WHO checklist as perceived by the theatre teams. It 
is evident that nurses find the checklist very useful in understanding the surgical 
procedure, its equipment requirements and efficient conduct of surgical procedures. 
They also find the information exchanged during time-out useful in understanding the 
patient risks. This is due to the fact that time- out creates a platform for communication 
between the nurses, surgeons and anaesthetists, where questions pertaining to the 
procedure can be asked and necessary information obtained. As a result, assumptions 
are reduced and there is realization of shared goals and objectives in the surgical team. 
It was also noted that anaesthetists found the checklist least beneficial in understanding 
the surgical procedure being performed and equipment needs of the procedure. This 
could be due to an underlying feeling among the anaesthetists that discussion on 
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surgical procedure being undertaken and surgical equipment needs is primarily a 
responsibility of the nurses and surgeons. Although the type of surgical procedure could 
have an impact on the type of anaesthetic administered to the patient, the anaesthetist 
may not find the information exchanged during the time-out beneficial as the patient is 
already under anaesthesia. Therefore the low response of the anaesthetist to the benefit 
of WHO checklist may improve if the time-out is conducted prior to patient being 
anaesthetized.  
11.5.4 Impact of WHO checklist on Teamwork. 
This study shows that the quality of checklist use has direct correlation to the teamwork 
within the theatre teams. A well-performed checklist improves the perception of 
teamwork among the theatre staff. From the study described in chapter 9, it has been 
established that equipment problems are associated with teamwork failures in the 
operating theatres. It this study, although, a strong correlation between quality of 
checklist and teamwork failures was not seen, there was a strong association seen 
between quality of checklist use and equipment failures.  
This study highlights that emphasis should be laid on ensuring that checklist is 
performed in a systematic manner and not just as a mandatory task. Theatre staff 
should be given dedicated training in performing the WHO checklist.  
 
11.6 Conclusion. 
A poorly performed checklist can lead to persistent teamwork failures and equipment 
problems thereby defeating the purpose of using the checklist. This is reflected in the 
perceived benefits of the checklist by the theatre teams. Team members clearly found 
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the checklist useful in understanding the procedure, equipment needs, patient concerns 
and running the theatre smoothly in cases where the checklist was performed well. They 
also rated the teamwork higher, when adequate information was exchanged during the 
Time-out. It is imperative that beyond the universal implementation of surgical checklist, 
emphasis should be laid upon how well the checklist is used by the theatre teams. This 
reflects the need for training healthcare staff in the correct use of the surgical checklist 
and increasing awareness among the healthcare staff of the importance of using the 
checklist in its true spirit. 
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Chapter 12 
Conclusion  
 
12.1 Summary of the project findings. 
This research has led to some interesting findings.  
The WHO surgical checklist was found to improve patient safety processes. It 
encourages teams to perform safety checks, which resulted in improvements in 
confirmation of patient’s identity by the theatre teams, from 9.5% to 97%. Antibiotic 
prophylaxis improved from 57% to 77%. There was also a trend towards improvement in 
the rate of surgical site infections. However, the correlation between the use of checklist 
and outcomes was not clear.  
The interview study further emphasized the need to establish a clear benefit of checklist 
use on intra-operative outcomes and theatre efficiency. There was consensus among 
the theatre staff on the role of the checklist in improving teamwork and communication 
between team members and promoting patient safety practices. However, the need for 
further modifications to the checklist was expressed in order to make it more relevant to 
the NHS and ensure a sustained uptake and compliance. Based on the interview study, 
the WHO checklist was modified for the NHS and this modified checklist was 
implemented by the NPSA across England and Wales. 
The descriptive study of failures and problem events in operating theatres (chapter 8) 
highlighted some interesting facts. Teamwork failures are common in operating theatres 
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accounting for 56% of all failure events in operating theatres. Technical failures occurred 
at a rate of one failure per case and 25% were associated with underlying teamwork 
failures. Equipment failures emerged as a major source of failures and disruptions in the 
operating theatres with strong associations to the existent level of teamwork in the 
operating theatres.  
As equipment problems emerged as an important surrogate marker of intra-operative 
teamwork and patient safety, these were further explored in a multicentre study (chapter 
9). Equipment problems are common in operating theatres occurring with at least one 
problem per case. More than half are due to unavailability of required equipment and in 
more than half of instances, the surgeon has to improvise and work around these 
problems leading to prolongation of operative period and patient harm. 40% of these 
equipment problems have underlying teamwork failures.  
I conducted an interview study to further explore the systems factors underlying 
equipment failures (chapter 10) which revealed various organisational, work related and 
team factors. Communication failures between surgeons and nurses led to unavailability 
of critical equipments. Lack of co-ordination between theatre staff and hospital 
sterilization services led to missing equipment and re-circulation of faulty equipment. 
Respondents believed that there was a need to standardise communication between 
surgeons and nurses to pass information regarding the equipment needs prior to the day 
of the surgery as well as on the day of surgery. Teamwork and communication 
enhancing interventions such as team briefings and checklists were suggested to be 
beneficial in reducing these equipment problems.  
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Having defined intra-operative teamwork failures, technical failures and equipment 
problems as surrogate markers for teamwork and patient safety in the operating 
theatres, I evaluated the benefits of the WHO checklist use in the operating theatres and 
also the variability in the use of WHO checklist (chapter 11). The theatre teams were 
found to use the checklist variably. Some teams were performing the checks better than 
the others. Checks were completed in order using a checklist in only 30% of cases and 
all relevant team members were present during the Time-out in 63% of cases. The 
information exchanged during the time-out was closely associated with the equipment 
failures in the operating theatres. Poor information exchange between nurses, surgeons, 
and anesthetists was associated with higher number of equipment failures and also 
poorer teamwork. Cases where the checklist quality of information scores were high, 
theatre team members reported a significant benefit of the checklist in understanding the 
surgical procedure and its equipment needs and also found it helpful in running the 
operating theatres smoothly. The framework of intra-operative failures (Chapter 8) 
developed in this project established a convincing correlation between the quality of 
checklist use, intra-operative failures, theatre efficiency and patient safety.  
It is now evident that few minutes spent using the WHO checklist in its true spirit, 
improves theatre teamwork and quality of information exchange and reduces equipment 
problems and associated threats to patient safety and interruptions in the flow of 
surgery. 
With the studies I designed, I was able to answer the specific research questions that I 
posed at the outset.  
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Specific Research questions Findings 
Can teamwork interventions such as checklist 
improve patient safety and clinical outcomes? 
Teamwork interventions improve 
patient safety processes in the 
operating theatres. There is a positive 
trend towards improvement in clinical 
outcomes however a very large 
sample size is required to achieve 
significant results. (Chapters 6 and 7) 
What is the impact of teamwork failures in 
operating theatres? 
Teamwork failures lead to equipment 
problems, technical problems, 
conflicts, patient harm, and theatre 
delays. (Chapters 7 and 8) 
Can teamwork failures be measured using 
observational methods? 
Yes, teamwork failures can be 
accurately measured and described 
using observational methods. (Chapter 
8) 
Can equipment problems and technical failures 
be measured using observational methods? 
Yes, these problems can be 
measured, quantified and analysed 
using observational methods. (Chapter 
8) 
Are Equipment problems secondary to poor 
communication and teamwork? 
Poor teamwork leads to equipment 
problems and equipment problems are 
a sensitive marker of teamwork 
failures in operating theatres.  
(Chapter 9 and 10) 
Do Teamwork failures lead to equipment 
failures, technical failures and compromise 
patient safety? 
Teamwork failures are strongly 
associated to equipment failures, 
technical failures and compromise 
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patient safety and lead to theatre 
delays. (Chapters 8, 9, 10) 
Can teamwork in the operating theatre be 
improved with the use of the checklist? 
Does the effectiveness with which the checklist 
is used have an impact on safety and 
teamwork in operating theatres?	  
Yes, a well-designed and implemented 
checklist improves teamwork, reduces 
equipment failures and technical 
failures during surgery, reduces risk of 
patient harm and improves theatre 
efficiency. (Chapter 11) 
 
Therefore, this research project has proven the hypotheses that: 
“Teamwork failures during surgery can lead to equipment problems, surgical delays and 
patient harm. A well-designed and implemented checklist intervention can improve 
teamwork; reduce equipment problems and patient harm during surgery.” 
 
12.2 Comments on Methodology.  
In surgery, research on teamwork has been limited and predominantly based on 
methods and techniques used in aviation. For my studies, special emphasis was put on 
designing study methods that are more relevant to surgery and highlight outcomes and 
processes that can be used to assess surgical care at ground level. I carried out an 
extensive search of the literature on psychology database (Psych info), medical data 
bases (Pubmed, Ovid, Cochrane) and aviation (Google, psych info) to gain an insight 
into the current understanding of teamwork and various measures and methods used to 
assess teamwork. Although the concepts of teamwork are universal, I realized that 
assessment of teamwork has to go beyond the basic measurement or scoring of 
communication, coordination, leadership and its various other components described in 
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chapter 4. To realize the importance of teamwork in surgery, it was essential to describe 
the impact of these components or their absence on patient safety and efficient 
provision of healthcare. 
The WHO checklist evaluation study was a pre-post study designed to assess the 
impact of a surgical checklist on patient safety processes and clinical outcomes. The 
theatre observation study was designed to gain insight into teamwork patterns and 
behaviors in operating theatres. The methods used in this study were adopted from the 
ethnographic methodology widely used in social sciences. Catchpole et al and Christian 
et al have previously used field notes to describe events and problems in operating 
theatres (Catchpole, Giddings et al. 2006; Christian, Gustafson et al. 2006). Similarly, 
Lingard et al have used field notes to observe and classify communication failures in 
operating theatres (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2006). However, my study has attempted to 
capture various problems in the operating theatres, evaluate the underlying teamwork 
failures, explore the association to technical failures and equipment failures and discuss 
the impact on patient safety and theatre efficiency, thereby assessing the entire climate 
of the operating theatre. Equipment problems emerged as a recurrent problem in 
operating theatres with strong association to teamwork failures. Therefore, it was 
imperative that I studied these problems more in-depth on a larger scale. The study on 
equipment failures described in chapter 9 is a novel study that describes these common 
teamwork related problems in detail combining self-reporting with field observations. The 
methodology was further strengthened by the use of interviews to explore the systems 
factors at play within the surgical systems. The quality of any observation or interview 
study is heavily dependent on the competence of the observers collecting the data. For 
this study, observers with a medical background who received training in theatre 
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observations, teamwork and systems factors carried out the observations and data 
collection. Additionally, psychologists and human factors experts contributed in refining 
the research methods and data analysis.  
There were some limitations to these study methods that deserve a discussion. Firstly, 
presence of an observer within the operating theatre environment may introduce certain 
barriers. Hawthorn effect (Adair 1984) can be a challenge to any observation study. 
Acknowledging this limitation, the initial two weeks of the study period were dedicated to 
acclimatizing the theatre teams to the presence of an observer in the operating theatre. 
As predicted, initially the operating theatre teams were conscious of the presence of an 
observer but within a week they got used to the observer being present in the theatres 
and performed their tasks in the usual manner. Secondly, a dilemma faced by the 
observers was the necessity to intervene if an immediate threat to patient’s safety was 
perceived. On a few occasions, I had to extend help during the surgical procedure. 
Although intervention on these occasions may have diluted the adverse effects of the 
event , such interventions were critical to patient safety and prevented adverse events. 
Moreover, these interventions helped the observers to blend into the theatre 
environment, further reducing the realization of an external observer being present. 
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12.3 Challenges. 
 
12.3.1 Recruiting participants. 
In healthcare, problems and error investigations have traditionally been a ‘who’s at fault’ 
finding exercise. Although lately, healthcare has been moving away from the name and 
blame culture. Despite recent shifts towards a systems approach to errors, the staff 
continues to feel vulnerable and threatened. This project was essentially about exploring 
systems factors in operating theatres and assessing teams. In some cases, it could 
therefore be mistaken for an assessment of individual’s performance and competence. 
Further, some surgeons, nurses and anaesthetists were averse to the idea of being 
observed. Therefore, it was very important that the purpose of the study be clarified and 
anonymity of data be assured. However, it was noticed that once the observer was 
present in the theatres with the teams for a specified trial period, they became more 
relaxed about being observed.  
 
12.3.2 Implementing a quality improvement programme 
Implementation of the surgical checklist during the study period and beyond was another 
significant challenge. In order to facilitate implementation and ensure its durability within 
the workflow of the operating theatre, the checklist has to be used effectively (Box 2). 
Three issues emerged in particular: 
 
12.3.2.1 Developing local champions 
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In a healthcare system such as the NHS where the hierarchy at consultant level is rather 
flat, it was important to recruit local champions among surgeons and anaesthetists who 
would initiate the checklist in their own clinical practice and encourage their colleagues. 
These champions were pivotal in converting the general opinion in favour of checklist 
use in operating theatres. At the beginning of the process it was important to achieve a 
critical mass of ‘positive adopters’ to drive further adoption rather than insisting that 
everyone is engaged from the outset. ‘Late adopters’ were found to drop their objections 
to the checklist in their operating theatres over time. Forcing people to use the checklist 
at an early stage would only create a critical mass of influential ‘negative adopters’, 
which may lead to the checklist, or any other quality improvement intervention, falling 
out of use across the organisation. 
 
12.3.2.2 Organisational leadership 
The NPSA has mandated the use of the checklist but its adoption and durability is 
unlikely without senior leadership and backing within each organisation (Degani and 
Wiener 1993). Since, the trust mandated the use of the checklist within St.Mary’s  
hospital, it is used in all the operating theatres for almost all surgical procedures. The 
clinical leads for various surgical departments in my trust were approached and 
engaged with in a discussion on how to best implement the checklist in their operating 
theatres. The checklists were further modified to address the specialty specific needs. 
Once the checklist became a hospital policy, the nurses were not only more regimented 
about using it but also prompted its use to the surgeons and anaesthetists more 
frequently as compared to the checklist study period.  
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12.3.2.3 Training 
One of the problems encountered in the WHO checklist study was the limited time given 
to training and embedding the checklist. Practical issues such as confusion regarding 
the person who should initiate or lead the checklist, the timing of the ‘Time-out’ - can all 
be addressed by offering appropriate training in the use of the checklist. These issues 
may seem trivial but in our experience they can be of significant importance during the 
implementation stage. They can be resolved to a certain extent by the use of training 
videos (http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/nrls/improvingpatientsafety/anaesthesia-and-
surgery/implementingthechecklist/) (NPSA 2009) and workshops led by local 
champions. However, ideally this should be supported through broader human factors 
and structured team training similar to Crew Resource Management (CRM) training in 
aviation (McCulloch, Mishra et al. 2009). Aviation has been using simulation-based team 
training to train and assess pilots and flight crews for decades.  
 
12.4 Lessons learnt   
Lessons learnt from this project are multifaceted. It is possible that the message that the 
checklist was modifiable by specialities and organisations was lost in our enthusiasm to 
drive the use of the checklist. There needs to be a stronger emphasis that the checklist 
is modifiable to align it to different organisations and specialities. This would address 
some of the scepticism associated with the checklist.  
There is a possibility that the checklist may also exacerbate tensions in the operating 
theatre (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2008). The anaesthetists were of the view that surgeons 
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should be present for the ‘Sign-In’, while surgeons would consider that impractical as 
they are often either consenting (counseling) patients between cases or writing up the 
operative notes. However, team members should realise that checklist is only a first step 
in an effort to improve communication and teamwork in operating theatres. The research 
experience suggests that with time, as communication becomes more open with the use 
of the checklist, teams are likely to realise that the checklist will be more effective when 
some of the checks are performed before the patient is anaesthetised. 
Operating theatre teams should be encouraged to measure the effect of the checklist on 
problems that they perceive within their daily work routine such as the equipment 
failures. This will facilitate increased compliance of the checklist and ensure its 
sustainability over years. 
It is clear that as the WHO checklist is more widely disseminated and implemented, 
further research will be required. The use of the checklist would benefit from further 
evaluation on a national scale. Ultimately, sound evidence on its effectiveness along 
with a change in the work culture of the operating theatre could ensure successful 
adoption of the checklist. 
 
12.5 Clinical impact. 
Findings of this project reflect the importance of teamwork in operating theatres and how 
a simple and easy to use checklist can improve patient safety in operating theatres. It is 
encouraging to note the wide acceptance of the benefits of the checklist by the 
healthcare bodies such as the royal college of surgeons, royal college of anaesthetists 
and the NPSA, which has mandated the checklist use across all England and Wales. 
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Further, the studies on teamwork failures and equipment problems in operating theatres 
have highlighted the need for improving communication in UK operating theatres and 
generated a critical mass of clinicians and nurses who realize the extent and severity of 
teamwork related problems in operating theatres. This awareness has furthered the 
cause of introducing team briefings in operating theatres.  
Measurement of teamwork has been largely an unexplored area of research in surgery. 
This thesis suggests an elaborate system of measuring teamwork in surgical teams 
across the NHS and highlight areas of improvement. Further, this thesis has identified 
surrogate markers of patient safety and efficiency in operating theatres such as 
technical errors, equipment failures and theatre delays that can be further developed 
into indicators for performance in hospital care.  
 
12.6 Policy implications 
In January 2009, NPSA announced a patient safety alert mandating the use of surgical 
checklist in England and Wales. The use of checklist has since become a hospital policy 
across the NHS. Therefore, non-adherence with the checklist may be considered a 
deviation from best practice, which may have medico-legal implications in case of future 
law suits. Similar to the use of pre-designed consent forms; surgical adherence to the 
checklist could potentially have an impact on the indemnity cover for hospitals and 
practitioners.  
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12.7 Future research 
My thesis, which describes the extensive research undertaken on teamwork in surgery, 
adds onto the growing evidence on role of teamwork in making healthcare safe. Yet, the 
understanding of teamwork in healthcare is still in its early stages and there is further 
need to assess the impact of checklists and other teamwork interventions on systems 
factors on a national and global platform. Acknowledging this gap in the evidence, 
recently a national surgical checklist implementation project has been launched in UK 
using the measurement tools developed in this PhD research. Equipment failures 
emerged as a frequent and serious problem in operating theatres.  
 
12.8 Conclusion. 
This research shows that teamwork is crucial to working effectively in operating theatres. 
Simple interventions such as briefings and checklists improve patient safety processes, 
promote a culture supportive of good teamwork and make theatres safer for the patients. 
It questions some traditional cultural practices in healthcare and promotes an 
environment where patient safety is central to team functioning, blurring the boundaries 
and hierarchies between the healthcare professionals to promote cohesiveness and 
team spirit in working towards a safer surgical care provision. The interventions and 
measurement tools used in this project should initiate discussion and further research 
into the largely unexplored field of teamwork in healthcare.  
The WHO surgical safety checklist is the first “team checklist” in surgery that has been 
developed, tested and implemented on a global scale. It could bring a change in the 
work culture in the operating theatre to one, which is more transparent, receptive to 
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quality improvement and driven by effective teamwork.  The WHO checklist is not a final 
product but an intelligent tool that will adapt with time. Building on this project, further 
research, both national and international, is essential to ensure its transference to a 
wider clinical setting, establish its durability over time, and standardise teamwork 
measurement and training in surgery.  
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Appendices 	  
Appendix 1: WHO surgical checklist data form 
Patient	  Name	   ________________	   Medical	  Record	  #______________	   	   Study	  ID	  #	  ____________________	  
-­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  	  
Pre-­Operative	  Data	  	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   Study	  ID	  #	  ____________________	  Date	  of	  Surgery	  	  ___/___/_____	  
Was the checklist used for this case?   Yes / No 
Who led performance of the checklist? 
Nurse 
Surgeon 
Anesthesia Provider 
Other:______________________ 
Was this an urgent case (e.g. needed to be performed today or sooner)? Yes / No 
Was the wound dirty or infected? Yes / No 
Was there an open wound preoperatively? Yes / No 
Was there gross contamination of the wound (e.g. pus or stool)? 
Yes / No 
 
Were non-sterile instruments used or was there a major break in sterile 
technique? 
Yes / No 
Did patient have either two peripheral IV’s or a central venous catheter with 
at least two ports prior to incision? 
Yes / No 
Was a pulse oximeter on the patient and functioning at the time of 
induction? 
Yes / No 
Was an antibiotic given? Yes / No 
If so, when? (circle one) 
>60 minutes before incision 
0-60 minutes before incision 
At or after incision 
How was the patient’s identity, procedure, and operative site confirmed 
prior to incision? (circle all that apply) 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed in writing 
Confirmed verbally by the nurse 
Confirmed verbally by nursing, 
surgeon, and anesthesia  	  
	  
	  
Post-­Operative	  Data	  
 229	  
	  
Final counts performed (circle all that apply) 
None 
Sponge 
Instrument 
Needle 
Estimated blood loss (mL) ________________                   
mL 
Lowest blood pressure after incision (mmHg) ________________             
mmHg 
Lowest heart rate after incision(beats/min)† ________________   
Beats/minute 
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†If	  asystole	  or	  complete	  heart	  block	  occurred	  during	  the	  operation	  then	  mark	  “X”	  for	  heart	  rate	   	  	  Did	  any	  of	  the	  following	  adverse	  events	  occur	  in	  the	  operating	  room?	  	   Cardiac	  arrest	  requiring	  chest	  compressions	  or	  electrical	  shock	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  	   Unplanned	  intubation	   or	  reintubation	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  	   Urgent	  tracheostomy/cricothyroidotomy	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  	   Placement	  of	  new	  central	  venous	  or	  arterial	  line	  after	  incision	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  	   Anaphylactic	  reaction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  	   Malignant	  hyperthermia	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  Other	  event	  requiring	  a	  halt	  in	  the	  operation	  (explain):	  ________________________________________	  	  	  Patient	  Name	   ________________	   Medical	  Record	  #______________	   	   Study	  ID	  #	  ____________________	  
-­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  	  
Additional	  Data	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   Study	  ID	  #	  ____________________	  
	  Patient	  Age	   	   ____________	  	   	   	   Gender:	  	   	  Male	  /	  Female	  (circle	  one)	   	  
Surgeon	  ______________	  
Procedure	   ____________________________________________________________________________	  
Mode	  of	  Anesthesia	  (circle	  one)	   General	  anesthesia	  with	  ventilatory	  support	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   General	  anesthesia	  without	  ventilatory	  support	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Conscious	  sedation	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Spinal,	  epidural,	  or	  regional	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Local	  with	  sedation	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   Local	  without	  sedation	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Other	  (please	  explain):	  _________________________________________	   	  	  Preoperative	  Diagnosis	  ____________________________________________________________________	  
Objective	  Airway	  Score	   ______________________	  	   	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   Unknown	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  Used	  
	  
Which	  parts	  of	  the	  checklist	  were	  fully	  completed?	  (circle	  all	  that	  apply)	  
Sign	  In	  
Time	  Out	  
Sign	  Out	  
	  
Length	  of	  Hospital	  Stay	   __________	  days	  
	  Surgical	  site	  infection	  (circle	  one)	  	   None	  /	  Superficial	  Incisional	  /	  Deep	  Incisional	  /	  Organ	  Space	  	  Major	  complications	  (circle	  all	  that	  occur)	  	  
Wound Disruption CVA/Stroke Graft/Prosthesis/Flap Failure 
Pneumonia Coma > 24 Hours Deep Vein Thrombosis 
Unplanned Intubation Cardiac Arrest Requiring CPR Sepsis 
Pulmonary Embolism Myocardial Infarction Septic Shock 
On Ventilator >48 Hours Major Peripheral or Cranial Nerve Injury Return to Operating Room 
Acute Renal Failure Bleeding > 4 Units 
Other 
Explain: 
________________________ 	  	   	  Death	  on	  day	  of	  operation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  
In-­‐hospital	  mortality	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   Yes	  /	  No	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Appendix 2: WHO surgical checklist interview topic guide 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Improving teamwork in surgery 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This project focuses on teamwork in the operating theatre to identify the areas for 
improvement in teamwork within the operation theatre. We aim to develop a briefing and 
checklist based intervention to enhance the team performance in the OT thereby avoiding 
error and improving patient safety. 
As you know that St. Mary’s Hospital is a pilot site to trial World Health Organisation’s 
surgical checklist. With this interview we want to assess what are the expert users’ opinion 
regarding WHO checklist as a patient safety improvement tool.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We hope to recruit a total of 15 members of theatre team. Surgeons, anaesthetists and 
nursing staff will be equally represented in our sample. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part, 
you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be interviewed for approximately 30-45 mins on your experiences in the 
operation theatre. and your ideas for further improvement in patient safety. 
 
What is the interview aiming to do? 
This will provide information about the interventions that need to be developed to 
enhance teamwork in the OT. 
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What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
We do not foresee any disadvantages of taking part in the study, other than the time required 
for the interview. 
 
What are the possible benefits to taking part? 
The aim of the project is to provide an efficient environment in the OT where the team 
members can work in cohesion. In this way, performance will be enhanced thereby improving 
clinical safety. On an individual level, engaging in this discussion may help you think more 
about your personal responses to teamwork thereby increasing your own awareness. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
We do not foresee anything going wrong. However if there are any problems, you are free to 
terminate your participation at any time 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All the data we collect from you will be anonymised by allocating you a code. Any paperwork 
containing your identity (consent form and registration form) will be kept separate to 
anonymised data collected during the study. If there are any audio or video recordings, they 
will only be used by the project team to supplement the study data collection and will be 
stored in a secure manner. 
  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be presented in departmental meetings, international conferences and peer 
reviewed journals. All data presented will be anonymous. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
This research is funded by NIHR 
 
 
Contact for further information 
For more information, please contact; 
 
Amit Vats   
email: amit.vats@imperial.ac.uk 
Krishna Moorthy: 
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Email: k.moorthy@imperial.ac.uk 
 
DRAFT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF  EQUIPMENT/ TECHNOLOGY FAILURES IN THE 
OPERATING THEATRE 
 
DATE_________________        INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER___________ 
INTERVIEWER_________         CONSENT FORM SIGNED __________________ 
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Themes 
 
1. Identify key patient safety issues 
 
a) What are your concerns regarding the safety of the patients in the operating 
theatre? 
b) Have you faced any situations where your patient’s safety was compromised 
due to lack of teamwork and communication in the OT? Can you give me a 
specific example and talk me through it. 
 
2. Identify strategies to counter the issues 
 
a) Do you take any measures to ensure that you do not face similar situations 
again? 
b) What is the scope for improving teamwork and communication and thereby, 
patient safety in the theatre and how? 
 
3. Relevance of Checklist 
 
 
a) What are the benefits of the WHO checklist in your experience? 
b) What are the shortcomings of the WHO checklist in your experience? 
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c) How do you think that checklist will improve teamwork, communication and 
patient safety in the theatre? 
d) What are the barriers to implementation and long-term sustenance of checklist 
in the theatres? 
e) What items would the checklist contain if you were to design it? 
f) What stage of the checklist should these items be in? 
g) Would you support a checklist that addresses the issues you are concerned 
about? 
h) Who should conduct the checklist and when during the operation should it be 
used? 
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Appendix 3: NPSA adaptation of WHO checklist for England and Wales 
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Appendix 4: Equipment problem self report form 
Equipment Problem Type of equipment 
problem (please circle) 
How was the 
problem dealt with 
(please circle) 
Did the problem impact on 
flow of surgery (please 
circle) 
Did the problem 
threaten patient 
safety (please circle) 
 1. Not available. 
2. Faulty. 
3. Wrong use of 
equipment. 
4. Lack of 
knowledge on 
how to use  
1. Equipment 
added 
2. Equipment 
replaced/ 
fixed. 
3. Work around 
the problem. 
1. No impact. 
2. Minor (less than 5 min) 
3. Moderate (between 
5min and 30 min). 
4. Severe (more than 30 
min). 
5. Surgery cancelled. 
1. No threat. 
2. Minor threat. 
3. Moderate threat. 
4. Adverse event. 
5. Severe adverse 
event. 
Reason for problem: 
 
 	  
Equipment Problem Type of equipment 
problem (please circle) 
How was the 
problem dealt with 
(please circle) 
Did the problem impact on 
flow of surgery (please 
circle) 
Did the problem 
threaten patient 
safety (please circle) 
 1. Not available. 
2. Faulty. 
3. Wrong use of 
equipment. 
4. Lack of 
knowledge on 
how to use  
1. Equipment 
added 
2. Equipment 
replaced/ 
fixed. 
3. Work around 
the problem. 
1. No impact. 
2. Minor (less than 5 min) 
3. Moderate (between 5 
min and 30 min). 
4. Severe impact (more 
than 30 min). 
5. Surgery cancelled. 
1. No threat. 
2. Minor threat. 
3. Moderate threat. 
4. Adverse event. 
5. Severe adverse 
event. 
Reason for problem: 
 
 
Equipment Problem Type of equipment 
problem (please circle) 
How was the 
problem dealt with 
(please circle) 
Did the problem impact on 
flow of surgery (please 
circle) 
Did the problem 
threaten patient 
safety (please circle) 
 1. Not available. 
2. Faulty. 
3. Wrong use of 
equipment. 
4. Lack of 
knowledge on 
how to use  
1. Equipment 
added 
2. Equipment 
replaced/ 
fixed. 
3. Work around 
the problem. 
1. No impact. 
2. Minor (less than 5 min) 
3. Moderate (between 
5min and 30 min). 
4. Severe (more than 30 
min). 
5. Surgery cancelled. 
1. No threat. 
2. Minor threat. 
3. Moderate threat. 
4. Adverse event. 
5. Severe adverse 
event. 
Reason for problem: 
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Appendix 5: Equipment problems- interview topic guide 	  
DRAFT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF  EQUIPMENT/ TECHNOLOGY FAILURES IN THE 
OPERATING THEATRE 
 
DATE_________________        INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER___________ 
INTERVIEWER_________         CONSENT FORM SIGNED __________________ 
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As you know, we are studying the nature, frequency and causes of surgical 
equipment/ technology failures in theatre during surgical interventions. This is part of 
our study into the reliability of healthcare systems.  The overall aim of the study is to 
identify the systems factors involved so that these equipment failures can be 
avoided. We are studying this in three different hospitals and interviewing a sample 
of staff in each of these hospitals. I would therefore like to ask you a series of 
questions about the factors due to which you feel equipment and technology failures 
occur in theatre. The interview should take around 20 minutes.   
As the participant information leaflet explains, your participation is entirely voluntary 
and you are free to withdraw.  If you do not wish to answer any particular question, 
then please just say so.  There are no right or wrong answers and I am interested in 
your own personal point of view.  The identities of all participants will remain strictly 
confidential and it will not be possible to identify individual members of staff, clinical 
teams or hospitals from the final results.   
Would you mind if I taped our conversation so that I do not have to write everything 
down?   
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
QUESTIONS  
Opening questions for non-medical staff  
Can you tell me about your job in this department? 
When did you start working for this department? 
Opening questions for surgeons 
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How long have you been a surgeon here?  
 
When did you start working in this specialty? 
 
How often do you think surgeons have problems with surgical equipment 
during a surgical intervention (e.g. missing or broken equipment)? 
 
[This question will allow us to explore the baseline point of view of the 
participant regarding the reliability of the system] 
 
Could you give us an example of an incident during a surgical procedure that 
you have been aware of or witnessed whereby surgical equipment was 
missing or broken? 
 
Why do you think this occurred? 
 
Where do you think the system is going wrong in this specific example? 
 
Is there any specific equipment or any specific specialty where this issue is 
particularly common? 
 
At what stage along the process of ordering to delivery of an equipment  to 
theatre you think there may be a problem? (e.g. TSSU, ordering, booking, 
storage, loan equipment etc.)   
 
Why do you think this process is unreliable – where are things going wrong in 
the system? 
 
What needs to be done to put it right? 
 
Could you suggest any solutions?  
 
Do you think there may be processes or systems missing or need improving? 
(e.g. reporting of missing or broken surgical instruments, better surgical 
instrument tracking during sterilisation, ordering of loan equipment by locum 
doctors etc.)  
 
Why do you think this process frequently fails – where are things going wrong 
in the system? 
   
What needs to be done to put it right? 
 
Could you suggest any solutions?  
 
These are some examples of surgical equipment/ technology failures we have 
found. 
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Why do you think these types of error occur? 
  
Are there procedures to follow in order to book, order and check surgical 
equipment? 
How useful are these? 
Are they always followed [if ‘no’ then explore why] 
 
Are there communication problems between departments that contribute to 
surgical equipment/ technology failures? [explore where and why] 
 
Are there environmental issues – such as not enough equipment storage 
space within the theatre premises? 
 
How reliant on staffing levels are the processes to order, check and maintain 
surgical equipment? 
 How do you think these problems can be reduced or prevented? 
 
 
ENDING 
 
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me.  Your 
comments have been very helpful and will be used together with those of the 
other participants to gain an understanding of surgical equipment failures and 
why they occur.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 241	  
	  
Appendix 6: WHO checklist usability data form 	  
1. Checklist used   Yes/ No 
2. Time out Yes/ No 
a. Timing Before prepping/ draping the patient 
Before skin incision 
After skin incision 
b. All items completed using checklist Yes/ No 
c. Items checked 1) Patient ID 
2) Procedure and site marked 
3) Anticipated difficulties 
4) Expected blood loss 
5) Blood crossmatch/group and save needed or 
available 
6) Special equipment/investigations required 
7) Patient-specific concerns 
8) Equipment required for procedure available 
9) Antibiotic prophylaxis  
10)  Pressure point(s) check 
11)  DVT prophylaxis 
12)  Intra-operative warming 
13)  Essential/relevant imaging   displayed 
d. All items completed in order Yes/ No 
e.  Time taken to complete Time out  
f. Who led the Time out (Circle) Nurse 
Anaesthetist 
Anaesthesia trainee 
Surgeon 
Surgical assistant 
ODP 
Other 
g. Members present for Time out (Circle) Nurse 
Circulating Nurse 
Anaesthetist 
Anaesthesia trainee 
Surgeon 
Surgical assistant 
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ODP 
Radiologist (expected?) 
h. Did all team members pause to do Time out Yes/ No 
i.  Team introduction 1. Not completed 
2. Completed with team resistance or ridicule  
3. Completed but not all team members 
introduced  
4. Completed appropriately  
j. Surgical information 1. Resistance from team members to exchange 
information 
2. Team members distracted by tasks at hand 
3. Minimal exchange of information 
4. Relevant information exchanged 
5. Good information exchange and encouraging 
other team members 
 
k. Anaesthetic information 1. Resistance from team members to exchange 
information 
2. Team members distracted by tasks at hand 
3. Minimal exchange of information 
4. Relevant information exchanged 
5. Good information exchange and encouraging 
other team members 
 
l. Nursing information 1. Resistance from team members to exchange 
information 
2. Team members distracted by tasks at hand 
3. Minimal exchange of information 
4. Relevant information exchanged 
5. Good information exchange and encouraging 
other team members 
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Appendix 7: Checklist usability self report form 
 
NURSE TO COMPLETE  
Did any team member suffer an injury?                                                                            Yes 
/ No 
 
Complete patient notes available before the procedure?                                                Yes 
/ No 
  
Signed consent form available prior to surgery?                                                               
  Yes / No 
 
Any investigation/imaging unavailable?                                                                              
  Yes / No 
 
Did you find the WHO surgical checklist useful for this case: 
 
a) In understanding the surgical procedure being performed   Yes / No 
b) In understanding the equipment needs for the procedure    Yes / No  
c) In understanding the patient’s condition and risks    Yes / No 
d) In running the operating theatre efficiently     Yes / No 
 
For this case, on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is poor information sharing and 5 is relevant or 
good information sharing), how would you rank? 
 
The information exchanged by the surgeon during the time 
out  
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
  
The information exchanged by the Anaesthetist during the 1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
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time out 
  
The information exchanged by the Nurse during the time 
out 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
 
 
 
SURGEON TO COMPLETE 
 
Name of Procedure performed 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Any team member missing when required?      Yes / No
  
                                                      
Did you need to revise any critical surgical steps?  
(E.g.: redoing anastamosis/ retying slipped knots and sutures)                                                             
 Yes / No 
 
Please 
mention___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
Any iatrogenic injuries during the surgery?                                                                                           
 Yes / No 
 
Please 
mention___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
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More than expected blood loss?       Yes / No 
 
Was it a difficult surgery?        Yes / No 
 
Did the surgery take longer than expected time to perform?    Yes / No 
 
What was the reason for the difficulty or increased duration of the procedure? 
 
a) Patient anatomy 
b) Equipment problems 
c) Poor scrub nurse assistance 
d) Poor surgical assistance 
e) Any other ( Please explain briefly) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Did you find the WHO surgical checklist useful for this case: 
 
a) In understanding the surgical procedure being performed  Yes / No 
b) In understanding the equipment needs for the procedure   Yes / No  
c) In understanding the patient’s condition and risks    Yes / No 
d) In running the operating theatre efficiently     Yes / No 
 
For this case, on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is poor information sharing and 5 is relevant or 
good information sharing), how would you rank 
 
The information exchanged by the surgeon during the time 
out  
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
  
The information exchanged by the Anaesthetist during the 1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
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time out 
  
The information exchanged by the Nurse during the time 
out 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
 
 
ANAESTHETIST TO COMPLETE 
 
Section 1 
Patient’s ASA grade                                                        1                         2                          3                        
4 
 
Did the patient have an unplanned hypotension or tachycardia during the procedure which was 
difficult to control ?                                                                                                                                           
 Yes / No 
 
Unplanned intubation/ airway problems during the surgery?                                                      
 Yes / No 
 
Unplanned I/V access required during the surgery?                                                                           
 Yes / No 
 
Did the patient have hypothermia during the procedure? Yes / No 
 
Any other anaesthetic problems/ complications in this case?     Yes 
/ No  
 
If yes to any questions please explain briefly 
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_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ 
 
Did you find the WHO surgical checklist useful for this case: 
 
a) In understanding the surgical procedure being performed  Yes / No 
b) In understanding the equipment needs for the procedure   Yes / No  
c) In understanding the patient’s condition and risks    Yes / No 
d) In running the operating theatre efficiently     Yes / No 
 
For this case, on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is poor information sharing and 5 is relevant or 
good information sharing), how would you rank 
The information exchanged by the surgeon during the time 
out  
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
  
The information exchanged by the Anaesthetist during the 
time out 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
  
The information exchanged by the Nurse during the time 
out 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
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Appendix 8: Snapshots of theatre observation spreadsheets (Chapter 8) 
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Appendix 9: Snapshot of equipment problem analysis spreadsheet (Chapter 9) 
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Appendix 10: List of research subject related publications/ submitted 
manuscripts 
Vats A , Deelchand V , Nagpal K , Burnett S , Franklin BD, Vincent CA, Moorthy K. 
Equipment related problems in UK operating theatres - A multicentre study. 
Revision and submission to BJS. 
 
Vats A, Nagpal K, Albayati M A, Sevdalis N, Darzi A, Vincent CA, Bicknell CD, 
Moorthy K. An observational study of teamwork failures in operating theatres. 
Previously submitted to Annals of surgery.  
 
Vats A, Vincent C, Nagpal K, Davies R, Darzi A, Moorthy K. Practical challenges of 
introducing WHO surgical checklist: UK pilot experience, British Medical Journal, Jan 
2010 
 
Vats A, Nagpal K, Moorthy K. Surgery - a risky business. Journal of Perioperative 
Practitioners 2009. 
 
Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al. A surgical safety checklist to reduce 
morbidity and mortality in a global population. New England Journal of Medicine 
2009. 
 
Nagpal K, Vats A, Lamb B, Ashrafian H, Sevdalis N, Vincent C, Moorthy K. 
Information transfer and communication in surgery: a systematic review. Ann Surg. 
2010. 
 
Morbi AH, Hamady MS, Riga CV, Kashef E, Pearch BJ, Vincent C, Moorthy K, Vats 
A, Cheshire NJ, Bicknell CD. Reducing error and improving efficiency during vascular 
interventional radiology: implementation of a preprocedural team rehearsal. 
Radiology. 2012. 
 
Nagpal K, Arora S, Vats A, Wong HW, Sevdalis N, Vincent C, Moorthy K.Failures in 
communication and information transfer across the surgical care pathway: interview 
study.BMJ Qual Saf. 2012. 
 
Nagpal K, Abboudi M, Fischler L, Schmidt T, Vats A, Manchanda C, Sevdalis N, 
Scheidegger D, Vincent C, Moorthy K. Evaluation of postoperative handover using a 
tool to assess information transfer and teamwork. Ann Surg. 2011. 
 
Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al Group.Changes in safety attitude and 
relationship to decreased postoperative morbidity and mortality following 
implementation of a checklist-based surgical safety intervention. BMJ Qual Saf. 
2011. 
 
Nagpal K, Vats A, Vincent C, Moorthy K. A systems approach to errors. Surgery 
2009. 
 
Nagpal K, vats A, Ahmed K et al. A Systematic, Quantitative Assessment Of Risks 
Associated With Poor Communication In Surgical Care. Archives of Surgery 2010. 
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Nagpal K, Vats A, An Evaluation of Information Transfer Through the Continuum of 
Surgical Care: A Feasibility Study. Annals of Surgery 2010. 
 
Nagpal K, Arora S, Vats A et al.Failures in communication and information transfer 
across the entire surgical care pathway: a systematic qualitative study. Annals of 
Surgery 2010. 
 
Appendix 11: List of relevant subject related international presentations 
Teamwork errors in surgery lead to technical errors disruption of surgery and patient 
harm. Vats A, Bicknell C, Blanco GA, Nagpal K, Moorthy K. ASGBI 2010, Liverpool 
 
Evaluation of the WHO checklist on patient safety in surgery-pilot study. Vats A, 
Nagpal K, Davies R, Vincent C, Darzi A, Moorthy K. ASGBI 2009, Glasgow 
 
Evaluation of the drivers and barriers to successful implementation of the WHO 
surgical checklist. Vats A, Nagpal K, Ahmed K, Benn J, Davies R, Darzi A, Vincent C, 
Moorthy K. International Forum, 2009, ICC, Berlin 
 
Effect of WHO surgical checklist on teamwork and operating theatre efficiency. Vats 
A, Nagpal K, Sevdalis N, Vincent C, Moorthy K. International Forum, 2009, ICC, 
Berlin 
 
Does teamwork improve with WHO surgical checklist. Vats A, Nagpal K, Sevdalis N, 
Vincent C, Moorthy K.SARS 2009, Bristol 
 
Interactive gaming based E-learning curriculum- A novel technique to improve patient 
safety awareness in medical schools. Vats A, Sacks M, Nagpal K, Moorthy K. 
International forum on Quality and Safety in healthcare 2010, Nice, France 
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